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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation undertakes a philosophical analysis of “natural capital” and argues that 
this concept has prompted economists to view Nature in a radically novel manner. 
Formerly, economists referred to Nature and natural products as a collection of inert 
materials to be drawn upon in isolation and then rearranged by human agents to 
produce commodities. More recently, nature is depicted as a collection of active, 
modifiable, and economically valuable processes, often construed as ecosystems that 
produce marketable goods and services gratis. Nature is depicted as consisting of 
various unproduced mechanisms or “natural machines” that are first discovered and 
then channeled so as to serve human ends. In short, nature as an ideal is a kind of 
garden that is characterized by natural objects purposefully arranged by intentional 
human agents. 
This dissertation first lays out working definitions of the key terms, such as 
capital and Nature, and then traces the historical roots of natural capital in the writings 
of eminent classical political economists, such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and 
Karl Marx. I then examine the question of substitutes for “critical natural capital”, and 
argue that the preservation paradox is warranted: no one can restore or preserve a part 
of Nature without turning it into an artifact. Following the recent work of Debra Satz 
and Michael Sandel, I finish my dissertation by situating the question of natural capital 
in the broader context of whether some goods should not be for sale, particularly those I 
define as Basic Ecological Goods. 
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PREFACE 
 
This dissertation is the original, unpublished, independent work by the author C. Tyler 
DesRoches. A modified version of Chapter Four was submitted for publication as 
“Economics and Basic Ecological Goods.” Some parts of this dissertation are published 
as “On Aristotle’s Natural Limit” in History of Political Economy (DesRoches 2014). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The World as a Garden 
An Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adam Smith was no stranger to the spontaneous productions of the Earth. In the 
Wealth of Nations he explicitly recognizes nature as a genuine producer, one that has a 
special role to play in agricultural production where he claims that “nature labours along 
with man” ([1776] 1976, 363). Smith also recognized that nature is capable of producing 
certain goods that are never augmented by human industry. In Book I, Chapter 11 (Of 
the Rent of Land), Smith observes that: 
 
Kelp is a species of sea-weed, which, when burnt, yields an alkaline salt, 
useful for making glass, soap, and for several other purposes. It grows in 
several parts of Great Britain, particularly in Scotland, upon such rocks 
only as lie within the high water mark, which are twice every day covered 
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with the sea, and of which the produce, therefore, was never augmented by 
human industry ([1776] 1976, 161).1 
 
Smith was not alone in recognizing such “natural productions”. His immediate 
predecessor, François Quesnay, the progenitor of Physiocracy in France, held that 
nature was the only bona fide producer. For Quesnay and the Physiocrats who wrote 
during the late eighteenth century, wealth was generated by agricultural production 
alone, a process whereby human labour merely served as the mid-wife to economic 
production. Unassisted human labour was deemed barren since it could merely modify 
or transmute the objects produced by nature.  
In his authoritative Principles of Political Economy, John Stuart Mill ([1848] 
2006) also explicitly acknowledges nature as a producer, though he also recognized its 
limitations as such. Towards the beginning of this work, Mill cites a variety of nature’s 
products generated by natural causes, including the bees that produce honey and some 
caves that could be used by people for shelter: 
 
It is to be remarked, that some objects exist or grow up spontaneously, of a 
kind suited to the supply of human wants. There are caves and hollow 
trees capable of affording shelter; fruit, roots, wild honey, and other 
natural products, on which human life can be supported; but even here a 
considerable quantity of labour is generally required, not for the purpose 
of creating, but of finding and appropriating them. In all but these few and 
                                                          
1 Even in this instance, however, it is to be remarked that the kelp is burnt by human agents to yield 
alkaline salt. 
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(except in the very commencement of human society) unimportant cases, 
the objects supplied by nature are only instrumental to human wants 
([1848] 2006, 25). 
 
While Mill was familiar with the existence of such original or natural objects, however, 
he affirmed that they were, on the whole, scant and relatively unimportant to economic 
science. Nature’s productions almost always require a significant amount of human 
labour to not only locate, but to prepare and process for human consumption. 
Classical political economists and their immediate predecessors recognized 
nature’s productions, particularly their use value, but they generally viewed such 
productions as capricious and manifestly deficient for human purposes. Nature’s 
unassisted productions were certainly not produced for human beings and, therefore, it 
is unsurprising that they almost always fell short of the standards set by humanity’s 
predilections. Most of the goods and services that were bought and sold in the 
marketplace bore the stamp of human labour, either directly or indirectly through 
manufactured machines. Thus, it is for good reason that, when it came to economic 
production, economic theorists almost always focused on the goods and services directly 
produced by human agency in combination with other factors of production, such as 
land and capital. Given the spontaneity of nature’s productions, along with the 
underlying supposition that such productions could always be improved by labour, it is 
unsurprising that this category of production was eventually expelled from economic 
discourse altogether.  
In her book The Natural Origins of Economics, Margaret Schabas (2005, 5) 
argues that, by the mid-nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill’s political economy 
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rendered explicit the role of human agency as the framework for economic analysis. 
Before Mill, economic theorists regarded their target phenomena as part of the same 
natural world that was to be studied by natural philosophers (see Davis 1989 as well). 
However, as the marginal revolution took hold during the 1870s, this viewpoint among 
economic theorists began to wane. Thus, it comes as little surprise to hear the 
prominent capital theorist Luigi L. Pasinetti open his Lectures on the Theory of 
Production by stating, “one of the most outstanding characteristics of human societies 
is, without doubt, that they produce the goods and services which they need” (1977, 1; 
emphasis added). This univocal emphasis on human agency as the chief source of goods 
and services to be consumed by human agents is not Pasinetti’s own quirky view, but is 
one that, by and large, was shared among economists throughout the twentieth century.  
During this period, the majority of production functions and economic growth 
models, first popularized by Robert Solow (1956), posited two and only two factors of 
production: capital and labour.2 This convention was to be enshrined in the Cobb-
Douglas production function where the familiar formula Y = KαLβ represents total 
aggregate production (Y) that depends on capital (K) and labour (L) (and α + β = 1). As 
for the status of “Land”, a mainstay of classical political economy, this factor of 
production was dropped from such formulations under the implicit assumption that 
capital could always serve as a substitute for land. As the environmental economists 
Klaus Hubacek and Richard van der Bergh observe, “by the second half of the 20th 
Century land or more generally environmental resources, completely disappeared from 
the production function and the shift from land to other natural inputs to capital and 
                                                          
2 My claim is not that no economist has ever cited land as a factor of production in a mathematical 
production function. 
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labour alone” (2006, 15). Similarly, the economists William D. Nordhaus and James 
Tobin explain that:  
 
The prevailing standard model of growth assumes that there are no limits 
on the feasibility of expanding the supplies of non-human agents of 
production. It is basically a two-factor model in which production depends 
only on labor and reproducible capital. Land and resources, the third 
member of the classical triad, have generally been dropped … the tacit 
justification has been that reproducible capital is a near perfect substitute 
for land and other exhaustive resources (1972, 14).  
 
Since capital is universally viewed as a factor of production that we humans produce, 
one that invariably depends on the ex-ante savings decisions of economic agents, such 
formulations portray the production of all economically valuable goods and services as 
emerging from human agency alone.3 Even when the aggregate variable of “resources” 
was ultimately introduced to such formulations after the oil shock of 1973, when 
economists were genuinely concerned with the question of sustained economic 
production in the face of a declining stock of fixed resources, this variable was largely 
taken to represent a conglomerate of inert materials that were capable of producing only 
when conjoined with the other two factors of production, capital and labour (see, for 
example, Dasgupta and Heal 1979; Solow 1974). Recounting how economists generally 
treat nature and resources, Dasgupta states that “we economists see nature, when we 
                                                          
3 While it is true that the increase in capital is motivated by ex-ante savings decisions, it is the ex-post 
realization – the interaction with other factors of production – that determines whether capital is actually 
accumulated over time. 
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see it at all, as a backdrop from which resources and services can be drawn in isolation” 
(2009, 2). Under this view, Nature is depicted as a repository of sorts, one that is 
generally taken to be located in a realm beyond human agency, where there exists a 
collection of items that, to be rendered useful, are transformed to serve human ends. 
This image, by and large, portrays Nature as merely furnishing the materials that are to 
be subsequently used as inputs in human-directed, technological forms of economic 
production. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will refer to this view as the 
Warehouse Image of Nature. 
A main claim of this dissertation is that the relatively new concept of “natural 
capital” subverts this orthodoxy. No longer is Nature regarded as a collection of inert 
materials to be improved by human labor and manufactured capital, or one that is 
subject to human-centered technological production processes alone; rather, nature is, 
to an increasing extent, taken to be a blind or mindless producer of economically 
valuable goods and services. Instances of natural capital, often construed as ecosystems, 
a concept that is borrowed from the science of ecology, are claimed to be capable of 
independently producing a wide variety of goods and services. The environmental 
economists Edward B. Barbier and Geoffrey Heal state, 
 
A new paradigm is emerging in environmental economics. It views the 
natural environment as a form of capital asset, natural capital … Natural 
capital consists not only of specific natural resources, from energy and 
minerals to fish and trees, but also interacting ecosystems. Ecosystems 
comprise the abiotic (nonliving) environment and the biotic (living 
groupings of plant and animals species called communities. As with all 
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forms of capital, when these two components of ecosystems interact, they 
provide a flow of services. Examples of such ecosystem services include the 
water supply and its regulation, climate maintenance, nutrient cycling, and 
enhancing biological productivity (2006, 1). 
 
This relatively new view of nature is captured by the concept of natural capital, 
which denotes, among other things, a rich variety of active, modifiable, and 
economically valuable production processes and structures that are afforded to human 
agents by nature, gratis.4 Under this view, the whole world does not merely consist of a 
pile of inert materials waiting to be rearranged or modified by human agents as it did 
under the Warehouse Image, but includes a diversity of unproduced “natural 
mechanisms” or “natural machines” that are generally found and then subjugated to 
serve human ends (Daly and Costanza 1992). While it remains true that the ecosystems 
denoted by the concept of natural capital can be modified and improved to better serve 
humanity’s predilections, as will be argued in Chapter Five, these ecosystems cannot be 
described as producing for any particular purpose independent of those attributed to 
them by intentional human agents. Under this view, which I will term the Garden 
Image of Nature, the ideal state of affairs is to have every last ecosystem producing 
goods and services for human agents. This image foresees the whole Earth as a kind of 
garden, one that consists of natural objects purposefully arranged and modified by 
intentional human agents to serve their own objectives. In short, the world as a garden 
enmeshes productive processes found in nature by adapting them to human wants and 
                                                          
4 Chapter Three will explain why this is a relatively new view of nature and not merely “Physiocracy 
restored”. 
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needs. Figure 1 outlines some of the main differences between the Warehouse Image of 
Nature and the Garden Image of Nature, many of which will be drawn upon and 
detailed throughout the remainder of this dissertation. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Warehouse Image and Garden Image of Nature 
 
Recognizing that nature is “productive” in this sense has significant consequences 
for economic science, not least because it implies that non-human agency is a proximate 
cause of economic phenomena. Another noteworthy consequence of the Garden Image 
is that nature qua collection of economically valuable natural machines is to be treated 
like all other forms of capital: to be managed efficiently. Thus, the Garden Image not 
only involves treating parts of nature in ways that they were not treated before – in this 
case, as capital assets – but it also involves an extension of the human economic realm 
to a whole range of phenomena that were not so explicitly recognized by economists 
operating under the Warehouse Image of Nature. 
WAREHOUSE Image of Nature GARDEN Image of Nature 
Emphasis on humans as the exploiters of 
natural resources. 
Emphasis on humans as managers or stewards 
of “natural assets". 
Pristine wilderness exists on Earth in the 
sense that there is “Nature” beyond the 
realm of human agency. 
No pristine wilderness left on Earth in the 
sense that there is “nature” beyond the realm 
of human agency. 
Emphasis on passive or inert materials.   Emphasis on active materials 
(ecosystems/biodiversity). 
Emphasis on passive or inert materials as 
inputs to human-directed technological 
forms of production. 
Emphasis on nature’s unassisted and assisted 
productions. 
Nature (or “land”) is indestructible. Natural processes are depletable or 
depreciable. 
The ecological conditions required for 
human economic activity are taken as given. 
The ecological conditions required for human 
economic activity are not taken as given. 
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Before outlining the remaining five chapters of this dissertation, more needs to be 
said about the economist’s ideal of the world as a garden. In fact, the notion of nature as 
a garden is hardly a novel idea. The environmental historian, Carolyn Merchant (2004, 
1996, [1980] 1990) for one, has convincingly argued that the whole of Western culture 
is, in actuality, a recovery narrative from the Fall of Man. On Merchant’s account, there 
are three main subplots that organize her argument: the Genesis story of the fall 
provides the beginning; science and capitalism, the middle; recovery of the garden, the 
end. The ultimate objective of Western culture, according to Merchant, has been to 
reinvent the Earth, thereby recovering the Garden of Eden. She convincingly shows that 
the original “Baconian-Cartesian-Newtonian project” was based on developing the 
power of technology in order to subdue, dominate, and master Nature so as to hasten 
the return to the Garden of Eden. This recovery plot was to be a long and slow process 
that would necessarily involve laboring in the Earth but that would ultimately return 
humans to their original Edenic state. Merchant (1996) argues that mechanistic science 
itself was originally developed for the purpose of reinventing the Garden of Eden on 
Earth. Bacon’s Novum Organum in particular was meant to be part of Instauratio 
magna or “the great restoration” – to reorganize the sciences for a very specific purpose: 
to restore the mastery over Nature that was lost by the fall. In this canonical work, 
Bacon states that, “Man by the fall, fell at the same time from his state of innocency and 
from his dominion over creation. Both of these losses can in this life be in some part 
repaired; the former by religion and faith; the latter by arts and science.” Humans, he 
asserted, could still “recover that right over nature which belongs to it by divine 
bequest,” and should endeavour “to establish and extend the power and dominion of the 
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human race itself over the [entire] universe”.5 Nature “is either free and follows her 
ordinary course of development as in the heavens, in the animal and vegetable creation, 
and in the general array of the universe; or she is driven out of her ordinary course by 
the perverseness, insolence, and forwardness of matter and violence of impediments … 
or lastly she is put in constrained, molded, and made as it were new by art and the hand 
of man; as in things artificial.”6  
The simple point being made here is that the image of nature as a garden is 
certainly not without precedent. For the purpose of this dissertation when I state that 
the economist’s ideal is to view the whole world or nature as a garden, I want to be very 
clear about what I mean. I mean that, according to economists who deploy the concept 
of natural capital, including Partha Dasgupta, Charles Perrings, Herman Daly, Edward 
B. Barbier, and Geoffrey Heal, the Earth is, increasingly comprised of economically 
valuable ecosystems and that such items are to be arranged and managed, like any other 
kind of capital, for the benefit of human beings and their interests. Unlike Merchant’s 
historical claim that certain prelapsarian ideals were fundamental to establishing the 
modern period that was characterized by the rise of modern science, I make no claim 
that economists seek to restore the Garden of Eden on Earth. Again, what I am claiming 
is simply that the ideal of nature among economists now envisions every last object in 
our ecosystems serve human needs. This claim, although compatible with Merchant’s 
thesis, should not be viewed as endorsing it. Nature as a garden consists of what would 
                                                          
5 Francis Bacon is quoted by Merchant (1996, 136). Donald Worster also describes Bacon as promising to 
remake nature and improving it for the human condition in general. He states, “Bacon promised to the 
world a manmade paradise, to be rendered astonishingly fertile by science and human management. In 
that utopia, he predicted man would recover a place of dignity and honor, as well as the authority over all 
the other creatures he once enjoyed in the Garden of Eden” (1977, 30). 
6 Bacon is quoted by Merchant ([1980] 1990, 170). 
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otherwise be natural objects that have been co-opted and purposefully arranged by 
intentional human agents to serve our own ends. 
Perhaps the clearest vision of what I mean by the world as a garden was put 
forward by none other than Thomas Henry Huxley, Charles Darwin’s bull-dog. In his 
Evolution & Ethics ([1893] 2009), Huxley invokes the Hobbesian distinction between 
the “state of Nature” and the “state of Art”. We are told that the former possesses 
products – “works of nature” – that have been created solely by “the cosmic process” 
while the latter, which is separated from the state of Nature by a wall, is filled with items 
that have been created, sustained and, for their continued existence, remain dependent 
upon mankind’s incessant activities. Huxley refers to this “state of Art” as a kind of 
garden, which is “as much a work of art, or artifice, as anything that can be mentioned” 
([1893] 2009, 10). 
Huxley also maintains that Nature is forever hostile to the garden and therefore, 
the gardener must constantly maintain his work of art. Huxley states, “the tendency of 
the cosmic process is to bring about the adjustment of the forms of plant life to the 
current conditions; the tendency of the horticultural process is the adjustment of the 
conditions to the needs of the forms of plant life the gardener desires to raise” ([1893] 
2009, 13). Fascinatingly, Huxley did not believe that Darwin’s (1859) mechanism of 
natural selection operated in the garden since man qua gardener or horticulturalist 
selected the traits of organisms to merely suit his fancy and not for any other purpose. 
Huxley states: 
 
The gardener … restricts multiplication; provides that each plant shall 
have sufficient space and nourishment; protects from frost and drought; 
12 
  
and, in every other way, attempts to modify the conditions, in such a 
manner as to bring about the survival of those forms which most nearly 
approach the standard of the useful, or the beautiful, which he has in mind 
([1893] 2009, 14). 
 
Indeed, Huxley’s hero in Evolution & Ethics, the horticulturalist, cannot but manage the 
whole garden according to his own ends and purposes, whether these devotions are 
grounded in aesthetic value or usefulness. Huxley goes so far as to imagine, as did his 
student, H.G. Wells, that the gardeners might, one day, even establish an earthly 
paradise – “a true garden of Eden” – in which all things serve the gardeners and their 
well-being.7 Under this state of affairs, with the garden under the firm grip of the 
gardeners, Nature, or the cosmic process that is characterized by “the coarse struggle for 
existence of the state of nature”, would be completely eliminated. There would be no 
more Nature since the state of nature would be superseded by a state of Art. This state of 
affairs is characterized by “every plant and every lower animal [being] adapted to 
human wants” ([1893], 2009, 19-20). 
 With the Garden Image of Nature made plain, the next chapter introduces 
criteria for distinguishing natural capital from manufactured capital, and lays out a 
                                                          
7 Huxley’s most enthusiastic student and author of The Time Machine, H.G. Wells, seems to have followed 
in the footsteps of his great teacher when he depicts the Earth of the distant future (the year 802, 701 AD, 
to be exact) as a garden. In chapter four of this novel, the main character – the Time Traveller – states, 
“there were no hedges, no signs of proprietary rights, no evidences of agriculture; the whole earth had 
become a garden.” Although Huxley draws a firm distinction between agriculture – the farm – and the 
garden in this quotation, the distinction is not entirely obvious. It should also be remarked that the co-
founder of the theory of evolution by natural selection, Alfred Russell Wallace (1864), also anticipated the 
day when the future of the Earth would become entirely domesticated. In The Origin of Human Races 
and the Antiquity of Man Deduced From the Theory of Natural Selection, Wallace states, “we can 
anticipate the time when the earth will produce only cultivated plants and domestic animals; when man’s 
selection shall have supplanted “natural selection”’ and when the ocean will be the only domain in which 
that power can be exerted, which for countless cycles of ages ruled supreme over all the earth” (1864, 
clxviii). 
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working definition of “Nature” for the purpose of this dissertation. It will be argued that 
since natural capital is conceived by contemporary economists as both a homogeneous 
fund of value and as a set of concrete heterogeneous particulars, it has what historians 
of economic thought have termed a (1) dual nature. The spatio-temporal particulars 
denoted by the concept of natural capital, such as ecosystems, are objects (2) capable of 
producing, (3) depletable, (4) beneficial, (5) original, and (6) self-generative. This 
chapter argues that, among these six characteristics, the first four are shared with 
manufactured capital, while the last two – original and self-generative – drive a wedge 
between natural and manufactured capital. 
Chapter Three, “Natural Capital: Novel Concept or the Same Old Stew?”, explores 
in greater depth some of the assertions and claims made at the outset of this chapter by 
tracing the historical roots of nature conceived as a producer in the works of the 
Swedish botanist Carl Linnaeus’ (1749) Oeconomia Naturae and the Physiocrats of 
France during the mid-18th Century. This chapter argues that if natural capital is taken 
to denote nature as an unassisted producer of readily consumable goods and services, 
then it can hardly be considered a novel concept. There is a nascent category of the 
concept of natural capital to be unearthed in the writings of classical political 
economists, such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx. When such 
economic theorists referred to the “spontaneous productions of the Earth” and nature’s 
“natural products”, they had a distinctive class of production in mind, one that denotes 
nature’s independently generated products. 
Chapter Four, “Critical Natural Capital and Sustainable Development”, tackles a 
version of the most vexing question concerning natural capital: to what extent can 
manufactured capital serve as a substitute for natural capital? Economists influenced by 
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the life sciences have long argued that there is a subset of natural capital, critical natural 
capital, for which there are no substitutes. This special category of natural capital is 
meant to denote the ecological conditions essential to the continued existence of 
economic agents and therefore, sustainable development. However, the problem is that 
no one has explained what these conditions might be and why they are essential for this 
purpose. To resolve this issue, this chapter introduces a new theory of “basic ecological 
goods” (BEGs). It is shown that BEGs are distinct from ordinary goods in consumer 
choice theory since the former are objective ecological conditions that must be met for 
the continued existence of economic agents. BEGs are required for the continued 
existence of a given agent because they possess objective causal properties essential for 
this purpose. The upshot of this theory is that the ecological conditions required for 
human economic activity and, therefore, sustainable development, are no longer 
shrouded in mystery as they were under the canopy of “critical natural capital”. The 
theory of BEGs explains what these minimal ecological conditions are and what 
conditions would have to be met for any good to potentially serve as a substitute for 
such goods. 
Chapter Five, “No One Can Preserve Nature”, begins by recognizing a corollary of 
the Garden Image of Nature. At first glance, this ideal view of Nature would seem to 
entail domesticating every last economically valuable ecosystem to serve human ends. 
As a result, the status of “wild ecosystems”, “wilderness”, and “untrammeled Nature” are 
called into question. While this chapter does not consider the desirability or goodness of 
such a domesticated world, it does argue that the preservation paradox is warranted. 
This paradox, well-known among environmental ethicists, contains three premises: 
nature is that realm of phenomena that is independent of intentional human agency; 
15 
  
preserving and restoring Nature requires intentional human agency; therefore, no one 
can preserve (or restore) Nature. While some scholars have argued that the preservation 
paradox is misguided, this chapter argues that no one can restore or preserve nature 
without turning it into an artifact. To defend this claim, this chapter delineates three 
features that distinguish artifacts from natural objects: artifacts are designed or 
planned, they possess a function attributed to them by an intentional agent, and they 
must be modified by an intentional agent. By relying on James Woodward’s (2003) 
analysis of absence causation, this chapter argues that even those aspects of Nature that 
are merely preserved, where human activity is intentionally omitted, qualify as artifacts. 
Finally, Chapter Six concludes by acknowledging the limitations of this 
dissertation and by considering a future direction of research: delineating the moral 
limits to buying and selling natural capital and ecosystem goods and services. 
Specifically, an argument is sketched for the moral limits to buying and selling water. 
Following the recent work of Michael Sandel and Debra Satz on the moral limits to 
markets, it is argued that, in desperate circumstances, when water is radically scarce, 
buying and selling water in the marketplace will almost certainly violate what Robert 
Nozick (1974) refers to as “Locke’s Proviso” – a constraint on original acquisitions that 
requires such activities do not worsen the situation of others. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
On Nature and Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The subject of this dissertation is the concept of natural capital in economics. Both 
“Nature” and “capital” are notoriously capacious terms, a statement that makes “natural 
capital” all the more perplexing. What makes matters worse, at least for the philosopher 
of economics, is that when deploying the concept of natural capital, economists rarely 
begin by first delineating the precise meaning of the terms “nature” or “capital”. Any 
reflection on the concept of natural capital is bound to give rise to many unanswered 
questions. What, if any, concept of “Nature” is presupposed by the economists who 
deploy the concept of natural capital? What does it mean for natural capital or Nature to 
“produce” anything at all, let alone welfare enhancing goods and services that are to be 
consumed by human agents? Why are some natural processes, and not others, denoted 
by the concept of natural capital? Do harmful natural processes count as instances of 
natural capital or is it only those processes that are judged to be beneficial to human 
agents in some way? What or who determines whether any natural process is beneficial 
or harmful? How is natural capital distinct from ordinary man-made or manufactured 
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capital? Is natural capital merely a species of capital or is it something else altogether? 
These conceptual questions have not been adequately addressed in the literature and, 
without answering them our understanding of natural capital remains an impoverished 
one. The purpose of this chapter is to help fill this void by establishing a coherent 
picture of natural capital as it is used by economists.  
This chapter proceeds by first distinguishing natural capital from manufactured 
capital and then proposes a working definition of the concept “Nature”. Before 
developing an account of natural capital, a few caveats are in order. The focus of this 
dissertation is the concept of natural capital in economics, but natural capital is not a 
concept that is only used by economists. Natural capital is an interdisciplinary concept 
that has been, and continues to be, employed by a wide variety of biophysical scientists, 
including conservation biologists, and ecologists. Indeed, many such non-economists 
have done much (perhaps the most) to popularize the concept of natural capital; this is 
particularly true for the related concept of “ecosystem services”. Moreover, such 
biophysical scientists continue to publish original books and research articles on the 
topic of natural capital and ecosystem services, not only in biology and ecology journals, 
but in the top environmental economics journals as well, including, for example, 
Ecological Economics, Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource 
Economists, Environmental and Resource Economics, and the Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management. Indeed, many such publications are co-
authored with the best environmental and resource economists, including the Nobel 
Prize winner, Kenneth Arrow, and the Cambridge economist, Partha Dasgupta, as well 
as Charles Perrings, Herman Daly, Edward B. Barbier, Bob Costanza, and Geoffrey Heal. 
Despite the artificial boundaries circumscribed by this project – the concept of natural 
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capital in economics – the reader should keep in mind that natural capital is not a 
concept that is hermetically sealed-off from other sciences. On the contrary, I would 
conjecture that, when it comes to the concept of natural capital, there is significant 
conceptual trade between economics and the biophysical sciences and that it is almost 
certainly the case that natural capital in economics has been, and will continue to be, 
shaped by this interaction. Therefore, the reader should recognize that, from time to 
time, this dissertation will invoke the research of biophysical scientists, but that the 
purpose for doing so is to illuminate the concept of natural capital as it is used by a 
growing number of economists, such as those just mentioned. 
The ideal would appear to require establishing necessary and sufficient 
conditions for natural capital since doing so would enable one to arbitrate between the 
correct and incorrect uses of this concept. With such a definite concept, one could then 
determine, for any given thing, whether it is an instance of natural capital. Establishing 
such rigid boundaries around the concept of natural capital would be a misguided 
project, however. Although environmental economists today share a relatively stable 
understanding of the concept, establishing necessary and sufficient conditions for 
natural capital seems unnecessary and at worst, imprudent. Indeed, it would appear 
that no single definition is able to pin down all the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the concept. Be that as it may, relinquishing the prospect of establishing necessary 
and sufficient conditions for natural capital still leaves a lot of room to advance a useful 
account of natural capital that will help to shed some light on this relatively new means 
of production, not only for its own sake, but to inform the problems faced in the 
remaining chapters of this dissertation.  
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To begin with, it is worth recognizing that many economists use the concept of 
“natural capital” as a blanket term to denote the entire resource base.8 However, the far 
most interesting use of this concept is when it is used to denote specific welfare-
enhancing entities and processes that are capable of producing without direct human 
intervention. On the whole, I submit that natural capital has (1) a dual nature, which 
means that it is conceived both as a homogeneous fund of value and as concrete 
heterogeneous particulars. These temporally and spatially located particulars are (2) 
capable of producing, (3) depletable, (4) beneficial, (5) original, and (6) self-generative. 
Each of these characteristics requires elaboration and, as we will see below, their 
attribution to particular instances of natural capital is also qualified in some way. By and 
large, I will maintain that the first four characteristics just given are shared with what 
economists refer to as manufactured capital, while the last two – “original” and “self-
generative” – drive a wedge between these two species of capital. While it is true that 
instances of natural capital can be original and self-generative, probably no instance of 
manufactured capital possesses either of these properties. 
“Capital” is a notoriously contested term. What do economists mean by capital 
when invoking the concept of natural capital? Invariably, when economists today treat 
nature or certain parts of nature as capital, they are treated as a means of production – a 
factor of production that is capable of producing goods and services which possess 
economic value. This is true in cases where natural capital is an aggregate variable in 
production functions and it is also true when specific processes denoted by the concept 
of natural capital produce economically valuable goods and services. This conception of 
capital as a means of production might well be considered a Schumpeterian pre-analytic 
                                                          
8 For example, Dasgupta (2009) refers to natural capital as a “mesh of resources”. 
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vision of capital that has roots in the writings of Adam Smith ([1776] 1976) and other 
economic theorists, such as David Ricardo (1817), Thomas Robert Malthus (1820), and 
Jean Baptiste Say (1821).9 Indeed, to gain a better understanding of what contemporary 
economists mean today by capital when they invoke the complex concept of natural 
capital, it will be valuable to provide a brief historical survey of capital on its own terms. 
The Physiocrats of France were the first to develop a clear outlook of capital and 
its role in production (Hennings [1987] 1990). These self-described “économistes”, most 
prominent in France circa 1750-1770, rejected the reigning Mercantilist doctrine of 
privileging foreign trade to enlarge the Kingdom’s “stock”. In their circular-flow model, 
the Physiocrats showed that farmers, combined with the natural powers of nature, are 
the only productive social class (Meek 1962). The other two classes in the model, the 
landowners and artisans, rely on the farmers for their basic needs and subsistence. The 
latter are considered all but “sterile” because while manufacturers might succeed in 
transmuting various natural objects into useful items, such actions are mere 
modifications and do not represent true production. In this model, nature yields a 
surplus or “produit net” that circulates annually among the three main social classes. 
Capital was principally understood as an “advance”, a pre-condition to the whole 
production process that derived from the wealthy landowning class (Hollander [1987] 
1992). Such advances were directed to the agricultural sector (to invest in seed, 
buildings, drainage, hired labor, oxen, ploughs, and other improvements) where it was 
used to sustain the farmers during the production process. Among historians of 
economic thought, it is worth emphasizing that it is generally held that the Physiocrats 
claimed nature alone was truly productive.  
                                                          
9 See Schumpeter (1954). 
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John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government ([1689] 1980), had argued 
that the original source of value derived from mixing one’s labour with physical goods. 
God gave nature in common to all of mankind and the penury condition of man required 
him to labour. Endowed with industriousness and rationality, mankind was obligated to 
subdue the earth and improve it for the benefit of life. Unassisted nature, for Locke, 
produced virtually no value at all. In fact, he argued that unimproved land is waste, “the 
benefit of it amount[s] to little more than nothing” ([1689] 1980, 26; my brackets). In 
stark contrast to the Physiocratic position, Locke supposed that nature provided man 
with inert or passive materials that were to be acted upon and improved: 
 
of the products of the earth useful to the life of man nine tenths are the 
effects of labour: nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our 
use, and cast up the several expences about them, what in them is purely 
owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in most of them 
ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour 
([1689] 1980, 25; italics in the original). 
 
 
In The Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1976), Adam Smith is decidedly Lockean when 
he argues that the first price of anything is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. Be that as 
it may, there are also clear vestiges of Physiocratic thought in Smith’s magnum opus, 
particularly in those passages that refer to agricultural production. The productivity of 
nature is displayed prominently when Smith states: 
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in agriculture … nature labours along with man; and though her labour 
costs no expence [sic], its produce has its value, as well as that of the most 
expensive workmen. The most important operations of agriculture seem 
intended, not so much to increase, though they do that too, as to direct the 
fertility of nature towards the production of the plants most profitable to 
man ([1776] 1976, 363). 
 
 
But while Smith agreed with the Physiocrats that nature had a role to play in the 
agricultural sector, he did not maintain that all value derives from the ground. Similar to 
his immediate predecessor, A.R.J. Turgot ([1770] 1898), who placed commerce and 
manufacturing on equal footing with agricultural production, Smith departs from the 
Physiocratic view of manufacturing as sterile. Rather, he insists that, in the 
manufacturing sector, nature does nothing and man “does all”.10 
Smith’s conception of “stock” corresponds to the Physiocratic conception of 
“advances” in at least one fundamental way: the accumulation of capital is only made 
possible by the thrift or prior abstinence of its owner. But Smith goes even further, 
arguing that capital is a pre-condition to the division of labour, a time-intensive 
roundabout production process, that itself serves to create ever more capital. Otherwise, 
when Smith employs the term “stock” throughout The Wealth of Nations he means one 
of two things: either the capital that affords its owner revenue in production or that 
                                                          
10 On the contrary, in his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, David Ricardo ([1817] 1951, 76) 
asks, “Does nature do nothing for man in manufactures? Are the powers of wind and water, which move 
our machinery, and assist navigation, nothing? The pressure of the atmosphere and the elasticity of 
steam, which enables us to work the most stupendous engines – are they not the gifts of nature? To say 
nothing of the decomposition of the atmosphere in the process of dyeing and fermentation. There is not a 
manufacture which can be mentioned, in which nature does not give her assistance to man, and give it 
too, generously and gratuitously.” 
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portion of stock that supplies its owner with the means for immediate consumption. 
Smith further divides the category of capital into either an agglomeration of physical 
things, instances of “fixed capital”, such as machines or livestock, or “circulating 
capital”, an investment fund that is more or less freely available to be directed towards 
alternative uses. Furthermore, Smith tells us that different kinds of occupations and 
production processes will require different degrees of fixed and circulating capital and 
that, generally, there is an inverse relationship between stocks and profits. 
Classical political economy was initiated by Smith, and consolidated by David 
Ricardo’s On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation ([1817] 1951). Ricardo 
maintained, with Smith, both the distinction between fixed and circulating capital and 
the proposition that capital is a produced means of production that requires continuous 
maintenance. Land, which occupies a prominent role in Ricardo’s “corn model”, 
represented the “original and indestructible powers of the soil” ([1817] 1951, 67). Unlike 
capital, Ricardian land did not depreciate over time. It was also considered more or less 
permanent and fixed in supply. Land was treated as distinct from capital, not only 
because it did not have a period of production but also because it was the only non-
reproducible (by human effort) factor of production. 
When John Stuart Mill endorsed Ricardian economics in his Principles of 
Political Economy ([1848] 2006), it was effectively crystallized in the minds of political 
economists until the neo-classical revolution began in the 1870s. Mill defined capital as 
a previously accumulated stock that affords assistance to labourers in the production 
process. Thus, capital is a subset of wealth whose origin necessarily lies in prior human 
agency. In physical terms, instances of capital, such as the machines used in the 
manufacture of commodities, are simply modified “appropriate natural objects” that 
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human agents locate in their environment and transmute to their benefit. While Smith 
had insisted that in the manufacturing sector nature does nothing, Mill, like Ricardo 
before him, argued that nature’s powers are used to produce all commodities. Capital 
goods are employed by human agents for a particular purpose or goal and, therefore, it 
is human agents who ultimately determine whether any object is capital. 
When Mill claims that labourers engaged in a production process subsist on 
previously accumulated capital, he shares the opinion of a long line of classical political 
economists. Capital can be conceived as a “fund” – the part of one’s possessions 
committed to carrying on a new production that is provided to labourers in advance. 
Without capital, we are told that current production can only be directed towards the 
immediate sustenance of labourers; circulating capital gives rise to the possibility of a 
longer production process because it provides labourers with the necessaries that are 
consumed during the production process. Capital affords labourers with shelter, 
protection, tools, and other requisite materials in a production process and therefore, it 
can manifest itself in a variety of forms, including buildings, machines, or inventory. It 
can also be more or less permanent (sunk capital). 
Although capital is the product of human agency and arises due to some degree of 
abstinence from immediate consumption, Mill is emphatic that all capital is eventually 
consumed as well. Drawing an analogy to the human population, he argues that capital 
is sustained, not by preservation, but by perpetual reproduction. Everyone eventually 
dies, but if births exceed deaths every year, the population will always increase. The 
same can be said for the stock of capital. Although not a single person who composed 
the original population is alive today, and was not alive until a very recent date, the 
overall population today far exceeds the population of earlier times. Similarly, in the 
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case of capital, sustaining this means of production over time requires humans to 
constantly engage in its perpetual reproduction. 
The marginal revolution, initiated by William Stanley Jevons ([1871] 1957), Léon 
Walras ([1874] 1954), and Carl Menger ([1871] 1981), involved a turn away from 
fundamental classical tenets, such as the labour theory of value, class conflict, the wages 
fund doctrine, and Malthus’s doctrine of population; these rudiments were replaced by 
individualism, utility maximization, a subjective theory of value, and a penchant for 
mathematical formalism. The revolution caused something of a rupture in how 
economists conceived of capital as well. 
Daniel Hausman (1981) explains that most early neoclassical capital theorists 
began to associate capital exclusively with some factor of production, usually a fund 
conception of capital, and to regard the rate of interest as its price. Notwithstanding 
some agreement among theorists, capital persisted as a vague term. Competing theories 
of capital led to no fewer than three so-called “capital controversies” throughout the 
twentieth century. The first was between John Bates Clark and Eugen von Böhm-
Bawerk, mostly in response to Marx’s theory of capital (Cohen 2008); the second 
involved the Chicago economist Frank Knight, who attacked Friedrich Hayek and the 
Austrian idea of a “period of production”; the third “Cambridge Capital Controversy” 
was initiated by Joan Robinson (1953) and involved capital theorists at the Cambridges 
on both sides of the Atlantic. While the technical details of these controversies do not 
concern us here, the competing conceptions of capital do. 
Irving Fisher, the foremost pre-war American economist, defined the interest rate 
as “the per cent of premium paid on money at one date in terms of money to be in hand 
one year later” (1930, 13). According to some historians of capital theory, this was 
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capital theory without mention of either capital or its marginal product (Cohen and 
Harcourt 2003). John Bates Clark claimed that capital earns interest because it is scarce 
and has a positive marginal product. According to Clark, there are short-lived 
heterogeneous concrete physical capital goods but the greatest emphasis should be 
placed on the conception of capital as a quantum or permanent fund of productive 
wealth embodied in capital goods. For Frank Knight (1936), concrete capital goods were 
almost completely abandoned. He preferred an abstract conception of capital similar to 
that defended by Clark (Mehta 2003). Knight’s conception of capital was “a 
homogeneous mass which was created by saving decisions, which could be invested in 
one industry and transferred to another, which was productive in the sense that it has a 
non-negative marginal product if used properly” (Hennings [1987] 1990, 116). Today, 
this Clark-Knight conception of capital as a distinct and productive homogeneous factor 
of production that earns interest and possesses a positive marginal product remains 
largely intact among neo-classical economists.  
Austrian economists such as Böhm-Bawerk criticized Marx’s claim that the return 
to capital involved the exploitation of labour and argued that capital ultimately resolved 
itself into “saved up” labour and land. Böhm-Bawerk disagreed with what he considered 
to be Clark’s mysterious permanent fund of productive wealth and states, “Clark thinks 
of capital as a quantum of value ‘imputed’ in material goods. He strips off everything 
which may suggest material existence and retains only a value jelly, existing eternally” 
(1907, 280).11 In his Positive Theory of Capital, Böhm-Bawerk (1891) argued that any 
production process involving capital, or intermediate goods, always involved more time 
compared to the immediate or direct production of goods. For the Austrians, time is 
                                                          
11 As quoted by Cohen and Harcourt (2003). 
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fundamental to capital because production with capital is a “roundabout” process. 
According to this theory, the increased productivity of capital-intensive production 
processes explains why there is an interest rate and thus the “average period of 
production” is central to the Austrian theory. For Knut Wicksell, whose account of 
capital and interest became the standard portrayal of the Austrian theory of capital and 
interest, interest is simply the difference between the marginal productivity of saved up 
labour and land and the marginal productivity of current labour and land (Hennings 
[1987]1990; Hausman 1981).12 
Historians of economic thought have argued that the recurring controversies in 
capital theory are due to the “dual nature” of capital. Avi J. Cohen and Geoffrey 
Harcourt state: “capital theory controversy commonalities originate in the dual nature 
of capital. Economists conceive of capital both as a heterogeneous collection of specific 
capital equipment used in production, and as a homogeneous fund of financial value 
that flows among alternative uses to establish a uniform rate of return” (2005, xxvii). 
This dual nature of capital, as we have seen, traces back to at least Adam Smith and 
refers to two different aspects or conceptions of capital. On the one hand, there is the 
physical, tangible, material, heterogeneous capital-as-goods conception where specific 
instances of capital might be used in disparate production processes and, on the other 
hand, there is the abstract homogeneous fund conception of capital as value that can be 
readily directed to its most valued use. Controversy in capital theory erupts when one of 
these conceptions is emphasized to the general neglect of the other (Cohen and 
Harcourt 2005). 
                                                          
12 Others, aside from the Austrians, drew upon Wicksell’s work as well. Such economists include the 
Swedish school of the 1930s, Keynes and the Keynesians, and recent monetary economists such as 
Michael Woodford. 
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I argue that natural capital, much like manufactured capital, also has a dual 
nature. Economists conceive of natural capital both as an abstract homogeneous fund 
and as specific concrete heterogeneous particulars. In fact, these two conceptions can 
also be said to constitute a boundary between what are two relatively distinct literatures 
on natural capital. In the first case, natural capital is a variable embedded in aggregate 
models of sustainable development. When natural capital is deployed in this sense, it 
invariably represents the social value of all renewable and non-renewable resources in 
an economy. By underscoring the totality of natural capital as an abstract homogeneous 
fund, this conception abstracts from the particularities or specificities that might be 
possessed by disparate forms of natural capital. In the second case, natural capital is 
customarily tied to the related concept of “ecosystem services” and instances of natural 
capital are considered in much more precise terms. In this second sense, natural capital 
denotes specific causal structures or mechanisms, many of which are found or 
discovered rather than made. Such “natural machines” are claimed to produce 
regularities that are beneficial or welfare enhancing to human agents. 
The first conception of natural capital – the fund conception – is central to what 
the philosopher Bryan Norton (1992) describes as the “social-scientific approach” to 
sustainable development. This approach, originally developed by the Robert Solow 
(1974) and John Hartwick (1977), involves sustaining the productive capacity of an 
economy over time where “productive capacity” is represented by the aggregate level of 
capital, including natural capital, in an economy.13 Such models follow the “Hartwick 
                                                          
13 Also, see Solow (1986; 1993a; 1993b) and Hartwick (1978a, 1978b, 1990, 1993). It is to be remarked that 
Solow began with highly disaggregated Leontief models and that his later one-sector model was meant to 
be a pedagogically tractable version of the disaggregated model. Because of this, there is reason to doubt 
that Solow would accept that capital really is, fundamentally, a homogeneous aggregate (see Halsmayer 
2014). 
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Rule”, which requires that, for the goal of sustainable development, total net investment 
in capital to remain above or equal to zero (Neumayer 2003).  
Consider, for instance, the most recent instantiation of such models. Kenneth 
Arrow et al.’s (2010; 2012) criterion of sustainability requires that an economy remain 
capable of providing the current standard of living across generations. This means that 
each generation must bequeath to its successor at least as large a quantity of an 
economy’s “productive base”, which is composed of three capital assets: human, natural, 
and man-made capital. 14  Man-made capital includes all of the produced means of 
production, such as machines, factories, and tools; human capital includes knowledge, 
education, skills, technology, and institutions; the stock of natural capital consists of the 
traditional renewable and non-renewable resources, but it also denotes various non-
market phenomena such as ecosystems. Under this view, the social value of an 
economy’s productive base is considered a country’s “comprehensive wealth”. 
According to Arrow et al.’s model, inter-temporal social welfare, V(t), is 
sustainable if and only if dV/dt ≥ 0. Because an economy’s productive base is a 
necessary condition for sustainability and the productive base includes three distinct 
types of capital, it is not surprising that what Arrow et al. call “genuine investment” 
plays a critical role. This represents the sum of the values of investments or 
disinvestments in each of the capital assets, whereby the value of each investment is the 
product of the change in the quantity of the asset times the shadow value of that asset. A 
change in the productive base and V(t) is non-decreasing at t2 if and only if genuine 
investment is non-negative at t1. Therefore, if there is a decline in any one particular 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
14 An economy’s productive base also includes population, public knowledge and institutions. 
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capital asset, sufficient investment will maintain the overall stock of capital and the 
productive base, along with social welfare, will be sustained. 
One of the most controversial questions, with respect to this fund conception of 
natural capital, is the substitutability question: to what extent can man-made capital 
serve as a substitute for natural capital? If it is true that some particular instances of 
natural capital have no substitutes then, ceteris paribus, its depletion would be 
catastrophic for the future generations that endeavor to live in a world without it. On the 
other hand, if manufactured capital invariably serves as a substitute for natural capital, 
then depleting the latter stock would be much less consequential, at least for human 
welfare. As we will see in Chapter Four, when a definitive answer is proposed to a 
version of the substitutability question, some economists have argued that certain 
instances of natural capital are special because they are limiting factors to economic 
growth and human economic activity. Scholars who argue for this thesis refer to such 
features of the environment as critical natural capital, a subclass of natural capital that 
represents the ecological pre-conditions to this activity. Their claim is that there are 
certain ecological conditions that have no substitutes and, therefore, such conditions 
must be maintained for the goal of sustainability. 
The second conception of natural capital denotes specific and frequently 
undesigned mechanisms of production. In such cases, natural capital refers to natural 
machines or heterogeneous instances of what might be cumbersomely termed “natural 
capital goods”. The literature covering this conception is both interdisciplinary and 
enormous. Such instances of natural capital almost always denote specific causal 
processes — certain unproduced structures or mechanisms — that are generally found 
and then recast as the means to produce ecosystem goods and services. “Ecosystems” in 
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this context is a term borrowed from the science of ecology and is generally understood 
to include a set of organisms living in an area, their physical environment, and the 
various interactions between them (Daily 1997).15 
The mapping and valuation of such heterogeneous production processes is a 
project that involves a division of labour between biophysical scientists, such as 
ecologists and biologists (who are responsible for the mapping of ecosystem goods and 
services), and the social scientists (especially economists) who ascribe economic value to 
such items. This literature consists of various dimensions, including biodiversity and 
ecosystem function (Xiao and Lee 2000; Acharya 2000; Loreau et al. 2001; Swift et al. 
2004; Barkmann et al. 2008; Kareiva et al. 2011), the policy and management of 
ecosystem services (Kroeger and Casey 2007; Koellner et al. 2008; Salzman 2005), and 
valuation techniques (Westman 1977; de Groot 1994; 1987; 1992; Daily 1997; Hein et al. 
2006; Ansink et al. 2008). 
This second conception of natural capital was first popularized by Gretchen 
Daily’s (1997) Nature’s Service and Robert Costanza et al.’s (1997) paper published in 
Nature. Daily (1997) defines ecosystem services in anthropocentric terms as the 
conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make 
them up, sustain and fulfill human life.16 Similarly, Costanza et al. define ecosystem 
services as “the benefits human populations derive, directly or indirectly, from 
                                                          
15 The economist E.F. Schumacher (1973) referred to a concept of natural capital in his book Small is 
Beautiful. He there argued that resources should be treated as depreciable capital assets instead of an 
income flow. 
 
16 Barbier (2011) offers a similar definition of “ecosystem”. An ecosystem comprises its abiotic (nonliving) 
environment and the biotic (living) groupings of plant and animal species, or communities. The biotic and 
abiotic components, and the interactions between them, are termed the “ecosystem structure”. 
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ecosystem functions” (1997, 253). 17  Today, the concepts of “natural capital” and 
“ecosystem services” stretch across numerous disciplines and have figured prominently 
in several well-known publications, including Daily’s (1997) Ecosystem Services: 
Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems, the World Bank’s Where’s the Wealth of 
Nations: Measuring Capital for the 21st Century (2006), Pushpam Kumar’s The 
Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (2010), Peter Kareiva’s et al.’s (2011) 
Natural Capital: Theory and Practise of Mapping Ecosystem Services, and Barbier’s 
(2011) Capitalizing on Nature: Ecosystems as Natural Assets.  
The most celebrated study on this theme is the World Resources Institute’s 
Millenium Ecosystem Assessment (2005).18 This enormous four-year project, initiated 
by the United Nations, involved 1,300 scientists and policy makers who considered, for 
the first time, the condition and trends of the whole world’s ecosystems. This study 
defined “ecosystem services” in very broad terms as the “benefits people obtain from 
ecosystems”, and classified such services into four types: (i) provisioning services (food, 
fiber, fuel, genetic resources); (ii) regulating services (climate, natural-hazard 
regulation, disease regulation); (iii) cultural services (places of recreation, sacred 
groves); and (iv) supporting services (nutrient cycling, soil production).19  
                                                          
17 Daily (1997) and Costanza (1997) did the most to popularize the concept of “ecosystem services”, but 
this concept originates with Westman (1977), who referred to “nature’s services”; the conservation 
biologists Paul and Anne Ehrlich coined the term “ecosystem services” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981). See 
Gómez-Baggethun et al. (2010). 
 
18 There is also the recently founded interdisciplinary Natural Capital Project, a joint venture between 
Stanford University’s Woods Institute for the Environment, the University of Minnesota Institute of the 
Environment, the Nature Conservancy, and the World Wildlife Fund. 
 
19 For more literature on the challenge of incorporating “cultural ecosystem services” into environmental 
assessments, see Satz et al. (2013), Chan, Satterfield, and Goldstein (2012), Chan et al. (2012), Satterfield 
et al. (2013), Klain and Chan (2012), and Daniel et al. (2012). 
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 It is worthwhile to consider a few examples of natural capital in this second 
sense. One such case is pollination, which involves a pollinator species, such as honey 
bees, causing the movement of a flower’s sex cells, and is normally conceived as the 
successful fertilization of flowers. Alexandra-Maria Klein et al. (2009) submit that 
species richness is required for natural pollination services and that this diversity of 
pollinator species in turn depends on habitat features such as suitable soils, tree cavities, 
and abundant floral resources. The economic benefits of pollination for important crop 
plants, like tomatoes, celery, rapeseed, cauliflower, papaya, almond, canola, and 
watermelon, have long been acknowledged (Costanza et al. 1997) and recent estimates 
suggest that the value of worldwide pollination services is approximately €195 billion 
(Lonsdorf et al. 2011). 
Another example, canonical in the literature, are the ecosystem services afforded 
to the residents of New York from the Catskills Watershed. Historically, this watershed 
afforded the citizens of New York City, upwards of ten million people, with high-quality 
drinking water. This watershed, which covers 5000-square-kilometers, not only purified 
the drinking water but meted water out gradually, stabilizing drinking supply and 
mitigating the possibility of floods (Turner and Daily 2008). Until the early 1990s, the 
natural water purification processes, by root systems and soil microorganisms, together 
with filtration and sedimentation, cleansed the water to such a degree that the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) standards were met (Chichilnisky and Heal 
1998). However, housing development and the pollution from vehicles and agriculture 
threatened the water quality of the region and in 1991 the EPA ordered New York City to 
build a water filtration plant, unless the city could somehow maintain water quality 
without it (Barbier 2011). 
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By 1996, New York City was confronted with a choice between restoring the 
Catskills watershed and constructing a water-purification plant. This choice has been 
construed as one between investing in either natural or manufactured capital. As it 
turned out, restoring the ecological integrity of the Catskills or investing in the 
“machinery of the watershed” was less costly than constructing a “human-constructed” 
water filtration system (Daily and Turner 2008). While protecting and restoring the 
Catskills was estimated to cost 250 million dollars over ten years (mainly to purchase 
and set aside over 140,000 hectares in the watershed), the overall cost was expected to 
reach up to 1.5 billion dollars; by contrast, the total cost of pursuing the alternative path, 
building and operating the filtration system, was estimated to cost between 6 and 8 
billion dollars (Barbier 2011). New York City opted for the former option and, since 
1997, has invested nearly 2 billion dollars in “land management changes and innovative 
tactics such as purchasing land around reservoirs to preserve forests and wetlands that 
buffer against pollution, paying landowners to restore forest along streams, and offering 
technical aid and infrastructure to farmers and foresters” (Daily and Turner 2008, 31). 
Another example is the ongoing Mangrove deforestation in Thailand (see 
Sathirathai and Barbier 2001; Barbier 2011, 2008, 2007, 2003). According to Barbier’s 
analysis, there were once two mutually incompatible ecosystem services that the natural 
mangroves afforded to human agents: they created nursery and breeding habitat for 
offshore fisheries, and formed a natural storm barrier to frequent coastal storm events, 
such as tsunamis, storm surges, and typhoons. For decades, it was common practice to 
convert mangroves into shrimp farms. The assumption was that the shrimp production 
was profitable. However, Barbier’s analysis shows that this activity came with a putative 
cost since it had the effect of damaging the natural storm barrier provided by the 
35 
  
mangroves. Moreover, after a five-year period, the mangroves that had been converted 
to shrimp farm ponds could no longer be used for the purpose of shrimp farming since 
the “soil [became] very acidic, compacted, and too poor in quality to be used for any 
other productive use” (Barbier 2011, 64). The question Barbier asks is whether the net 
economic returns to shrimp farming justifies further mangrove conversion to this 
economic activity or whether is it worth investing in replanting the mangroves to 
rehabilitate abandoned shrimp farm areas. Barbier (2011) estimates that the annual 
economic returns to shrimp aquaculture is 322 dollars per ha (when discounted over the 
five-year period at 10-15 percent yield a net present value of 1,078-1,220 dollars per ha). 
Restoration costs, on the other hand, were estimated to be between 8,812 and 9,318 
dollars per ha in net present value terms. According to these numbers alone, restoring 
the environments after years of shrimp farming would appear to be economically 
unfeasible since the restoration costs clearly exceed the net economic returns per ha.  
Barbier then estimates the economic value of three ecosystem goods and services 
– the net income from collected forest products, habitat-fishery linkage, and storm 
protection service – all of which combine to the approximate value of 10,158-12,392 
dollars per ha. This relatively high value not only implies that the decision to prevent 
shrimp aquaculture operations from occurring in the first place may have been the 
preferable outcome (since the value of ecosystem services naturally generated by the 
mangroves when left intact exceed the net economic returns to shrimp farming) but it 
also makes the post hoc restoration activities economically feasible as well. Barbier 
states, “before the decision to allow shrimp farming to take place, the restoration costs 
should be treated as one measure of the “user cost” of converting mangroves 
irreversibly, and this cost should be deducted from the estimation of the net returns to 
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shrimp aquaculture” (2011, 66). Barbier’s study of the mangrove forests in Thailand 
shows the importance of valuing the ecosystem services generated by natural capital and 
of taking this information into account when faced with land use decisions. 
Another recent study of natural capital and ecosystem services was conducted by 
Silvio Simonit and Perrings (2013) on reforesting land near the Panama Canal. These 
scholars considered the effect of planned reforestation of the Panama Canal watershed 
on a bundle of ecosystem services and showed that reforestation would increase the 
water flows needed to operate the Panama Canal during the dry season, an effect 
expected to have far reaching economic consequences (the flow of water through the 
Canal is sufficiently low to restrict its operations in approximately one in fifteen years). 
Simonit and Perrings developed a spatially explicit model of ecosystem services and 
predicted how the ecosystem services would vary with reforestation activities, 
particularly during the dry-season when an enormous volume of water (each lockage 
uses approximately 211,200 cubic meters of freshwater) is required to operate the 
Canal’s locks. They show that reforestation is expected to not only increase and regulate 
the water flow used to operate the Canal during the dry season, but that such activities 
would have the additional benefit of contributing to the production of two other 
ecosystem services as well: timber production and carbon sequestration. Without 
reforestation, and continued deforestation, their model predicts that sediment would 
increasingly flow into the Canal, thus clogging the channel and resulting in the need for 
expensive dredging and other expensive investments in manufactured capital. 
Thus far, I have only claimed that, much like manufactured capital, natural 
capital is conceived as a means of production that has a dual nature. The family 
resemblance between these two categories of capital goes deeper, however. It is widely 
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understood that specific instances of natural capital, such as ecosystems, are both 
beneficial to human agents and “depletable” or “depreciable”, two characteristics that 
are routinely ascribed to manufactured capital as well. Describing natural capital as a 
depreciable asset, Dasgupta states: 
 
Like reproducible capital assets (roads, buildings, and machinery), 
ecosystems depreciate if they are misused or are overused. But they differ 
from reproducible assets in three ways: (1) depreciation of natural capital 
is frequently irreversible (or at best the systems take a long time to 
recover), (2) except in a very limited sense, it isn’t possible to replace a 
depleted or degraded ecosystem by a new one, and (3) ecosystems can 
collapse abruptly, without much prior warning (2008, 3). 
 
This foregoing statement implies that natural capital exists contingently and that, 
under certain conditions, instances of natural capital and the ecosystem services they 
produce can become scarce. Clearly referencing Ricardo’s ([1817] 1951) canonical phrase 
ascribing original and indestructible powers to land, Dasgupta argues that Nature qua 
natural capital is not a fixed and indestructible factor of production. To the contrary, 
Dasgupta insists that, today, we can no longer assume that nature is an “indestructible 
factor of production” (2010, 6).20 While instances of natural capital can be depleted by 
human causes or non-human causes, economists generally concern themselves with the 
former causes since it is believed that such depletions are almost always caused by the 
                                                          
20 More specifically, “the problem with that assumption”, Dasgupta tells us, “is that it is simply wrong” 
(2008, 2). For more on this theme, see Dasgupta (2007). 
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intended or unintended consequences of human activity. This focus on the human 
causes of depreciating natural capital, however, should not blind us from the 
observation that natural capital can be depleted by natural causes, as well. No one would 
deny that a large meteor striking the Earth and causing a mass extinction would 
effectively deplete the planet’s stock of natural capital. The notion that instances of 
natural capital depreciate serves as a valuable image for economists since it enables 
them to entertain the possibility that certain natural processes, ones that produce 
ecosystem goods and services, may require direct human intervention to ensure that the 
beneficial regularities produced by natural capital continue into the future. This 
observation brings us to another central characteristic of natural capital, one that is also 
shared with manufactured capital. 
Invariably, natural capital denotes processes that are beneficial to economic 
agents. It has become commonplace for economists to depict ecosystems as instances of 
natural capital or natural assets that, much like manufactured capital, produce a flow of 
beneficial goods and services to human agents over time (Barbier 2011).21 Economists 
generally recognize that natural capital affords human agents with at least two distinct 
benefits: direct or indirect welfare-enhancing features and a vital biological life-support 
function – what are sometimes referred to as the ecological pre-conditions to human 
economic activity. The first class of benefits derive from traditional renewable and non-
renewable resources, but also extends to a host of non-market phenomena, such as the 
regulation of the atmosphere’s chemical composition, basic climatic stability, 
                                                          
21 Daily et al. (2000, 395) state, “the world’s ecosystems are capital assets. If properly managed, they yield 
a flow of vital services, including the production of goods (such as seafood and timber), life support 
processes (such as pollination and water purification), and life-fulfilling conditions (such as beauty and 
serenity).” Similarly, Dasgupta (2010) submits that the concept of natural capital denotes ecosystems 
generally. 
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photosynthesis, pollination, the purification of air and water, the detoxification of 
wastes, nutrient cycling, erosion control, sediment retention, genetic resources, etc. 
(Costanza et al. 1997). Alternatively, the economists Fikret Berkes and Carl Folke divide 
natural capital into three subclasses. They state, “natural capital consists of three major 
components (1) non-renewable resources, such as oil and minerals, that are extracted 
from ecosystems; (2) renewable resources, such as fish, wood, and drinking water that 
are produced and maintained by the processes and functions of ecosystems; and (3) 
environmental services such as maintenance of the quality of the atmosphere, climate, 
operation of the hydrological cycle including flood controls and drinking water supply, 
waste assimilation, recycling of nutrients, generation of soils, pollination of crops, 
provision of food from the sea, and the maintenance of a vast genetic library” (1992, 2). 
The second benefit of natural capital includes the so-called ecological pre-
conditions to human economic activity, a class of conditions that, as mentioned above, 
are referred to as critical natural capital. Barbier, for example, implicitly refers to such 
conditions when he states, “humans depend on and use this natural capital for a whole 
range of important benefits, including life support” (2011, 6). This special subclass of 
natural capital denotes those vital, essential, or non-substitutable aspects of the 
environment that are required for sustaining human welfare and human economic 
activity tout court (Farley 2008).  
 The various processes denoted by the concept of natural capital necessarily yield 
welfare enhancing benefits or utility to human agents. This characteristic, essential to 
the concept, implies that unless all natural processes are beneficial to human agents, 
then not all natural processes are instances of natural capital. In most cases, the natural 
processes denoted by the concept of natural capital will not be beneficial to human 
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agents merely because they are deemed “natural” (because the term “services”, as 
economists use it, can denote virtually anything that agents might prefer for any reason, 
there may be circumstances in which agents prefer items denoted by the concept of 
natural capital because they are natural). Moreover, the concept of natural capital would 
seem to exclude every putatively harmful natural process, such as viral infections, or the 
earthquakes and volcanoes that lay waste to human beings and their property. 
Ecosystems are almost always considered to be instances of natural capital, but if these 
natural processes merely produced harmful effects for human agents, then they could 
not be considered as such. If ecosystems are instances of natural capital, then they are 
made so not because they are in some sense natural but because they are, in part, 
beneficial to human agents. In particular, such ecosystems will produce a stream of 
goods and services that yield utility to human agents over time. Since it would appear 
that not everything that produces welfare enhancing effects for human agents count as 
natural capital, we must treat natural capital as a subset of the items that are welfare 
enhancing or beneficial for human agents. 
Natural capital has a dual nature, is productive, depletable, and beneficial to 
human agents. Given these characteristics, one might legitimately surmise that natural 
capital is merely a species of capital with the added qualification that it denotes specific 
items, such as ecosystems, that have not generally been denoted by the term “capital” 
until a recent date. While this thesis might seem prima facie plausible, if one takes the 
traditional view of capital as a produced means of production that necessarily requires 
human effort to be brought into existence, then it remains unclear whether natural 
capital can be construed as such. If all manufactured capital goods, such as machines 
used in manufacturing and tools, are necessarily produced by human agency, and there 
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are instances of natural capital that are not, then natural capital cannot simply be a 
species of capital. Instances of natural capital are bound to have a different genesis and 
etiology than ordinary capital goods. Unlike manufactured capital, the processes 
denoted by natural capital have no intelligent designer, save for those cases when 
humans engage in large-scale constructions and interventions, such as ecosystem 
restoration. And, while economists and biophysical scientists might attribute natural 
capital with a final cause in the Aristotelian sense, to produce specific goods and 
services, it should be clear that instances of natural capital were not generated for 
human purposes. 
Natural capital also possesses characteristics that classical political economists 
used to distinguish “land” from “capital”. For classical political economists, particularly 
Ricardo ([1817] 1951), land was considered to be more or less fixed in supply. It was an 
original factor of production that did not have a period of production, a genuine “gift of 
nature” as it were, that was non-reproducible by human effort. The economist Peter 
Victor (1991) has argued that natural capital is similar to land because it is not 
reproducible. For this reason one might conjecture that, from the viewpoint of the 
history of economic thought, natural capital represents something of a revival of “land” 
since, as stated in Chapter One, this variable is no longer considered a distinct factor of 
production, at least among neo-classical economists (see Blaug 2000). Among classical 
political economists, “originality” did not mean that land was a mysterious uncaused 
entity, but that it owed its existence to non-human material causes. Similarly, while 
instances of manufactured capital are produced means of production that depends on 
humans with a disposition towards saving, the original accumulation of natural capital 
did not require abstinence from consumption in this same sense. As Barbier remarks, 
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natural capital, unlike manufactured capital, is original in the following sense: “unlike 
skills, education, machines, tools, and other types of human and human-made capital, 
we do not have to manufacture and accumulate our endowment of natural assets. 
Nature has provided ecosystems and their benefits to us for free” (Barbier 2011, 3). 
While capital universally depends on human agents with a disposition towards saving, 
the existence of natural capital does not. Indeed, much like the category of land for 
classical political economists, natural capital can be described as preceding human 
economic activity and is therefore a bona fide original or unproduced means of 
production. Indeed, since natural capital possesses some characteristics of both land 
and capital, it would appear to be a hybrid concept of sorts – a cross between land and 
capital. 
As stated above, natural capital can be depleted by either human or non-human 
causes, or a combination of both. But it is to be remarked that natural capital, unlike 
manufactured capital, can also be accumulated by these causes as well. For instance, in 
the case of direct or indirect human causes, instances of natural capital can be 
intentionally restored, improved, or augmented by human agents. On the other hand, 
left to its own devices there are circumstances in which natural capital is capable of self-
generation and thus, accumulation, quite independently of human agency (see Dasgupta 
2009; 2010). By stark contrast, no instance of manufactured capital possesses this 
characteristic. The capacity for self-generation goes a long way to distinguish natural 
capital from manufactured capital since the latter invariably depends on human agency 
to be accumulated over time. In short, no manufactured capital exists without human 
agency but this is not the case for natural capital since there are cases in which natural 
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capital can be produced by completely natural processes (though human effort may be 
required to appropriate such items). 
 
Nature and Natural Capital  
With some understanding of the relationship between capital and natural capital 
now established, another question is this: what do economists mean by “natural” or 
“nature” when deploying the concept of natural capital? What concept of nature, if any 
at all, is presupposed in such cases? How can we think of the division between nature 
and artifact with respect to the concept of natural capital? My answer to these questions 
will endorse the fairly uncontroversial philosophical thesis that everything, including 
artifacts and intentional human agency, is natural. Following the lead of the philosopher 
of conservation biology, Sahotra Sarkar (2012), I further submit that it is still useful to 
make an operational distinction between natural objects, on the one hand, and 
intentionally constructed items, on the other, along with any unintended consequences 
that arise from such actions. 
Since economists are rarely explicit about the meaning of nature in relation to the 
concept of natural capital, the answer to the foregoing questions will inevitably require a 
certain amount of interpretation and reconstruction. It should be clear to the reader that 
the purpose in answering this question is not to argue for a normative thesis whereby 
economists should use the concept of nature in any particular way when invoking the 
concept of natural capital. Rather, the question is intended to be consistent with the 
overall objective of this chapter, namely, to establish a coherent account of natural 
capital that economists might adopt. There is also the worry that while economists share 
a relatively stable understanding of natural capital, every economist may not presuppose 
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one specific concept of nature, let alone form a consensus as a group. This is a sensible 
concern to keep in mind. However, one should also acknowledge that among those 
economists who share the concept of natural capital, they collectively employ the 
adjective “natural” to distinguish natural capital from artificial capital, that is, the 
produce of human agency. 
For Aristotle, the concept of “nature” had several meanings (see Collingwood 
[1945] 1976, 81-85). In one sense, it denotes specific items that exist by nature, and not 
by any other causes. This concept of nature emphasizes the origin or genesis of an item 
and requires that natural objects exist by non-human causes. In other words, this 
concept of nature presumes that there are things that exist by skill (the artificial) and 
things that exist on their own when left to themselves (natural objects). Aristotle has 
this sense of nature in mind when, for example, he reviles usury. As Joel Kaye explains, 
“Aristotle believed usury was the most despicable and unnatural, because in the 
usurious loan, money, which was invented solely as an instrument of exchange, is made 
to generate itself, to give unnatural birth to itself” (1998, 87). Money does not exist by 
nature, but by law or convention (Nichomachean Ethics, 1133a30ff).22 The charging of 
interest involves money begetting money and is unnatural because this activity is not in 
accordance with the end for which money was originally created (to facilitate 
exchange).23  Aristotle condemns usury because this activity distorts the purpose of 
money. 
                                                          
22 All references to Aristotle in this dissertation refer to Benjamin Jowett’s translation found in Jonathan 
Barnes’s ([1984] 1995) edited volume, The Complete Works of Aristotle. 
 
23 Aristotle also recognizes that money can serve as a unit of account and a store of wealth. 
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In his Physics, he introduces a concept of nature that corresponds particularly 
well with how economists actually use “nature” when deploying natural capital. Aristotle 
affirms that nature denotes an inner principle of change that is characteristic of self-
moving things.24 Unlike artificial objects, natural ones are involved in a process of 
growth, change, and flux. Nature, in this sense, is deeply intertwined with how things 
behave when left to themselves, free from human agency. Since instances of natural 
capital can produce in a self-generative way whereby production processes materialize 
from within – without the need for external causes – this concept of nature is 
particularly fitting for understanding what economists mean by nature when they 
invoke the concept of natural capital, particularly when the concept is used to denote 
ecosystems. 
One virtue of this Aristotelian concept of nature is that it can account for the fact 
that instances of natural capital can be manipulated, modified, and generally controlled 
by human agents without necessarily losing their essential identity as items of natural 
capital (becoming purely artificial). In Book 2, Chapter 1 of his Physics, Aristotle gives 
the example of a wooden bed. While the shape and structure of the bed has been 
fashioned by an intentional human agent, the carpenter, this formal cause is merely 
“human impositions on the unchanged matter that remains a natural product” 
(Bensaude-Vincent and Newman 2007, 5). If one were to plant the bed in the ground 
and that bed were to sprout anything at all, it would not generate beds, but trees. In this 
case, the inner principle of change or motion is independent of the form that is imposed 
                                                          
24 For much more on the detail of Aristotle’s distinction between “natural” and “artificial”, see Physics 2.1, 
192b12-23. 
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on it by the carpenter and the nature of the object is associated with the unchanged 
matter. 
In this sense of “nature”, the natural world would be one that owed its entire 
existence to natural causes and, therefore, would exclude all intentional human activity. 
This world would be one populated by objects, whether biotic or abiotic, without any 
forms imposed on them from without. It would be a world that was left entirely to itself, 
independent of human agency. Indeed, this Aristotelian concept of nature can serve us 
with a good thought experiment to give shape to what a bona fide natural world would 
look like independent of any form imposed on them by intentional agents. Of course, 
one can easily imagine a contrary world as well, one where there is no biotic or abiotic 
items that are left to be naturally expressed, where every last object and bit of material 
has been subject to the intentional activity of human agents. Indeed, the philosopher 
Alan Holland (2003) describes such a world as a “human-made world”, since it would be 
one where every object owed its form to human causes.25 
In his A Treatise of Human Nature David Hume ([1739-40] 2000, 304) remarks 
that there is no more ambiguous and equivocal word than “Nature”. 26  Hume also 
recognized that, in ordinary parlance, the word is often invoked as a rhetorical device to 
oppose the rare or unusual. In The Origin of Species, Charles Darwin (1859) recognizes 
nature simply as a “web of complex relations”, whereby no single organism can live 
independently of that web (Worster [1977] 1993, 156). In the 1872 version of the same 
text, Darwin states, “I mean by Nature, only the aggregate action and product of many 
                                                          
25 For more of Holland’s work on the concept of natural capital, see Holland (1995; 1997). 
 
26 See Soper (1995). 
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natural laws, and by laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us.” 27  Another 
conception of nature that adds to our understanding of natural capital is the concept of 
nature as a collection of things – the sum total of natural objects (see Collingwood 
[1945] 1976, 43).  
More recently, the critic Raymond Williams (1976, 184) echoes Hume by stating 
that nature is “perhaps the most complex word in the English language.” 28  The 
environmental historian, William Cronon (1996) emphasizes that nature is merely a 
social construct, an idea that never exists independently of the interpretive meanings we 
attach to the term (Wapner 2010, 16). In their The Moral Authority of Nature, Lorraine 
Daston and Fernando Vidal (2004) take “nature” to task by exposing the authority of 
this term when it is invoked in human affairs. To suggest that specific social conventions 
and political arrangements are “by nature” or “natural”, is often to assert that such 
institutional arrangements are either irrevocable or optimal. All too often, Daston and 
Vidal state, “Nature appears as an external authority, even if its imperatives are lodged 
deep in the body or psyche. Nature’s authority can also be internalized, made “natural” 
in the sense of seeming inevitable or effortless” (2004, 9). Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent 
and William R. Newman (2007) concur with Daston and Vidal’s analysis. In their The 
Artificial and the Natural, they state “the concept of nature functions and has always 
been used as a cultural value, a social norm, and a moral authority” (2007, 3). Since 
terms such as “nature” and “natural” do not merely possess a descriptive component, 
but a normative one as well, it is crucial to recognize that the concept of natural capital 
is not exempt from such influences (particularly when it is deployed by economists in 
                                                          
27 See Inkpen (2014, 10). 
28 Also, see Williams (1980). 
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debates about sustainable development). Indeed, the concept of natural capital would 
appear to be one instance of what Bernard Williams (1985, 140-3) refers to as a “thick 
concept” – a concept that is not merely descriptive, but action-guiding as well. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, it will be sufficient to point out, as a cautionary note, the 
moral authority that pervades the concept of natural capital when this it is invoked by 
economists. 
In one of his Three Essays on Religion, the essay entitled Nature, J.S. Mill 
([1874] 2006) considers a variety of possible meanings behind “nature”. Eventually, Mill 
boils his analysis down to two distinct concepts of nature. He states: 
 
It . . . appears that we must recognize at least two principle meanings in 
the word ‘nature’. In one sense, it means all powers existing in either the 
outer or inner world and everything which takes place by means of those 
powers. In another sense, it means, not everything which happens, but 
only what takes place without the agency, or without the voluntary and 
intentional agency, of man. This distinction is far from exhausting the 
ambiguities of the word; but it is the key to most of those on which 
important consequences depend ([1874] 2006, 375). 
 
Mill’s first concept of nature denotes everything actual and everything possible, 
including human agents and their intentional activities. The second concept of nature, 
the one that Mill prefers, drives a wedge between intentional human agency and that 
realm of phenomena that has not yet been affected by human agency (Schabas 1995). It 
is worth noting that G.F. Hegel and Karl Marx recognized these two concepts of nature, 
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but placed them under the same general heading of “Nature”. As Leo Marx (2008) 
explains, for these scholars, “First Nature” is the biophysical world as it existed before 
the evolution of Homo sapiens, and “Second Nature” is what most would refer to as the 
artificial: the material and cultural environment that our species has imposed upon 
“First Nature”. This view of Nature sustains a division between human activity and 
everything else, but, ultimately, it is in agreement with Mill’s first concept of nature as 
denoting everything actual and possible. 
It would appear that Mill’s second concept of nature fits natural capital 
particularly well since economists are wont to claim that specific instances of natural 
capital, unlike manufactured capital, are production processes that generate welfare-
enhancing benefits to economic agents in a manner that is relatively detached from 
human agency. Moreover, at least some of the time, economists appear to distinguish 
natural capital from manufactured capital by emphasizing materials or processes that 
have not yet been subject to direct human agency. This is especially true when it is 
acknowledged that the items denoted by natural capital are generally unproduced 
means of production that do not have to be intentionally built or constructed by human 
labour. 
But, while instances of natural capital are often considered to be “original” or “a 
gift of nature”, in much the same way that land was described by classical political 
economists, not every instance of natural capital is like this. In some cases, whether 
through ecosystem engineering and ecosystem restoration, it is difficult to deny that 
such instances of natural capital are intentionally constructed or built by human agents 
for some intended effect (this point will be made all the more clear in Chapter Five when 
it is argued that no one can restore or preserve nature without turning nature into an 
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artifact). Moreover, there are other cases in which the productivity of natural capital is 
improved or enhanced by direct human intervention, as would be the case when so-
called “invasive species” and other undesirables are extricated from specific ecosystems. 
Specific production processes denoted by natural capital can be modified or transmuted 
by human labour so that they persist in generating desired ecosystem goods and 
services. The economically valuable pollination services afforded by pollinator species 
and the water filtration services provided by specific watersheds are both instances of 
natural capital, and yet they can both be modified and improved by human intervention 
without losing their status as instances of natural capital. Dasgupta, Ann Kinzig and 
Perrings state that, “many ecosystems are deliberately ‘simplified’ (through the removal 
of pests, pathogens, predators or competitors) in order to increase their value for 
particular purposes. The best examples of this are to be found in agriculture, 
aquaculture, forestry, and urban systems. The biodiversity in such systems is managed 
to enhance production of particular services” (2013, 168). Thus, while it is clear that 
natural capital denotes specific cases of unproduced means of production, ones that are 
capable of producing in a manner that is relatively detached from human agency, not 
every instance of natural capital is separated from human agency in the sense that 
would be required of Mill’s second concept of nature. 
In fact, even if economists were committed to Mill’s second concept of nature, 
that realm of phenomena or domain on Earth that has not yet been subject to human 
agency, then the extension of this concept would appear to be empty. This is because, 
strictly speaking, there is no longer any part of the Earth that remains completely 
unaffected by human technologies (Bensaude-Vincent and Newman 2007; Wapner 
2010). In his The End of Nature Bill Mckibben states, 
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An idea, a relationship, can go extinct just like an animal or a plant. The 
idea in this case is ‘nature’, the separate and wild province, the world apart 
from man to which he has adapted, under whose rules he was born and 
died. In the past we have spoiled and polluted parts of that nature, 
inflicted environmental ‘damage’ … We never thought we had wrecked 
nature. Deep down, we never really thought that we could: it was too big 
and too old. Its forces, the wind, the rain, the sun – were too strong, too 
elemental. But, quite by accident, it turned out that the carbon dioxide and 
other gases we were producing in pursuit of a better life – in pursuit of  
warm houses and eternal economic growth and agriculture so productive it 
would free most of us for other work – could alter the power of the sun, 
could increase its heat. And that increase could change the patterns of 
moisture and dryness, breed storms in new places, breed deserts. Those 
things may or may not have begun to happen, but it is too late to prevent 
them from happening. We have produced carbon dioxide – we have ended 
nature. We have not ended rainfall or sunlight … But the meaning of the 
the wind, the sun, the rain – of nature – has already changed (Mckibben 
1990, 43-4. Quoted in O’Neill et al. 2008, 125-6). 
 
Mckibben’s (1990) claim that nature is dead is not meant to suggest that there is 
nothing left that is actual and possible – Mill’s first concept of Nature – but simply that 
there is no longer any part of the Earth’s surface that can be truly described as detached 
from human agency. Paul Wapner (2010) draws a similar conclusion when, in his recent 
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book Living Through the End of Nature, he remarks, “the wildness of nature has indeed 
largely disappeared as humans have placed their signature on all the earth’s ecosystems” 
(2010, 19). Wapner continues: 
 
Empirically, a growing human population, unparalleled technological 
prowess, increasing economic might, and an insatiable consumptive desire 
are propelling us to reach further across, dig deeper into, and more 
intensively exploit the earth’s resources, sinks, and ecosystem services … 
the cumulative force of our numbers, power, and technological mastery 
has swept humans across and deeply into all ecosystems to the point where 
one can no longer easily draw a clean distinction between the human and 
nonhuman realms. Whether one looks at urban sprawl, deforestation, loss 
of biological diversity, or ocean pollution, it is clear that humans have been 
progressively overtaking large swaths of nature and thereby imprinting 
themselves everywhere (Wapner 2010, 4). 
 
Indeed, the technology of our species is now so vast that it has extended far beyond the 
sub-lunar region to include the Cydonia (the region of Mars) (Bensaude-Vincent and 
Newman 2007). While this may be news to some, even Karl Marx had remarked that, 
“the nature which preceded human history no longer anywhere exists” (1968, 59). Thus, 
it would appear that the claim that there is some realm of phenomena on Earth that 
remains unaffected by human agency is simply false and if there is nothing left on Earth 
that remains unaffected by human agency, then the very processes denoted by the 
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concept of natural capital, could not be considered genuinely “natural” in this Millian 
sense.  
The alternative concept of nature proposed by Mill ([1874] 2006), however, 
maintains that everything possible and actual is part of nature. Prima facie, this concept 
is attractive since it is clearly compatible with naturalism, the thesis that there are no 
supernatural phenomena. As Daniel Dennett reminds us, “artificial environments are 
themselves a part of nature, after all” (1990, 192). The problem with this all-
encompassing concept of nature, however, is that it also appears to be discordant with 
natural capital for the obvious reason that everything actual and everything possible 
includes manufactured capital as well. If this first Millian concept of nature requires that 
everything is part of nature, then it would appear to be a poor fit for shedding light on 
what economists mean by natural capital. What good is a concept of nature if, by 
deploying it, it destroys the very features or characteristics that make natural and 
manufactured capital distinct in the first place? 
These two Millian concepts of nature appear to present us with a dilemma. Mill’s 
second concept of nature has to recognize the empirical claim that everything on Earth 
is – in some sense – artificial because the whole planet has been, directly or indirectly 
affected by human activity. Mill’s first concept of nature, on the other hand, insists that 
all humans and their intentional activities are part of nature, full stop. Indeed, it would 
appear that neither horn of this dilemma is going to be particularly useful for 
understanding the concept of natural capital in economics. 
Fortunately, this dilemma is more apparent than real. The way out of this rabbit 
hole is to concede that while everything, metaphysically, is natural we can still 
operationalize the concept of “Nature” for our purposes by insisting that those items 
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which remain relatively detached from human agency, those items that do not possess 
significant features caused by intentional human agents, are natural. In taking this 
pragmatic approach, I am following Sahotra Sarkar when he states:  
 
Even if humans are conceptualized as part of nature, we can coherently 
distinguish between humans and the rest of nature. There is at least an 
operational distinction; that is, one that we can straightforwardly make in 
practical contexts. We can distinguish between anthropogenic features 
(those largely brought about by human action) and non-anthropogenic 
ones (2012, 19). 
 
By making this operational distinction, Mill’s two concepts of nature are treated as 
compatible since one does not necessarily preclude the other. Mill’s first concept of 
nature is more fundamental since, even the most artificial of objects, such as atomic 
bombs and jumbo jets, are natural. On the other hand, for practical purposes, these 
same items are deemed artificial since they were intentionally built by human agents 
and they possess a variety of anthropogenic features. The same is true for items denoted 
by the concept of natural capital. Since everything actual and everything possible is 
natural, every instance of natural capital must also be natural. However, in light of the 
empirical claim that no phenomena denoted by the concept of natural capital is 
completely insulated from human agency, it is always a question about the relative 
detachment that such items – the ecosystems denoted by the concept of natural capital 
– have in relation to human agency.  
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Thus, the natural and artificial are located along a spectrum or continuum with 
the most natural objects being those that remain relatively detached from human agency 
and the most artificial objects are those that have been built and constructed by 
intentional human agents. There is no sui generis difference between artificial and 
natural objects since the difference is always a matter of degree. In other words, there is 
a blending of the natural and the artificial. As Bensaude-Vincent and Newman state, 
“artifacts are never really unnatural. As physical and chemical systems they belong to 
nature and generate a number of effects independent of the intentions of their 
designers” (2007, 2). This approach to the natural/artificial distinction has the virtue of 
preserving the practically significant distinction between, for example, intentionally 
modified environments such as city centers, from environments that have been subject 
to relatively little human agency, such remote uninhabited islands that were recently 
generated by natural causes in the Pacific. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, particularly Chapter Five, it will be useful to 
explicate a bit further what is meant by “relatively detached” with respect to Nature as a 
realm of phenomena that is separated from intentional human agency. Rather than 
imposing a strict division between natural and artificial objects, what I propose is that 
the artificial/natural distinction be described as a continuum or spectrum whereby 
phenomena are branded as more (less) natural or more (less) artificial, depending on 
their degree of detachment from intentional human agency. It will be useful to 
distinguish objects that remain completely detached from human agency from those 
which have a first or second degree of detachment. These divisions are represented in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. The Artificial/Natural Continuum 
 
 
According to this Figure directly above, the natural or most natural objects in the 
universe are those found to the left side of the continuum. They remain completely 
detached from human agency in the sense that they have not causally interacted with 
intentional human agents: they have been neither affected directly nor indirectly by 
human agents. If there truly is no longer any part of the sub-lunar region that is 
completely detached from human agency, then it follows that describing the Earth, or 
parts of the Earth, as entirely natural, would be incorrect. Be that as it may, parts of the 
Earth might well still be described as “relatively natural” when compared to objects that 
owe their forms to human agency and have been completely instrumentalized to serve 
human ends. Only that part of the universe which has not yet been affected by human 
agents is a candidate for complete detachment from human agency. 
On the opposite end of this continuum, to the right side of Figure 2, are those 
items that have been completely instrumentalized by intentional human agents to serve 
their own ends. This category includes ordinary technical artifacts, such as chairs, that 
use materials found and subjected to the intentional modifications of human agents. Not 
only are chairs intentionally planned and built by the woodworker, often in combination 
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with manufactured machines, but the actual construction of such artifacts will normally 
involve transforming or modifying materials to bring about certain desirable 
characteristics of the object at hand. Under this framework, all such items, including 
capital goods, such as manufactured machines and tools, possess what I term a first 
degree of detachment from intentional human agents. 
Finally, objects that have been either directly or indirectly affected by human 
agency but that have not yet been completely instrumentalized by intentional human 
agents can be described as possessing a second degree of detachment. This category 
includes items that have not been intentionally made by human agents but that, 
nonetheless, have arisen at least in part as a consequence of human activity. For 
example, the sawdust caused by the woodworker building the chair is a consequence of 
intentional human agency but since it is not the goal of such activity and has not (yet) 
been instrumentalized for human purposes, it can be described as having a second 
degree of detachment. Therefore, unlike those items which can be described as having a 
first degree of detachment from human agents, establishing that some object has a 
second degree of detachment is much weaker since it merely requires that there be some 
causal connection between some intentional human agent and that object. 
This chapter has established that while both natural capital and manufactured 
capital share many of the same characteristics, there are at least two features that make 
the former theoretical category distinct from the latter. As conceived by economists, 
natural and manufactured capital both have a dual nature since, depending on the 
context of analysis, they are both conceived as heterogeneous particulars and 
homogeneous funds of economic value. And, while the specific instances of both 
categories are declared to be capable of producing, depletable, and beneficial, only 
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instances of natural capital can be original or unproduced means of production capable 
of self-generation. This means that there are some instances of natural capital that, 
rather than being necessarily made by human agency, they are simply found and then 
declared to be an instance of natural capital whose attributed function is to produce 
ecosystem goods and services. However, since the items denoted by the concept of 
natural capital, such as ecosystems, can be improved, modified, and restored by human 
intervention, there are instances of natural capital that can be brought into existence by 
a combination or mixture of human and non-human agency as well. The implication of 
this statement is that while no instance of manufactured capital comes into existence 
merely by non-human material causes, the etiology of natural capital does not 
necessarily rely on anthropogenic causes. 
 As for the concept of nature, for the purpose of illuminating the concept of 
natural capital, this chapter effectively collapsed Mill’s two concepts. Mill’s first concept 
of nature denotes everything actual and everything possible, including human agents 
and their intentional activities. His second concept, by contrast, denotes that realm 
which has not yet been affected by human agency. With respect to this second concept, 
because there is virtually no part of the surface of the Earth that is completely insulated 
by human activity, I claimed that the question is one of relative, not absolute 
detachment. The problem with adopting Mill’s first concept of nature, on the other 
hand, is that it would be of little use when enforcing the distinction between 
manufactured and natural capital since everything, by definition, would be natural. To 
evade this difficulty, I proposed to accept Mill’s first concept of nature as the most 
fundamental, but, for operational purposes, to distinguish between humans and their 
activities from the rest of nature. This unassuming move enables one, for practical 
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purposes, to distinguish between anthropogenic features and non-anthropogenic 
features, a division required to make sense of the distinction between manufactured and 
natural capital, without being obligated to explain how it is that intentional human 
agency is somehow “outside of nature”. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Natural Capital:  
Novel Concept or the Same Old Stew? 
 
 
 
 
 
The most striking feature of natural capital is the idea that Nature not only affords 
human agents with passive materials and raw resources to be improved by human 
labour, but that, in many cases, it endows us with relatively stable welfare-enhancing 
production processes. The concept denotes various unproduced means of production 
that generate goods and services ready-made for human consumption, in a manner that 
is relatively detached from human agency. Consider, for instance, the pollination 
“services” provided by pollinator species, such as honey bees. Economists have claimed 
that such species perform economically significant roles in the cultivation of numerous 
crop plants, such as tomatoes, celery, and rapeseed. As recognized in the previous 
chapter, recent estimates suggest the economic value of worldwide pollination services 
is approximately €195 billion (Lonsdorf et al. 2011). Another sweeping study published 
in the journal Nature suggests the Earth’s entire biosphere, including a wide range of 
natural services, such as the purification of water, nutrient cycling, and the 
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detoxification of wastes, is worth between $14 and $54 trillion dollars, annually 
(Costanza et al. 1997). 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that at least two features distinguish 
natural capital from manufactured capital: originality and self-generation. Instances of 
manufactured capital are never original or self-generative since they are a produced 
means of production that depend on the investment decisions of economic agents; 
moreover, manufactured capital goods are incapable of producing autonomously, 
completely free from human agency. Simply because natural capital is distinct from 
manufactured capital, however, does not entail that the two characteristics which make 
it so are without historical precedent. The objective of this chapter is to deepen our 
understanding of natural capital by situating the concept in the history of economics. 
While natural capital is a relatively new concept among contemporary economists, I will 
argue that the characteristics which make it so have roots in the writings of classical 
political economists. 
No other school of thought in the history of economics emphasizes the inimitable 
role of land and Nature’s capacity to generate wealth more than the French Physiocrats 
of the mid-eighteenth century. It would seem that if the concept of natural capital were 
to have a forerunner of any kind it would be found in the writings of the Physiocrats. 
However, I will argue this is not the case. The founder of this school, the physician 
François Quesnay, and his associate Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, claimed that land 
(often called “Nature”) needed to be animated by human labour first.29 As such, the 
independence of Nature’s productions among the Physiocrats, a distinctive feature of 
natural capital, is called into question. Within the Physiocratic model of economic 
                                                          
29 To be clear, Turgot was not a Physiocrat. 
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production, Nature or land is the unique and necessary but insufficient condition for the 
production and circulation of wealth in a given society. Thus, it is an overstatement to 
claim that, for the Physiocrats, Nature is the lone source of wealth. 
Nonetheless, I will submit that envisioning the whole of Nature as producing for 
human agents, one that is presumed by economists who deploy the concept of natural 
capital, has roots in the writings of Carl Linnaeus who depicts the whole Earth and all of 
its productions as the “oeconomy of nature”. From this viewpoint, the Earth was 
perceived as a world to be managed for maximum output and human beings had the 
obligation to make nature’s productions accrue to the enrichment of the human 
economy (Worster [1977] 1994). While it is true that economists today have stripped 
Nature’s productions from the explicit theological and teleological clothing in which 
Linnaeus originally dressed them, Nature qua independent producer is on full display in 
during the 18th Century with Linnaeus’ Oeconomia Naturae (1749). Moreover, I will 
claim that there is a nascent category of natural capital to be unearthed in the writings 
of other eminent economic thinkers, such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl 
Marx. When these theorists referred to the “spontaneous productions of the Earth” or 
Nature’s “natural products” they had a distinctive class of production in mind, one that 
denotes Nature’s independently generated products. And, while such products were, on 
the whole, treated as scant or relatively unimportant for the purpose of economic 
theorizing, such productions can be considered as a harbinger to the items denoted by 
the concept of natural capital today. 
The distinctive feature of natural capital, the one that makes this concept so 
remarkable in the first place, is that it presumes ex hypothesi that aspects of Nature 
which have not been directly subject to human agency are capable of independently 
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producing economically significant natural products. In the very least, those who 
regularly deploy the concept of natural capital do not rule out such unaided productions 
a priori. Of course, neither of the foregoing statements implies that instances of natural 
capital cannot be augmented or improved without losing their status as natural capital 
(as we have seen in Chapter Two), but it does suggest that there are specific cases in 
which economists tacitly suppose that non-human agency alone is the proximate cause 
of certain economic phenomena. What I mean by non-human agency here is not 
anything metaphysically mysterious or fantastical. On the contrary, when economists 
claim that a specific instance of natural capital produces they suppose, implicitly or 
explicitly, that unassisted Nature is not only causally efficacious, but that there is some 
structure or mechanism, not originally produced by humans, that is sufficiently effectual 
to generate some stream of goods and services to be consumed by human agents. Thus, 
unlike manufactured capital, natural capital can be found, not made. Thus, while the 
claim that Nature has agency does not entail that Nature consciously or intentionally 
produces goods and services for human agents, or for any other purpose, it also does not 
rob Nature of its capacity to spontaneously generate economically valuable goods and 
services. 
Perhaps the most interesting point of departure, when attempting to situate the 
concept of natural capital in the history of economic thought, is to consider the 
Physiocrats of France who are widely known for having claimed that Nature or land 
alone is truly productive. “Physiocratie” means “reign of nature” (Vardi 2012). On the 
surface at least, it would seem that if there is any theory of economic production in the 
history of economic thought that would qualify as being a progenitor to the concept of 
natural capital, the Physiocratic doctrine would be it. This is because it is generally 
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accepted that no other group of economic thinkers emphasized land as the origin of 
wealth more than the Physiocrats. In what follows, however, I will submit that unlike 
natural capital, which distinctively captures Nature’s unassisted productions, the same 
cannot be said for the Physiocrats. While their creed involved the notion that land was 
the ultimate source of wealth, human labour was required to set it into motion. It is true 
that the Physiocrats claimed land was the crucial source of society’s wealth; however, 
they also held that the natural fertility of the soil was, on its own, insufficient to 
automatically generate it. Wealth generation and the ensuing circulation of wealth 
throughout a given society could only be activated by an equally special causal factor: 
human agency. In particular, a specific class of individuals – the Farmers or 
Husbandman – was required to cultivate the land in order to take advantage of the 
original powers of the soil. The well-known implication of this statement is that, on the 
Physiocratic account, no other class of individuals was truly productive. 
In his Theories of Surplus-Value, Karl Marx describes the Physiocrats as “the true 
fathers of modern political economy.” Describing the Physiocratic account of the 
economy during a period when political economy was in its infancy Marx states, “this 
was an extremely brilliant conception, incontestably the most brilliant for which 
political economy had up to then been responsible.” 30  Adam Smith also held 
Physiocracy in the highest esteem, particularly its founder, François Quesnay. In fact, it 
is well-known that, had Quesnay still been alive in 1776, the year that Smith published 
the Wealth of Nations, Smith would have dedicated his magnum opus to Quesnay. 
Smith states that the Physiocratic school, “with all its imperfections” was “the nearest 
                                                          
30 Theories of Surplus Value in Economic Manuscript of 1861-63 (see Marx and Engels 1989, 239-40, as 
quoted by Vardi 2012, 12). 
65 
  
approximation to the truth that has yet been published upon the subject of political 
economy.”31  Of course, not every economic theorist was equally spellbound by the 
Physiocrats. David Hume, for one, was outright scornful towards Physiocrats, thinkers 
that he believed to be the most fanciful of men. When corresponding with abbé 
Morrelet, a Physiocratic sympathizer, Hume urged, “thunder [the Physiocrats], and 
crush them, and pound them, and reduce them to dust and ashes! They are, indeed, the 
set of men the most chimerical and arrogant that now exist.”32 
The Physiocrats, who described themselves as “les économistes”, were most 
prominent circa 1750-1770 and are widely recognized for inventing various “tableau 
économique”. These pictures represented the dynamics of production and distribution 
across the entire economy, most often on an annual basis (these dynamics are depicted 
in one version of The Marquis de Mirabeau’s tableau économique Figure 3). The 
Physiocrats are also widely known for having influenced Smith’s systematizing of 
economic phenomena in the Wealth of Nations, and for rejecting the reigning 
Mercantilist doctrine that had been led by the Director of the East India Company, 
Thomas Mun, who privileged foreign trade (the balance of trade doctrine) to enlarge the 
Kingdom’s stock or treasure. Headed by François Quesnay, the personal physician to 
King Louis XV and Madame de Pompadour, the Physiocrats were the most influential 
school of economic thought during the mid-18th Century and according to at least one 
historian they were also the first to develop a clear view of capital’s role in economic 
production (Hennings [1987] 1990). Although Quesnay’s success is normally attributed 
to his theoretical accomplishments, his main goal was practical: to derive maxims of  
                                                          
31 Smith ([1776] 1976, 678). 
 
32 This quotation is from a letter from Hume to Morrelet in 1769. Quoted by Skinner (2009, 410). 
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Figure 3. Tableau Économique 
 
 
wise governance that would lead to the greatest possible production of commodities and 
the happiness of humankind (Banzhaf 2000). 
Above all, the Physiocrats are renowned for having claimed that all wealth derives 
from the ground, a position that can be traced back to Richard Cantillon’s ([1755] 1952) 
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Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Général. The first sentence of Cantillon’s Essai is 
telling: “la terre est la source out la matière d’ou l’on tire la richèsse; le travail de 
l’homme est la forme qui la produit” ([1755] 1952, 1). This means that land is the matter 
and labour is the form of all produce and merchandise. In this work, Cantillon had 
proposed a land theory of value, which implied that the value or what he labeled the 
“intrinsic value” of manufactured commodities is proportional to the quantity of land 
used for its production, including the upkeep of those laborers who were used to fashion 
such products (Brewer 1992). Land, for Cantillon, the Irishman who was famous for the 
large fortune he amassed from banking activities in Paris, was the unique non-
reproducible and original factor that creates value. Moreover, for any given production 
process, labourers are required to subsist on the produce of the land. The basis of this 
theory can be understood in terms of what he took to be the “par” between labour and 
land, an idea that derives from Cantillon’s main intellectual ancestor, William Petty 
(1623-87).  
Petty, most famous for authoring A Treatises of Taxes and Contributions (1662) 
and Political Arithmetic (1676) had proposed a similar complex “land-and-labour” 
theory of value. Since land and labour could be expressed in terms of one or the other, 
each of these factors was placed on the same footing (see Petty 1963). As Petty states, 
“all things ought to be valued by two natural denominations, which is land and labour; 
that is, we ought to say, a ship or garment is worth such a measure of land, with such 
another measure of labour; for as much as both ships and garments were the creatures 
of lands and men’s labours thereupon”.33 Cantillon also ascribed a “par” between labour 
                                                          
33 Petty (1963, 44) is quoted by Alessandro Roncaglia ([1977] 1985, 80). 
 
68 
  
and land, but his version was not as symmetrical as Petty’s. Because land was the 
ultimate or crucial scarce factor of production for Cantillon, he considered it to be even 
more fundamental than labour, a position that is clearly at odds with the labour theory 
of value (both the embodied and labour commanded theory of value) that would later 
become the canon of classical political economists, such as Smith, Ricardo, Mill, and 
Marx. At several points in his Essai, Cantillon reminds the reader that labour is clearly 
not a constraint on production since it is not truly scarce: “Men multiply like mice in a 
barn if they have the means of subsistence without limit”.34 Labour costs can always be 
reduced to the amount of land needed for the production of labourers and, therefore, 
although the intrinsic value of any commodity might well include the cost of 
maintaining the workers throughout a production process, such costs can always be 
expressed in terms of land alone, the one true scarce factor of production (Brewer 1988). 
The link between Cantillon’s Essai and the Physiocrats is relatively clear. The 
Marquis de Mirabeau, who founded the Physiocratic school of thought with Quesnay, 
originally planned to publish his L’Ami des Hommes or “Friend of Mankind” (1759) in 
direct response to Cantillon’s Essai (Meek 1962). Moreover, Anthony Brewer (1992) has 
convincingly argued that Quesnay’s economics, characterized by the sole productivity of 
agriculture, appears to come directly from Cantillon’s Essai; the main difference being 
that for the latter, land is the only scarce resource while for Quesnay the main constraint 
on economic production is agriculture performing below its potential, the cause of 
which was almost always a lack of capital investment. 
The Physiocrats developed an abstract and deductive “system” – a circular-flow 
model of production and consumption that consisted of three interdependent social 
                                                          
34 Cantillon is quoted by Brewer (1992, 36). 
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classes, only one of which was claimed to be truly productive (Riskin 2003). Quesnay 
showed that the Farmers or Husbandmen, when combined with the natural powers of 
Nature, are the lone bona fide productive social class. The other two classes in the 
model, the landowners and artisans, rely on the farmers for their basic needs and 
subsistence. These latter two classes are considered all but sterile because while they 
might succeed in transmuting various natural objects into useful forms, such activities 
are merely modifications (“façonner”) and do not represent genuine or true production 
(“produire”), a special activity that could only be accomplished by the Farmers.  
Among the Physiocrats, capital was understood to be an “advance”, a necessary 
pre-condition to the whole agricultural production process (Hollander [1987] 1992). 
Without capital that had been saved up during a previous time period, there could be no 
production according to the Physiocratic circular-flow model. Such advances derived 
exclusively from the wealthy landowning class, who themselves had originally received 
them in the form of rents that had been produced by the productive class during the 
previous period of production. Above all, policy prescriptions for the Physiocrats 
required that such advances be directed to the agricultural sector as investments in 
various tangible means of production, including seed, buildings, drainage, hired labor, 
oxen, ploughs, and other improvements. All such investments were required to sustain 
the productive class until the annual harvest. In other words, advances or capital stocks 
were to be invested in the only genuinely productive class of production. 
The Physiocrats held that the agricultural sector alone was truly productive. 
Why? The chief reason for this claim was because the Physiocrats believed Nature alone 
was capable of yielding a surplus or “produit net” (net product), one that subsequently 
circulated among the three main social classes. The net product was the central factor – 
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the strategic policy variable – for the Physiocrats. Anything that increased the net 
product caused an expansion of economic activity while anything that reduced it, such 
as inadequate advances, caused a contraction (Meek 1962). As Ronald L. Meek explains,  
 
The Physiocrats’ theoretical system was that this net product was yielded 
by agriculture, and by agriculture alone. Agriculture as the supreme 
occupation, not only because it was morally and politically superior to 
others, not only because its produce was primary in the wants and always 
in demand, but also – and mainly – because it alone yielded a disposable 
surplus over necessary cost (1962, 20). 
 
Artisanal and manufacturing activities figured in the Physiocratic model, but the 
members of these classes were deemed sterile because, in the long run, they were unable 
to produce a surplus over and above the costs that were incurred in production. 
Therefore, the two unproductive classes of society, the landowners and artisans, were 
directly dependent upon the “produit net” produced in the agrarian sector. As Quesnay 
explains in Extracts from ‘Men’:  
 
Those who make manufactured commodities do not produce wealth, 
because their labour increases the value of these commodities only by an 
amount equal to the wages which are paid to them and which are drawn 
from the product of landed property. The manufacturer who makes cloth, 
the tailor who makes clothes, and the cobbler who makes shoes, do not 
produce wealth any more than do the cook who makes his master’s dinner, 
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the worker who saws wood, or the musicians who give a concert. They are 
all paid out of one and the same fund (Quesnay is quoted by Meek 1962, 
96). 
 
The fund that Quesnay refers to at the end of this passage directly above is that 
which is generated by the land, but only after it has been properly prepared and worked 
by the Farmers or Husbandmen. It is crucial to recognize that, for the Physiocrats, while 
land is the source of all wealth, unassisted land or Nature is insufficient for generating 
it. This claim is not uncontroversial since some scholars have has argued that Nature 
alone is the prime mover in the Physiocratic model of economic production (Banzhaf 
2000). Be that as it may, it should be clear that Quesnay and the other Physiocrats, 
including The Marquis de Mirabeau, maintained that, strictly speaking, human labour 
and capital cause the agricultural sector to prosper, stimulate industry, and increase and 
perpetuate wealth throughout the entire society (see, for example, Quesnay’s The 
‘General Maxims’). In other words, land is a unique and necessary, but insufficient 
condition, for the production and circulation of wealth among the three main classes in 
the Physiocratic model. 
Further evidence to support this claim can be found in Quesnay’s Extract from 
Corn where he distinguishes between the roles played by Farmers and Artisans. He 
states, “one group of men causes this wealth to be generated by means of cultivation; 
another group prepares it for use; and those who have the enjoyment of it pay both of 
these groups” (Meek 1962, 73). This statement depicts an economy that produces 
wealth, not merely by the forces of unassisted nature or land alone, but land that is 
stimulated in the right kinds of ways. Moreover, without sufficient capital, or what the 
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Physiocrats referred to as “advances”, from the landowners directed towards 
agricultural production, Quesnay expects pure poverty among the people. He asks, 
rhetorically: 
 
what then would be the fate of that poor man who is told to go and plough 
the land? Could he cultivate it on his own account? Would he obtain work 
from the farmers if they are poor? Farmers who find it impossible to meet 
the costs required for proper cultivation and to pay the wages of servants 
and workmen cannot employ the peasants. The land, lacking manure and 
all but uncultivated, can only leave all of them to languish in poverty” 
(Extract from Corn, quoted in Meek 1962, 82; italics in the original). 
 
 In his magisterial Réflections sur la Formations et Distribution des Richesses 
(Reflections on the Formations and Distribution of Riches), a correspondent to the 
Physiocrats, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot ([1770] 1898), was even more explicit than 
Quesnay when recognizing the role of human agency as the “First Cause” of wealth 
production. Matching Quesnay’s standard Physiocratic model, Turgot, the Baron de 
Laune and Finance Minister to Louis XVI,  also divided society into three classes: the 
Husbandman (productive class), the Artisans (the unproductive class), and the 
Proprietors (the disposable class). While scholars generally deny that Turgot was a 
genuine member of the Physiocrats, hardly anyone would deny that this friend and 
interlocutor of David Hume’s accepted the inimitable role of land in the production of 
wealth (Vardi 2012; Riskin 2003; Meek 1962). In fact, Turgot maintained that the 
Husbandman or the farmer was to the realm of economic phenomena what was 
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Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover was to the entire Universe. Just as Aristotle had concluded 
in Book 8 of Physics that, logically, there must be an initial unmoved mover to explain 
all of the other motion in the universe, Turgot suggests that, in the realm of economic 
phenomena, it is the Husbandman, and not the land or Nature that imparts the first 
impulse (“donne le premier movement”) which generates wealth. The Husbandman’s 
labour alone causes the land to produce, without which, “the land produces nothing” 
(Turgot ([1770] 1898, 16). 
The portrait Turgot paints of wealth production, however edifying it may appear 
to be on the surface, is logically incoherent. In fact, in his Réflections sur la Formations 
et Distribution des Richesses, Turgot plainly contradicts himself when he 
simultaneously claims that the Husbandman is the sole source of wealth and the Earth 
is the sole source of wealth. The former claim is emphasized throughout most of his 
short book where Turgot states that it is the Husbandman who is the “sole source of all 
wealth”, the “sole source of the riches”, that, once produced, circulates throughout 
society, animating the other classes that constitute society. However, later on, in the 
very same book, when Turgot describes the first time humans cultivated the Earth when 
he states that: 
 
it is the earth which is always the first and only source of all wealth; it is 
that which as the result of cultivation produces all the revenue; it is that 
also which has provided the first fund of advances prior to all cultivation. 
The first Cultivator has taken the seed he has sown from plants which the 
earth has sown from plants which the earth had of itself produced; while 
waiting for the harvest he has lived by hunting and fishing, and upon wild 
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fruits: his tools have been branches of trees, torn down in the forests, 
shaped with stones sharpened against other stones; he has himself 
captured in the chase animals wandering in the woods or caught them in 
his traps; he has brought them into subjection and trained them; he has 
made use of them first for food and afterwards to help him in his labour. 
The first fund has grown little by little; the cattle, especially, were of all 
moveable wealth that which was most easy to accumulate: they died, but 
they reproduced themselves, and the wealth which consists in them is in a 
way imperishable: this fund, moreover, grows by the mere process of 
generation, and gives an annual produce, either in milk, or in fleeces, in 
hides and other materials, which, with the wood obtained in the forests, 
have formed the first fund for the works of industry ([1770] 1898, 46). 
 
While explicitly recognizing that Turgot may have been inconsistent when 
attributing different things with the status of “sole source of wealth”, it is also clear that, 
with Quesnay, Turgot cannot be said to emphasize Nature’s unassisted productions of 
wealth, or goods and services, certainly not in any way resembling what modern day 
economists do when deploying the concept natural capital. For both of these eighteenth 
century economic theorists and for the Physiocrats generally, unaided Nature was 
incapable of producing wealth. If it were correct that the Physiocrats emphasized 
Nature’s unassisted productions, then their framework would have been a prime 
candidate for being a precursor to natural capital since both would have emphasized 
Nature’s unaided productions. 
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It should be recognized that, as mentioned above, the emphasis here on Nature’s 
unassisted productions is not meant to deny that the production processes denoted by 
the concept of natural capital must remain completely unaffected by human agency to 
qualify as instances of natural capital. On the contrary, as made clear in the previous 
chapter, instances of natural capital can be augmented and improved or modified by 
human agency. The reason to emphasize nature’s unassisted productions here, and not 
improved instances of natural capital, is because the former is a distinguishing feature 
of natural capital. From this vantage point, we can see that, for the Physiocrats, Nature 
or land is special insofar as it is required for the inimitable role it serves in producing 
wealth (that subsequently animates the three main classes of society, including the 
farmers, landowners, and artisans). Nevertheless, unassisted Nature or land alone is an 
insufficient condition for generating the wealth that circulates throughout society. For 
the Physiocrats, labour and land are jointly necessary and sufficient for economic 
production, a species of activity that is only manifested by the Farmers or Husbandmen. 
If unassisted Nature qua producer of economically valuable goods and services 
cannot be unequivocally aligned with the Physiocrats, then where else might one look 
for a nascent category of natural capital? Indeed, some of the most esteemed economic 
thinkers in the history of economic thought did recognize Nature’s unaided productions. 
As we will see below, this category of production was often neglected because it was 
considered economically insignificant, particularly when compared to those items that 
had been improved by capital and human labour through the manufacturing process 
and other artisanal activities. Before turning to such economic theorists, however, it is 
worth recognizing the writings of the 18th Century Swedish botanist, Carl Linnaeus 
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(1707-1778) who believed that the whole Earth and its productions were to be managed 
for maximum output and adapted to the human economy. 
Linnaeus had devised his own system of plant classifications, Systema Naturae, 
describing it as “the Creator’s magnificent arrangement”. Linnaeus’ writings, 
particularly his Oeconomia Naturae (1749), held significant sway over not only 
nineteenth century naturalists, such as Charles Darwin and the geologist, Charles Lyell, 
but classical political economists, such as Adam Smith, as well (Koerner 1999; Pearce 
2010). Robert Stauffer states, “the importance of Linnaeus in the evolution of ecology is 
very great, and it is striking that among the naturalists writing after Linnaeus and before 
Darwin, it is the geologist Charles Lyell who shows the clearest grasp of Linnaeus’ ideas 
on the economy of nature and who makes the fullest use of them in his work” (1960, 
238-9). Indeed, Darwin not only deployed the Linnaean terms of “polity of nature” and 
the “economy of nature” in his own works with great regularity and gleaned the notion 
of reciprocal dependence between organisms from Linnaeus’ Oeconomia Naturae, but 
his deep admiration for Linnaeus is on full display in a famous letter written to his 
friend William Ogle, where Darwin refers to the Swedish botanist, along with the French 
naturalist and zoologist George Cuvier, as one of his “gods” (Koerner 1999, 15; Gotthelf 
1999).35 
                                                          
35  Feb. 22, 1882 
My dear Dr Ogle 
You must let me thank you for the pleasure which the Introduction to the Aristotle book 
has given me. I have rarely read anything which has interested me more; though I have not read 
as yet more than a quarter of the book proper. From quotations which I had seen I had a high 
notion of Aristotle’s merits, but I had not the most remote notion what a wonderful man he was. 
Linnaeus and Cuvier have been my two gods, though in very different ways, but they were mere 
school-boys to old Aristotle. – How very curious, also, his ignorance on some points as on muscles 
as to means of movement. – I am glad that you have explained in so probable a manner some of 
the grossest mistakes attributed to him. – I never realized before reading your book to what an 
enormous summation of labour we owe even our common knowledge. I wish that Aristotle could 
have known what a great Defender of the Faith he has found in you. 
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In her Natural Origins of Economics, Margaret Schabas (2005, 30) argues that 
Linnaeus was one of the most important economic theorists of the Enlightenment and, 
furthermore, that the “oeconomy of nature” that Linnaeus depicts in Oeconomia 
Naturae is the first genuine depiction of an economy (a claim that flies in the face of the 
orthodoxy since it is generally presumed that the Physiocrats were the first economic 
theorists to depict an economy). Even among those who would dispute this claim, and 
question the status of Linnaeus as a bona fide economic theorist, there can be no 
question that Linnaeus held economic theorizing in the highest regard. As Lisbet 
Koerner recounts in her Linnaeus: Nature and Nation, Linnaeus’ support for economic 
science is unquestionable when he states: “no science in the world is more elevated, 
more necessary and more useful than Economics, since all people’s material well-being 
is based on it” (1999, 103). 
For Linnaeus, “Oeconomy” is the art of household management or oikonomikê in 
the Aristotelian sense. Recall from Book 1 of his Politics, Aristotle grapples with the 
topics of wealth and household management, and investigates whether money-making 
and oikonomikê is the same thing (DesRoches 2014). He responds in the negative, 
arguing that “it is easy to see that the art of household management is not identical with 
the art of getting wealth, for the one uses the material which the other provides” (Pol 
1256a9-11).36 For Aristotle, natural wealth-getting involves the master of a household 
acquiring and administering those useful objects of wealth that constitute “true wealth” 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Believe me my dear Dr. Ogle 
     Yours very sincerely, 
      Ch. Darwin 
 
36 It is worth noting that while Jowett’s canonical work translates oikonomikê as an art, others have 
considered oikonomikê to be a practical science that aims at good action (See, for example, Miller 1995). 
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or “true riches” in order to meet the needs of all household members, including the 
master, his wife, children, and slaves. While Linnaeus has less to say about the relation 
between wealth and household management than Aristotle, Linnaeus extends Aristotle’s 
concept of oikonomikê to designate the whole oeconomy of nature. As Trevor Pearce 
(2010, 496) explains, during the seventeenth century, the word “oeconomia” still had its 
Aristotelian meaning: the ordering of things pertaining to one’s household; its usage was 
metaphorically extended to nature as a whole, animal bodies, and human bodies. 
Linnaeus simply adopted Aristotle’s notion of oikonomikê and extended “the 
physiological idea of the animal economy to nature in its entirety. In [Linnaeus’] eyes, 
the economy of nature deserved a description as detailed and rational as that of the 
animal economy” (Pearce 2010, 497). In Oeconomia Naturae, Linnaeus states, “By 
oeconomy of nature we understand the all-wise disposition of the creator in relation to 
natural things, by which they are fitted to produce general ends, and reciprocal uses.”37 
In short, Linnaeus believed that the oeconomy of nature was God’s great household, a 
household that was to be managed for human ends. 
For Aristotle, good oikonomikê involves becoming economically self-sufficient, 
mainly to avoid the constraints imposed by other people and nature. For Aristotle, the 
self-sufficiency of a household is sometimes understood as “autarky”, “independence 
from others”, “lacking in nothing”, or “getting enough” (Meikle 1995). From the 
viewpoint of human lives on the whole, the self-sufficiency of households is a necessary, 
though intermediary, step along the road to human flourishing or eudaimonia. A self-
sufficient oikos not only provides the subsistence needs of each household member, but 
for those individuals capable of achieving eudaimonia; the household’s true wealth will 
                                                          
37 Linnaeus (1749, 31) is quoted by Pearce (2010, 497). 
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also confer the basis for pursuing those non-pecuniary goods that Aristotle tells us are 
necessary conditions for the good life.38 Linnaeus, too, emphasized self-sufficiency as 
the proper goal of oikonomikê. Indeed, with his strong cameralist leanings, Linnaeus 
had devised a grand scheme for an autarkic Sweden whereby nonindigenous species of 
fruits and vegetables were to be domestically grown in greenhouses (Koerner 1999; 
Schabas 2005). 
Linnaeus’ Oeconomia Naturae presents a static portrait of the geo-biological 
interactions in Nature with only one kind of change: a cyclical pattern that, inexorably, 
returns to the beginning (Worster [1977] 1994, 34). Linnaeus envisions all of the Earth’s 
species of plants and animals as purposefully and perfectly arranged, living in mutually 
dependent relations with one another. Nature, for Linnaeus, also possessed self-
regulating properties (Koerner 1999, 82). Each and every creature plays an important 
and specific function or “allotted place” in nature’s economy (Pearce 2010). All creatures 
were assigned a part in the great unfolding oeconomy of nature; each with its own 
foodstuff, geological range, limits to appetites, and minimum and maximum rates of 
reproduction (Worster [1977] 1994). It is critical to recognize that Linnaeus’ oeconomy 
of nature not only included the plants and animals, but humans, and the entire 
atmosphere.  
Indeed, for Linnaeus, the whole world was a “terraqueous globe” that consisted of 
three distinct and yet mutually interdependent kingdoms: the fossil (or the crust of the 
                                                          
38 For Aristotle, only the ruling free men heads of the household need complete virtue of character. 
Although women have the capacity for deliberation, this capacity is without authority (see Book 1, Chapter 
13 of the Politics), which, as Roberts (2009) explains, means that women can think of their good and how 
they might attain it but that deliberation is not in their full control. Both women and children can achieve 
virtue relative to their inferior souls (Pol, 1260a 20-4). Slaves, on the other hand, lack practical wisdom, 
the capacity to deliberate, and they also have an inferior rational part of the soul (Miller 2005). For more 
on Aristotle’s account of the nature of women, see Smith (1983). 
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Earth), the vegetable, which “adorns the fact of the Earth and draws the great part of its 
nourishment from the fossil kingdom”, and the animal kingdom, which is sustained by 
the vegetable kingdom (Linnaeus 1749, 40). In relation to these three distinct kingdoms, 
we are told that “man’s activities are seamlessly joined to those of plants and animals, 
even to the Earth’s crust and atmosphere” (Schabas 2005, 30). Linnaeus describes all 
such interdependencies when he states, 
 
Everything arranged by the omnipotent Creator on our globe is performed 
in such a wonderful order that there is not one thing that is not dependent 
for its existence on the support of another … The earth becomes the food of 
the plant, the plant that of the worm, the worm that of the bird and the 
bird often that of the beast of prey … Man who turns everything to his 
needs, often becomes the food of the beast or bird or fish of prey or of the 
worm and the earth. So all things go round.39  
 
For Linnaeus, the whole of nature was imbued with purpose and nature was incapable 
of producing waste. Just as Aristotle had famously argued that “nature does nothing in 
vain”, Linnaeus wholeheartedly agreed with this sentiment since he believed that each 
and every creature was fully engaged in the oeconomy of nature (De Incessu Animalium 
2, 704b12-17). Even the dead and fallen tree, for example, does not go to waste but is, 
without delay, efficiently eliminated by a wide variety of creatures that depend on such 
items for their continued existence, such as liverworts, mushrooms, beetles, caterpillars, 
and woodpeckers (Pearce 2010, 498). Similarly, as Donald Worster suggests, “all of 
                                                          
39 Linnaeus quoted by Schabas (2005, 30). 
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animate nature is … bound together in common interest by the chains of sustenance that 
link the living to the dead, the predator to its prey, the beetle to the dung on which it 
feeds” (1977 [1994], 35). Linnaeus, emphasizing the obvious benefits of this state of 
affairs explains that: 
 
The whole earth would be overwhelmed with carcasses, and stinking 
bodies, if some animals did not delight to feed upon them. Therefore when 
an animal dyes (sic), bears, wolves, foxes, ravens, &c. do not lose a 
moment till they have taken all away. But if a horse, e.g. dyes near the 
public road, you will find him, after a few days, swoln, burst, and at last 
filled with innumerable grubs of carnivorous flies, by which he is entirely 
consumed, and removed out of the way, that he may not become a 
nuisance to passengers by his poisonous stench (1749, 121). 
 
While it is true that, according to Linnaeus, human beings are part and parcel of 
the oeconomy of nature, these creatures still occupied a special role in this system since 
the whole contrivance was designed for mankind by the hand of God. This divine 
oeconomy of nature was an idea absorbed by Linnaeus who was under the influence of 
Robert Boyle and John Ray (Koerner 1999, 82). While Linnaeus believed that human 
beings were fully integrated into the oeconomy of nature and, like other species, are 
living as subordinate parts of the divine order, non-human nature remains merely an 
apparatus for the purposes of mankind (Worster [1977] 1994). Indeed, Linnaeus 
maintained that all things were made for the sake of man, an exceptional species that he 
describes as “the Lord of the animals”; the purpose of the whole oeconomy of nature 
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was, ultimately, to make human lives more convenient and pleasant than they would be 
otherwise (Koerner 1999, 85). Linnaeus states:   
 
we follow the series of created things, and consider how providentially one 
is made for the sake of another, the matter comes to this, that all things are 
made for the sake of man; and for this end more especially, that he by 
admiring the works of the Creator should extoll (sic) his glory, and at once 
enjoy those things, of which he stands in need, in order to pass his life 
conveniently and pleasantly (1749, 123-4).  
 
Worster has argued that Linnaeus’ Oeconomia Naturae (1749) is the first system 
of the oeconomy of nature that envisioned human beings to be at the center of his 
system. The role of human beings in the oeconomy of nature, it is worth recognizing, 
resembled that which had been encouraged by Francis Bacon in his Novum Organum. 
Bacon’s dream was “to extend man’s empire over nature” and “to the effecting of all 
things possible”.40 Linnaeus recognized humans as living amongst other creatures, all of 
which were a part of a divine order; however, “man must vigorously pursue his assigned 
work of utilizing his fellow species to his own advantage. This responsibility must extend 
to eliminating the undesirables and multiplying those that are useful to him, an 
operation “which nature, left to herself, could scarcely effect.” Created to praise and 
emulate the Creator, men fulfill their obligations not by choosing to be “mere idle 
spectators” but by making nature’s productions accrue to the enrichment of the human 
economy” (Worster [1977] 1994, 36). Indeed, as Koerner (1999) argues, there is little 
                                                          
40 Bacon is quoted by Worster ([1977] 1994, 343). 
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doubt that Linnaeus held a sunny prelapsarian view of nature, judging the Earth to be a 
world that must be managed for maximum output; domesticating the wilderness to 
serve human purposes meant restoring it to an Edenic state. Although no one would 
deny that, with the concept of natural capital, contemporary economists have stripped 
Nature’s productions from the theological and teleological clothing in which Linnaeus 
dressed them, it should be evident that Nature qua independent producer is on full 
display in Linnaeus’ Oeconomia Naturae (1749). 
In addition to Linnaeus, some of the most esteemed economic thinkers in the 
history of economic thought also recognized Nature’s unaided productions. Witness 
John Locke’s ([1689] 1980) canonical view of unassisted Nature in his Two Treatises of 
Government where he argues that the original source of value derives from mixing one’s 
labour with Nature. In Chapter Five “Of Property” of his Second Treatise, Locke claimed 
that God gave the Earth in common to mankind and that, originally, in the “State of 
Nature”, each person had an equal claim to make use of the Earth and its products. For 
Locke, much like the ancient poet Hesiod’s portrayal of mankind’s station in Works and 
Days, the penury condition of man required him to labour. Endowed with 
industriousness and rationality, Locke submits that man is to subdue the earth and 
improve it for the benefit of human life. From the viewpoint of Locke’s prelapsarian 
ideal, whereby the ultimate objective was to restore or reinstate the Garden of Eden on 
Earth, unassisted Nature produced virtually no value at all. As a matter of fact, Locke 
goes even further, arguing that unimproved land is waste, “the benefit of it amount[s] to 
little more than nothing” ([1689] 1980, 26). Locke supposed that Nature merely 
provided man with inert or passive materials that were to be acted upon and improved. 
He states: 
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of the earth useful to the life of man nine tenths are the effects of labour: 
nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up 
the several expences [sic] about them, what in them is purely owing to 
nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine 
hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour ([1689] 1980, 25; 
italics in the original). 
 
Locke surely recognized Nature’s unassisted productions, but he also considered 
them to be paltry. Why? Suppose, for a moment, that unassisted Nature produced all of 
the economically valuable goods. In other words, suppose that Nature was sufficiently 
productive to independently yield all of the goods and services required for human 
consumption. If this were actually true, then the natural objects spontaneously 
generated by Nature would immediately possess the right kinds of characteristics and 
there would be no need for human toil or industry to improve them. There would be no 
motivation to improve any natural objects for the benefit of life, as Locke prescribes, 
since Nature’s productions would already possess all of the characteristics desired by 
humankind. In this fictitious world there would also be no scarcity imposed on 
humanity by nature and, as a consequence, there would be no need for economic 
science. All of Nature’s perfectly produced spontaneous productions would be available 
to human agents without cost. 
Presumably, there are significant limitations to the usefulness of Nature’s 
spontaneously generated products; humans are required to modify such objects because 
they are, on the whole, inadequate for human consumption. Indeed, the supposed 
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“goods” and “services” generated by Nature alone rarely possess those characteristics, 
qualities, and properties required to satisfy either human fancies or needs. In one of his 
political essays entitled, Of Interest, David Hume remarks that: 
 
every thing useful to the life of man arises from the ground; but few things 
arise in that condition which is requisite to render them useful. There 
must, therefore, beside the peasant and the proprietors of land, be another 
rank of men, who receiving from the former the rude materials, work them 
into their proper form, and retain part for their own use and subsistence 
([1752] 2007, 51). 
 
Hume surely recognizes that there are a few useful items automatically generated by 
Nature, but overall it is rare for the “rude materials” of the Earth to possess those 
specific properties desired by humankind and this is what prompts people to modify 
them in the first place. The transmutation of natural objects found in one’s environment 
brings about desirable characteristics that, otherwise, would remain unavailable. Turgot 
propounds virtually the same position towards Nature’s spontaneous productions when 
he states: 
 
the crops which the land produces to satisfy the different wants of man 
cannot serve that purpose, for the most part, in the state in which nature 
gives them; they must undergo various changes and be prepared by art. 
Wheat must be converted into flour and then into bread; hides must be 
tanned or dressed; wool and cotton must be spun; silk must be drawn from 
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the cocoons; hemp and flax must be soaked, peeled, and spun; next, 
different textures must be made from them; and then they must be cut and 
sewn into garments, foot-gear, etc. ([1963] 1770, 5). 
 
Also writing on the topic of political economy at around this time, just prior to the 
Wealth of Nations being published in 1776, was another economic theorist from the 
Scottish Enlightenment, James Steuart. In Steuart’s Principles of Political Economy 
(1767) he also explicitly recognizes Nature’s products when describing “the earth’s 
spontaneous productions being in small quantity, and quite independent of man, 
appear, as it were, to be furnished by Nature”.41 For Steuart, like J.S. Mill, as we will see 
below, it is patently clear that there is a subclass of products – nature’s products – that 
are merely found and not necessarily made by human agency.  
Adam Smith ([1776] 1976), too, in Book I, Chapter XI of Wealth of Nations, also 
refers to Nature’s unaided productions as the “spontaneous productions of the Earth” (I, 
XII, 112), including the kelp (as noted in Chapter One) that is not augmented by 
industry nor harvested directly by man. Smith is decidedly Lockean when he claims that 
the first price of anything is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. Moreover, there are 
unmistakable vestiges of Physiocratic thought in Smith’s magnum opus, particularly in 
those passages that refer to agricultural production specifically. Here, Nature’s (albeit 
assisted) productivity is displayed prominently when Smith states: 
 
in agriculture … nature labours along with man; and though her labour 
costs no expence [sic], its produce has its value, as well as that of the most 
                                                          
41 As quoted by Marx ([1967] 1954, 174, fn. 1). 
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expensive workmen. The most important operations of agriculture seem 
intended, not so much to increase, though they do that too, as to direct the 
fertility of nature towards the production of the plants most profitable to 
man ( [1776] 1976, 363). 
 
Agricultural production is a special case of production for Smith, one that is distinct 
from the manufacturing process; however, the distinctiveness that Smith attributes to 
agricultural production is not identical to that argued by the Physiocrats as was detailed 
above. While sustaining the view that agricultural production is unique, Smith also 
departs from what he perceived to be the antiquated Physiocratic view of manufacturing 
and artisanal activities as “sterile”. This claim is evidenced by Smith’s insistence that, 
when it comes to the manufacturing sector, Nature does nothing and man “does all” (a 
view that would eventually be rejected by later classical political economists, especially 
J.S. Mill ([1848] 2006) who, in his Principles of Political Economy, argues that Nature’s 
powers are not merely to be found in agricultural production but in all physical objects, 
including the manufactured commodities that are bought and sold in the 
marketplace).42 
                                                          
42 “Nature, however, does more than supply materials; she also supplies powers. The matter of the globe is 
not an inert recipient of forms and properties impressed by human hands; it has active energies by which 
it co-operates with, and may even be used as a substitute for, labour. In the early ages people converted 
their corn into flour by pounding it between two stones; they next hit on a contrivance which enabled 
them, by turning a handle, to make one of the stones revolve upon the other; and this process, a little 
improved, is still the common practice of the East. The muscular exertion, however, which it required, was 
very severe and exhausting, insomuch that it was often selected as a punishment for slaves who had 
offended their masters. When the time came at which the labour and sufferings of slaves were thought 
worth economizing, the greater part of this bodily exertion was rendered unnecessary, by contriving that 
the upper stone should be made to revolve upon the lower, not by human strength, but by the force of the 
wind or of falling water. In this case, natural agents, the wind or the gravitation of the water, are made to 
do a portion of the work previously done by labour” (Mill [1848] 2006, 26).  
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Mill’s view on Nature has already been discussed at length in Chapter Two but, 
insofar as he was aware of Nature’s unassisted productions, Mill’s view more or less 
coincides with that of Hume and Turgot; Mill, however, is slightly more generous when 
recognizing the specific instances of Nature’s unassisted productions. Towards the very 
beginning of his Principles of Political Economy, in the short but important chapter 
entitled “Of the Requisites of Production” (see page 2, Chapter 1), Mill clearly recognizes 
a limited number of Nature’s unassisted productions, describing them as the “natural 
products” that “grow up spontaneously” in a manner that is quite independent of human 
agency. Some of these spontaneous productions that Mill lists, including caves and 
hollow trees, are items that, because of their favourable characteristics, are ready-made 
for human consumption and do not require any further transformations or 
transmutations brought about by direct human agency. 
In Das Kapital, Karl Marx ([1867] 1954) appears to echo Smith when he explicitly 
recognizes nature labouring along with man. We are told that in the “virgin state”, 
Nature supplies man with all of the necessaries and means of subsistence and that 
labour is a process in which both man and Nature participate. Nature’s productions can 
be located in a “pure state” and can be brought “out” of this wholesome and 
uncontaminated realm by human agents that are involved in the labouring process. 
Marx clearly identifies ready-made means of subsistence such as fruits that are 
produced by Nature’s labour but, for the most part, human industry is required to 
appropriate Nature’s productions and to modify them so that they are made into “a form 
adapted to his own wants.”43 In Chapter One, section four, of Das Kapital entitled, “The 
Fetishism of Commodity and Its Secret”, Marx makes the same point and thus, 
                                                          
43 See Bender (1986, 360). 
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unequivocally agrees with the other classical political economists described above when 
he states, “it is as clear as noonday that man, by his industry, changes the forms of the 
materials furnished by nature, in such a way as to make them useful to him.”44 For 
Marx, laboring necessarily involves opposing oneself to Nature by using the natural 
forces of one’s body. With this scheme, Marx draws a clear distinction between the 
spontaneous productions of the Earth that are produced in a manner that is relatively 
detached from human agency, on the one hand, from the raw materials, also produced 
by Nature, but that are required to undergo further manufacturing and processing to 
satisfy human fancies. Marx states: 
 
All those things which labour merely separates from immediate connexion 
with their environment, are subjects of labour spontaneously provided by 
Nature. Such are fish which we catch and take from their element, water, 
timber which we fell in the virgin forest, and ores which we extract from 
their veins. If, on the other hand, the subject of labour has, so to say, been 
filtered through previous labour, we call it raw material; such is ore 
already extracted and ready for washing. All raw material is the subject of 
labour.45 
 
What, if anything, is remarkable about attributing productive powers to 
unassisted Nature? Given that most classical political economists, including Smith, 
Ricardo, Mill, and Marx were all wedded to some version of a labour theory of value, it is 
                                                          
44 Ibid. (1986, 336). 
45 Ibid. (1986, 360-1). 
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hardly surprising that Nature qua unassisted producer of economically valuable goods 
and services does not ipso facto have a strong track-record. 
The foregoing quotations would appear to be bromides, but from the purview of 
natural capital they are highly significant. For one, they appear to confirm the 
hypothesis that most classical political economists recognized a nascent category of 
Nature’s unassisted productions and, even more significantly, this category of 
production was deemed to be relatively unimportant for the purpose of economic 
theorizing. Nature’s productions suitable for immediate consumption were considered a 
rarity. Even in exceptional cases when nature’s productions were made immediately 
available for human consumption, Mill reminds us that human labour is still frequently 
required to locate and acquire them. This observation has important consequences for 
the concept of natural capital. If Nature’s imperfectly produced productions constituted 
the vast majority of Nature’s productions and such products could always be improved 
by human labour and capital, then why bother with a trifling set of goods and services 
that, purely by happenstance, meet the standards set by humanity’s predilections? 
These quotations also reveal important limitations or constraints on how 
economists can possibly conceive of Nature. While it may be true that there is a subset 
of Nature’s productions, which, by chance, possess the qualities and characteristics 
required for human consumption, the undesigned and mindless production processes 
that give rise to such items cannot produce all of the goods and services to be consumed 
by human agents. Nature might well produce goods and services but it is only because 
Nature is an imperfect producer at best that the science of economics gets off the ground 
in the first place. The science of economics must presuppose that Nature imposes some 
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degree of scarcity on human agents. Otherwise, there would be no economic problem to 
solve. 
Why did classical political economists believe that Nature’s unassisted 
productions were, on the whole, inconsequential, while economists today argue that 
such productions possess economic value and ought to be managed accordingly? One 
answer to this question is the following. Unlike contemporary economists who 
champion a subjective theory of value, whereby any subjectively preferred good or 
bundle of goods can possess a price, classical political economists were universally 
committed to some version of an objective labour theory of value in the tradition of 
John Locke. For a theorist committed to an embodied labour theory of value, the natural 
price or exchange value of every commodity exchanged in the marketplace is 
determined by the amount of labour required to produce it. For a theorist committed to 
a labour commanded theory of value, exchange value is determined by the labour that 
would be saved for the buyer of a particular commodity. Both variations of the labour 
theory of value, although distinct in their own right, purport to explain the value of 
commodities bought and sold in the marketplace by establishing a necessary connection 
to human labour. For such economic theorists, it would appear that nature’s unassisted 
productions not only possess no value but, ipso facto, could not have possessed such 
value.46  Indeed, the notion that such productions, products brought into existence 
                                                          
46 With that being said, under the labor-commanded theory of value, when land commands labor in 
exchange for it in the marketplace, it would be considered to have value (not merely a price).  
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without human labour, could have exchange value is, strictly speaking, extricated from 
the realm of possibility.47 
This chapter has argued that the two features which distinguish the categories of 
natural capital and manufactured capital, self-generation and originality, have roots in 
the writings of eminent economic thinkers. Since the Physiocrats emphasized the 
inimitable role of land in economic production, one would have expected the concept of 
natural capital to have a clear forerunner in this school of thought. However, it was 
argued that although Quesnay and other prominent Physiocrats, such as A.R.J. Turgot, 
claimed that land or Nature was the ultimate source of wealth, this unique wellspring 
from which all riches derive needed to be activated by human labour first. As such, it 
was claimed that the independence of Nature’s productions among the Physiocrats, a 
distinctive feature of natural capital, is called into question. Within the Physiocratic 
model of economic production, it was argued that Nature or land is the unique and 
necessary but insufficient condition for the production and circulation of wealth in a 
given society. 
Be that as it may, it was also shown that the ideal of envisioning the whole of 
Nature producing for human agents, one that is presumed by economists who deploy 
the concept of natural capital, has origins in the writings of Linnaeus who depicted the 
whole Earth and all of its productions as God’s great oeconomy of nature. While no one 
denies that economists today have stripped Nature’s productions from the theological 
and teleological clothing in which Linnaeus originally dressed them, Nature qua 
independent producer is on full display in Linnaeus’ Oeconomia Naturae (1749). 
                                                          
47 Of course, no classical political economist would have denied that land is bought and sold, and rented 
out for periods of time. Land, qua unproduced factor of production, has a price but this question is 
distinct from the question of whether land has value. 
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Additionally, I also claimed that there is a nascent concept of natural capital to be 
unearthed in the writings of economic thinkers, such as Smith, Mill, and Marx. When 
these theorists referred to the “spontaneous productions of the Earth” or Nature’s 
“natural products” they had a distinctive class of production in mind, one that denotes 
Nature’s independently generated products. And, while such products were, on the 
whole, treated as scant or relatively unimportant for the purpose of economic theorizing, 
such productions should be considered a harbinger to the items denoted by our current 
concept of natural capital. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Critical Natural Capital and Sustainable 
Development 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Economic models of sustainable development show that, for sustainability, 
the aggregate level of capital in an economy must remain intact. With respect to 
such models, there is no greater point of disagreement than the questionable 
substitutability of natural capital. To what extent can manufactured capital serve 
as a substitute for natural capital? In response to this question, two positions are 
deeply ingrained in the social scientific approach to sustainable development: 
weak and strong sustainability. 
The proponents of “weak sustainability”, normally associated with the work 
of Robert M. Solow (1986, 1993a), claim that for the normative objective of 
sustainable development, the total stock of capital is to be held constant across 
time or between generations. Under this view, economic agents can deplete natural 
capital provided that it is replaced by a sufficient quantity or level of manufactured 
capital. 
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The proponents of “strong sustainability”, on the other hand, are generally 
economists who have been influenced by the life sciences, such as ecology and 
conservation biology. These economists, normally associated with the work of 
Robert Costanza and Herman Daly (1992), argue that natural capital and 
manufactured capital are better viewed as complements, not substitutes. Unlike 
the proponents of weak sustainability who require that the total stock of capital 
remains intact, the proponents of strong sustainability argue that the stock of 
natural capital must be maintained independently. 
One argument that proponents of strong sustainability have deployed 
against weak sustainability is the argument from critical natural capital. According 
to this argument, there exists a special subclass of natural capital, critical natural 
capital, for which there are no substitutes. Critical natural capital is meant to 
denote the ecological conditions that are essential to the continued existence of 
economic agents and, therefore, sustainable development. The problem with this 
argument, however, is that no one has explained what these conditions are and 
why they are essential for this purpose. Since the supporters of strong 
sustainability merely assert that there is a category of critical natural capital for 
which there are no substitutes, this argument is equivocal and, at worst, a chimera.  
This chapter unmasks the concept of critical natural capital by introducing 
an entirely new theory of “basic ecological goods” (BEGs). It is shown that BEGs 
are distinct from ordinary goods in orthodox consumer choice theory since the 
former are objective ecological conditions that must be met for agents to exist 
while the latter merely yield utility to agents. The reason why BEGs are required 
for the continued existence of a given agent is because they possess objective 
96 
  
causal properties essential for this purpose. Although BEGs have no actual 
substitutes, it is argued that for any good to potentially supplant a BEG it would 
have to meet a two-fold requirement: it would have to play the same life-sustaining 
causal role and leave the agent no worse off. Thus, whereas the substitution of 
ordinary goods in consumer choice theory is wholly explained in terms of welfare 
substitution, in the special case of BEGs, a potential substitute good must, in 
addition to sustaining agent welfare, provide the agent with the same objective 
causal property required for continued existence. 
The theory of BEGs upholds the claim, defended by the proponents of 
strong sustainability, that there are ecological conditions required for human 
economic activity while explaining precisely why such goods have no substitutes. 
As a consequence, the ecological conditions required for human economic activity 
are no longer shrouded in mystery as they were under the canopy of “critical 
natural capital”. For this reason, the theory of BEGs helps to move the debate 
forward between weak and strong sustainability. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the debate 
between weak and strong sustainability, and directs the reader’s attention to the 
argument from critical natural capital. Then, the following two sections introduce 
the theory of BEGs, along with necessary and sufficient conditions required for any 
good to potentially serve as a substitute for such goods. The chapter concludes by 
further probing the implications that BEGs have for the social scientific approach 
to sustainable development. 
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Sustainability Development and Critical Natural Capital 
The social scientific approach to sustainable development, as described by Bryan 
Norton (1992), was originally motivated by The World Commission on Environment 
and Development’s (1987) Our Common Future, but was pioneered by the earlier work 
of Robert M. Solow (1986, 1993a) and subsequently developed by David Pearce et al.’s 
(1989) Blueprint for a Green Economy. Invariably, this approach to sustainable 
development involves sustaining the productive capacity of an economy over time 
whereby “productive capacity” is represented by the aggregate level of capital in an 
economy. Models of sustainable development generally employ a Hicksian conception of 
capital whereby sustained income or an economy’s total output depends on maintaining 
the level of capital intact (Hicks 1946). Sustaining the aggregate level of capital over 
time requires following “Hartwick’s Rule” whereby total net investment in capital 
remains above or equal to zero (Hartwick 1977). Otherwise, if net investment were to fall 
below this threshold, capital would be depleted over time and since the stock of capital 
represents the productive capacity of an economy, production, along with the present 
and future human welfare that depends on it, would also decline. “Sustainability is 
basically seen by neoclassical economists as a problem of managing a nation’s portfolio 
of capital to maintain it at a constant level, either in toto or per capita” (Ayres et al. 
2001, 157). 
Kenneth Arrow et al.’s (2004, 2010) most recent instantiation of such models 
show that a sustainable economy will remain capable of providing the current standard 
of living across generations as long as each generation bequeaths to its successor at least 
as large a quantity of an economy’s “productive base”, which is composed of three 
distinct kinds of capital assets: human, natural, and manufactured capital. 
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Manufactured capital includes all of the traditional produced means of production, such 
as machines, factories, and tools; human capital includes items such as knowledge, 
technology, and institutions; and the stock of natural capital consists the traditional 
renewable and non-renewable resources, but it also denotes various non-market 
phenomena as well, including, for example, ecosystems. Arrow et al. (2010) show that 
inter-temporal social welfare, V(t), is sustainable if and only if this variable is equal to or 
greater than zero over time (dV/dt ≥ 0). Because an economy’s productive base is a 
necessary condition for sustainability and this base includes three kinds of capital, the 
notion of “genuine investment” plays a critical role in their model. Genuine investment 
represents the sum of the values of investments or disinvestments in each of the capital 
assets, whereby the value of each investment is the product of the change in the quantity 
of the asset multiplied by the shadow value of that asset. Any change in the productive 
base and V(t) is non-decreasing at t2 if and only if genuine investment is non-negative at 
t1. In other words, a non-negative investment in capital follows Hartwick’s Rule. 
With respect to such models, two opposing positions have been staked out: weak 
and strong sustainability. The source of this division rests on the disputed 
substitutability of natural capital, a topic that has now filled the pages of several 
journals, including Environmental Values (Beckerman 1994, 1995; Daly 1994) and 
Ecological Economics (Daly 1997; Solow 1997; Stiglitz 1997). Most recently, in response 
to the role of natural capital in a model of sustainable development published in the 
Journal of Economic Perspectives (Arrow et al., 2004), the substitutability of natural 
capital emerged as a point of disagreement in the journal Conservation Biology (Daly et 
al. 2007, Arrow et al. 2007). 
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What do economists mean by “substitutability”? Generally, economists 
distinguish between substitutions at two levels of analysis: in consumption and 
production (Stern 1997; Beckerman 1995). At the level of consumption, substitution is 
normally defined in terms of interchangeability in the agent’s utility function. One good 
or a bundle of goods constitutes a substitute for another if it sustains the overall level of 
welfare or utility of a given economic agent, whereby utility derives from the satisfaction 
of the agent’s subjective preferences. Within the context of models of sustainable 
development, the disputed substitutability of natural capital normally arises at the level 
of production. At this level, whether one factor of production can serve as a substitute 
for another depends on whether that factor can supplant another while sustaining the 
overall level of production.  
Weak sustainability is traditionally associated with the work of Robert M. Solow 
(1986, 1993a) and it requires that the total stock of capital is held constant across time 
or between generations (Pearce and Atkinson 1993). Under this view, agents can deplete 
natural capital provided that it is replaced by a sufficient quantity or level of 
manufactured capital (Stern 1997). Hence, the presumption is that such reductions in 
natural capital can be offset by enlarging the stock of manufactured capital since one can 
serve as a substitute for the other. Economists who maintain this view frequently 
conceive of natural capital as an abstract homogeneous fund that can be easily directed 
towards alternative uses. In this sense, natural capital is not taken to serve a special role 
for the goal of sustainable development or the human welfare that depends on it. What 
matters is not that any particular stock of capital might be depleted over time but that 
the overall stock of capital, the productive capacity of an economy, remains intact. This 
is why, for example, when Dasgupta describes such models he states, “it is mostly 
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supposed that the growth of ideas is capable of circumventing any constraint the natural 
environment may impose on the ability of economies to grow indefinitely” (2001, 130). 
One argument deployed as a defense of weak sustainability was originally put forward 
by Robert Solow who claimed that “higher and rising prices of exhaustible resources 
lead competing producers to substitute other materials that are more plentiful and 
therefore cheaper” (1973, 53). As one resource is exhausted, its rising price will 
incentivize the production of cheaper alternatives and thus, other resources will always 
become available. Solow has also argued that, over time, human knowledge and 
technological progress increases the productivity of labour and resources by 
continuously reducing the amounts of resources that are required to produce a constant 
or increasing flow of consumer goods and services (Sagoff 1995).  
Strong sustainability, on the other hand, originally derived from the work of 
David W. Pearce et al. (1989) and others, especially Robert Costanza and Herman Daly 
(1992). Pearce et al. (1989) considered four possibilities for maintaining a constant 
stock of natural capital: the physical quantity of the natural resource stocks should 
remain unchanged; the total value of the natural resource stocks should remain constant 
in real terms; the unit value of the services of the natural resources, as measured by the 
prices of natural resources, should remain constant in real terms; or, the value of the 
resource flows from the natural resource stock should remain constant in real terms. 
The proponents of strong sustainability generally argue that since natural capital and 
manufactured are complements rather than substitutes, sustainable development 
requires that each stock of capital should be held constant, independently. Those who 
argue for this view are often the biophysical scientists and ecological economists who 
privilege a conception of natural capital as specific and concrete heterogeneous non-
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market natural processes, such as ecosystems. While the proponents of this view 
generally recognize exceptions to this rule – that there are instances of manufactured 
capital that might serve as a substitute for natural capital – the extent to which this 
holds true is a matter of disagreement. This is hardly surprising given that natural 
capital and manufactured capital are both aggregate variables that are meant to denote 
an enormous variety of heterogeneous items. While it is easy to conceive of some forms 
of manufactured capital that would substitute for some forms of natural capital, 
proponents of strong sustainability argue that it is most certainly false that all forms of 
manufactured capital are substitutes for all forms of natural capital or even that there is 
always some form of manufactured capital that can be a substitute for all forms of 
natural capital. 
The proponents of strong sustainability have deployed several arguments to 
support their claim that manufactured capital and natural capital are, in general, 
complements rather than substitutes.48 This chapter is only concerned with one such 
argument: there is a special subclass of natural capital, “critical natural capital”, that is 
required for the continued existence of economic agents and therefore, sustainable 
development. This subclass of natural capital, first introduced by members of the 
London Centre for Environmental Economics, was originally meant to denote those 
specific instances of natural capital that were required for basic life support (Victor 
1991; Stern 1997). David Pearce and Kerry Turner (1990), for instance, argued that it 
was possible to substitute between some instances of manufactured and natural capital 
                                                          
48 For the details of these specific arguments, see Herman Daly (1994). For a critique of these same 
arguments, see Dale Jamieson (1998). 
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but they maintained that there was a minimal stock of critical natural capital for which 
there are no substitutes.  
Since its inception, this concept has been adopted by many other scholars, 
including Carl Folke et al. (1994, 6) who state that, “there will always be a minimum or 
critical amount of natural capital needed to sustain any individual of the human 
species”. Similarly, Rudolf De Groot et al. (2003, 189) state, “critical natural capital 
cannot be substituted for by human-made capital and must be individually preserved”. 
Most recently, the authors of the highly influential Millenium Ecosystem Assessment 
(2005) declare that there are forms of natural capital that are “critical for human 
welfare”. Joshua Farley describes critical natural capital as generating “benefits that are 
essential to human welfare and have few if any substitutes” (2008, 1404) and the 
environmental economist Barbier asserts that there are forms of natural capital that are 
“so essential for life” and that “humans depend on and use this natural capital for a 
whole range of important benefits, including life support” (2011, 6).49 
While it may be true that there are instances of critical natural capital, the 
meaning of terms such as “non-substitutable”, “near-impossible to substitute”, and 
“essential” in this context remain obscure. The concept of critical natural capital 
requires a clearer formulation then it tends to receive. As it stands, critical natural 
capital merely serves as a black-box or placeholder for the ecological conditions that are 
required for human economic activity. The real problem is that no one has explained 
what these conditions are and why they are essential for this purpose. Without such an 
account, the argument made by proponents of strong sustainability – that there is some 
                                                          
49 Similarly, Paul Ekins (2003, 278) states, “it is not possible to identify [critical natural capital] as 
particular elements of natural capital.” 
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set of ecological conditions that are essential to human economic activity and therefore, 
these conditions ought to be sustained – is empty. A satisfactory theory of the ecological 
conditions essential for the continued existence of economic agents should clearly 
explain why the members of this subclass have no substitutes. 
In response to this state of affairs, the next two sections introduce a new theory of 
what are termed “basic ecological goods” (BEGs) and explain what would be required for 
any good to potentially serve as a substitute for such distinctive goods. 
 
A Theory of Basic Ecological Goods 
Aside from anomalous goods, such as “Giffen goods” and “Veblen goods”, 
substantive claims are rarely made about goods, aside from the fact that they contribute 
to the utility of agents when consumed.50 This section introduces a novel kind of good, 
“basic ecological goods” (BEGs). Two features distinguish BEGs from ordinary goods. 
First, BEGs are ecological conditions that must be satisfied for the continued existence 
of a given agent. While such goods might also contribute to agent welfare, BEGs are 
special because they are required to be an agent with subjective preferences. In this 
sense, BEGs are pre-conditions to the satisfaction of subjective preferences. Second, the 
reason why BEGs are essential in this sense is because, for any given agent with a 
particular constitution, such goods possess objective characteristics or properties that 
afford a causal role to the agent that is not available in any other good. 
BEGs are necessary for the continued existence of a given agent. This proposition 
implies that agent existence is a contingent fact that depends on, among other things, 
                                                          
50 Giffen goods violate the law of demand since agents consume more them when their prices rise. Veblen 
goods, named after the old institutional economist, Thorstein Veblen, are generally associated with 
conspicuous consumption. 
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certain ecological conditions. On the face of it, the existence of such goods will strike 
many as a platitude, but BEGs represent an arresting departure from consumer choice 
theory which takes agent existence to be a parameter, not a variable.51 The theory of 
BEGs presumes that agents do not exist in a vacuum, but are embedded in an external 
environment that includes a totality of factors, both biotic and physical, that influence 
the agent’s welfare and continued existence (Brandon 2012; 1990).52 BEGs denote a 
distinct kind of good that populate the agent’s environment; they reflect the familiar 
idea that life can only exist within a certain range of physical or material conditions. 
Although the focus here is human agents, this view corresponds particularly well with an 
organism’s viable environment as that term is used by biophysical scientists (Beissinger 
and McCullough 2002). As Daniel C. Dennett explains, the continued existence of any 
organism requires that certain ecological conditions be satisfied: 
 
A tiger is viable now, in certain existing environments on our planet, but 
would not have been viable in most earlier days, and may become inviable 
in the future (as may all life on Earth, in fact). Viability is relative to the 
environment in which the organism must make its living. Without 
breathable atmosphere and edible prey – to take the most obvious 
conditions – the organic features that make tigers viable today would be to 
no avail. And since environments are to a great extent composed of, and 
                                                          
51 As Mark Blaug ([1962] 1996) reminds us, ever since the marginal revolution in economics circa 1870, 
economists have treated population as exogenous variable. 
 
52 Robert Brandon’s (1990) concept of external environment is different from mine since it covers those 
external conditions that affect the survival and reproduction of an organism.  
105 
  
by, the other organisms extant, viability is a constantly changing property, 
a moving target, not a fixed condition (1996, 115). 
 
To be a welfare enhancing agent requires that the agent is situated in some viable 
environment because such an environment possesses the ecological conditions required 
for the agent’s continued existence. However, this claim is a qualified one since, as 
Dennett explains, any viable environment is bound to have a “moving target quality”. 
Since environments undergo constant change and agents are themselves changing self-
reproducing physical systems capable of modifying their environments, i.e., niche 
construction (see Lewontin 1983), even if it were discovered that a particular ecological 
condition qualified as a BEG for some agent at a certain time and place, that same BEG 
might not be classified as such in the future. To put it more precisely we can define a 
BEG by stating that: 
 
x is a BEG for agent α in environment E at time t  if all variables other 
than x were held fixed at their values at t, and x were removed from E, then 
α would cease to exist (shortly after t).53 
 
What would be required for some “x” to qualify as a BEG? In the short-term, say, 
over the lifetime of a single agent, suppose it was discovered that a particular molecule, 
B2Z6, was a BEG for that agent. This would mean that for the viability of this agent, and 
                                                          
53 Throughout this chapter, the symbol “” should read as “if and only if”. For pragmatic purposes, this 
definition of a BEG can be read in light of J.L. Mackie’s (1980, 63) “causal field”: a set of background 
conditions, not completely specified but taken as fixed. The causal field fixes everything but some set of 
variables that one is interested in.  
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his sustained capacity to continue being that agent, B2Z6 would have to be available to 
that agent in the right kind of way. 54  Taking an evolutionary long-term view of 
organisms as historical entities fashioned by the forces of natural selection (among 
others) in ever changing environments casts doubt on the BEG status attributed to B2Z6 
in the short-term. From a long-term view, even though B2Z6 became indispensable to the 
continued existence of some agent along the evolutionary pathway, it is a contingent fact 
that such molecules became available in the first place, and that the agent’s biological 
ancestors became dependent on it for their continued existence. Thus, although B2Z6 
might be a BEG for some agent today, it could have been otherwise and it might fail to 
be the case in the future. The definition of a BEG given above accounts for such 
contingencies. 
So far, I have only posited that, for a given agent, there are peculiar ecological 
conditions that are required for its continued existence. To make BEGs more palpable, 
more needs to be said about why such goods are necessary for this purpose. What 
makes some goods essential for the continued existence of a given agent and not others? 
Why, if a BEG were removed from a particular environment, would the agent cease to 
exist? The short answer to this question is that, unlike ordinary goods that only 
contribute to the utility of agents, BEGs possess certain objective properties capable of 
performing a causal role required for the agent’s continued existence.  
Two issues require elaboration: first, the idea that BEGs possess certain distinct 
properties and, second, that such properties perform some causal role needed for the 
continued existence of the agent. 
                                                          
54 By “the right kind of way” I mean that such objects will have appropriate extrinsic properties in relation 
to the agent. It is commonly said that water is a necessary condition for life but it is obviously a sufficient 
condition for death as well. 
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Consumer choice theory normally abstracts from the properties or material 
attributes of goods. In the case of BEGs, however, it is useful to adopt a properties-view 
of goods. This outlook, while not standard to economics, is certainly not foreign to the 
social science. Some economists have adopted this stance towards both resources and 
commodities. In a seminal paper by Robert U. Ayres and Allen Kneese, they recognize 
that “almost all of standard economic theory is in reality concerned with services. 
Material objects are merely the vehicles which carry some of these services, and they are 
exchanged because of consumer preferences for the services associated with their use or 
because they can help to add value in the manufacturing process” (1969, 284). David 
Stern (1997, 197) also recognizes that “individual commodities and other inputs have 
unique physical or other properties which make them poor substitutes”. Similarly, 
Julian Simon (1981) has forcefully argued that, in light of Malthusian worries 
concerning the depletion of scarce resources, what matters most is not sustaining any 
particular resource but the service a resource provides. Simon states, 
 
We are interested in the particular services that resources yield, not in the 
resources themselves. Examples of such services are an ability to conduct 
electricity, an ability to support weight, energy to fuel autos, energy to fuel 
electrical generators, and food calories . . . . What is relevant to us is not 
whether we can find any lead in existing lead mines but whether we can 
have the services of lead batteries at a reasonable price; it does not matter 
to us whether this is accomplished by recycling lead, by making batteries 
last forever, or by replacing lead batteries with another contraption (1981, 
410-11). 
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Kelvin Lancaster’s (1971) theory of consumer demand and Amartya Sen’s (1985) 
capabilities-approach to human welfare both focus on the characteristics of 
commodities, rather than commodities themselves. For Lancaster, it is the objective 
characteristics of commodities and not the commodities themselves that yield utility to 
agents. Similarly, Sen’s capabilities-approach to human welfare involves converting a 
commodity vector into a vector of characteristics of those same commodities. The 
achieved functionings (bi) of agent i are defined as follows: bi = fi (C(Xi)) where fi is a 
utilization function for agent i, C() is the function converting a commodity vector into a 
vector of characteristics of those commodities, and Xi is the vector of commodities 
possessed by the agent. 
The main reason to adopt a comparable properties-view of BEGs is because ex 
hypothesi such goods have causal properties that may potentially become available in 
other goods. This, of course, is not to say that the causal properties of BEGs are actually 
available in other goods since BEGs are defined as performing an essential causal role 
for the continued existence of some agent. This point is crucial for understanding BEGs. 
BEGs are necessary because they perform a specific causal role in relation to the agent 
that is required for the agent’s continued existence. Following the example given above, 
B2Z6 could only be properly classified as a BEG for some agent if there were no other 
naturally occurring molecules or synthetic molecules capable of executing a required 
causal role, one that is not multiply realizable under contingently existing 
circumstances. In this sense, BEGs are indexed to what is technologically available. It is 
precisely because the causal role performed by B2Z6 is not available in any other goods 
that B2Z6 is required for an agent with a particular constitution. Strictly speaking, what 
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is necessary for the continued existence of the agent in this case is not B2Z6 itself but the 
causal properties instantiated by B2Z6. As we will see below, this claim is central to 
understanding what – in principle – would be required for any good to serve as a 
substitute for BEGs, but for the time being more needs to be said about BEGs 
performing a required causal role in relation to contingently existing agents. 
Many things might qualify as a BEG for a given agent and it is useful to consider a 
real-world example. Take, for example, oxygen molecules or dioxygen (O2). O2 is 
produced on Earth mainly by plants engaged in the process of oxygenic photosynthesis. 
The molecule began accumulating in the Earth’s atmosphere during the Precambrian 
Period (4,600-561 million years ago), and our biological ancestors adapted to it, 
eventually becoming dependent on it for their continued existence (Williams 1992). At 
this particular time, there is some minimum quantity of O2 required for the continued 
existence of certain agents, aerobic organisms, with a particular constitution.55 O2 is 
consumed by aerobic organisms during cellular respiration. In vertebrates, O2 diffuses 
through membranes in the lungs (the capillaries are permeable to O2) and eventually to 
red blood cells. More specifically, O2 is used in the mitochondria of cells to generate 
adenosine triphosphate (ATP), the “molecular unit of currency” of intracellular energy 
transfer (Knowles 1980). Any other kind of molecule, including carbon monoxide (CO) 
and carbon trioxide (CO3) cannot be used by mitochondria to generate ATP. Since O2 is 
the only kind of molecule capable of executing a causal role required for the continued 
existence of aerobic organisms, it is a BEG for these organisms. 
                                                          
55 Whether some good constitutes a BEG is not set a priori, but can vary according to how much an 
individual possesses. It is clear that since O2 can be removed from the Earth’s atmosphere without 
affecting the continued existence of aerobic organisms not all O2 is a BEG for such organisms. One might 
argue that there is a possible world where no BEGs exist, but our concern is primarily with in this world, 
planet Earth, where there are BEGs. 
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The contingency of agent existence can be represented by a simple causal system 
whereby the dependent variable, Y (t0), is the agent or the target system of the agent that 
depends on various inputs Xn (t), where t ≤ t0. These inputs include some set of BEGs 
that represent the ecological conditions necessary, not only for the present, but 
continued existence of the agent. Of course, Xn is likely to include a wide range of other 
factors and conditions, but for our purposes what matters is that it includes some set of 
BEGs. This means that for a given agent at t0 that does not stand in the right kind of 
extrinsic relation to the required set of BEGs, that agent is not embedded in a viable 
environment and will therefore no longer exist at time t0 or shortly thereafter. 
For the sake of simplicity, from this point forward, given that the causal 
properties of BEGs perform a causal role in relation to a causal system – the target 
system of some economic agent – it is useful to adopt Robert Cummins’ (1975) 
terminology and describe such properties as functional properties. That being said, what 
is meant by functional properties in this context only means that BEGs possess and 
execute a required causal role within a particular causal system. 
The main tenets of BEGs have now been introduced. Let’s take stock. BEGs are 
distinct from ordinary welfare enhancing goods because they possess causal properties 
that are essential for the continued existence of agents. While such goods might 
contribute to the welfare of agents, a fact determined by the agent’s subjective 
preferences, BEGs serve another role. They are the ecological pre-conditions to the 
satisfaction of any agent’s subjective preferences. What makes BEGs essential? For a 
given agent with a particular constitution, such goods alone possess the functional 
properties not available in any other good. It should be clear that the causal roles 
executed by BEGs are objective, not subjective. This means that the relations between 
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BEGs and the agent do not directly depend on subjective preferences but are 
independently determined by two factors: the kind of creature the agent is and the 
structure of the agent’s environment. 
The theory of BEGs is a descriptive theory, not a normative one. The theory posits 
objective ecological pre-conditions to human economic activity, but it does not follow 
from this statement that such goods are objectively valuable or that such goods ought to 
be preserved. This is not because there are no good reasons to preserve such conditions, 
but because normative questions such as these are treated as a separate issue from the 
theory presented. In Kantian terms, the theory of BEGs is located within the realm of 
hypothetical imperatives, not categorical ones. Under the working assumption of a 
subjective theory of value (more specifically, the subjective preference-satisfaction 
approach to agent welfare of consumer choice theory), agents might well prefer a world 
with BEGs to one without BEGs but there is no requirement for agents to have such a 
preference. Thus, strictly speaking, basic ecological goods only qualify as goods when 
the agent prefers BEGs to no BEGs. Otherwise, BEGs might well be labeled basic 
ecological conditions or something like this. Basic ecological conditions only become 
basic ecological goods when they provide utility to agents and they only provide utility 
when the agent subjectively prefers them over some other state of affairs. This implies, 
as absurd as it might sound, that undermining the ecological conditions necessary for 
continued existence might coincide with utility maximization. Agents might prefer death 
to life and the theory of BEGs is in full agreement with this prospect. 
That being said, if the theory of BEGs is true and the agent prefers a bundle of 
goods that contains BEGs (prefers continued existence to non-existence), then this 
agent will require a viable environment partly constituted by such goods. In other 
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words, for human economic activity to take place the world might be many different 
ways but it cannot be any possible way. 
 
The Substitutability of Basic Ecological Goods 
Because BEGs are defined as essential for the continued existence of a given 
agent they can be described as having potential substitutes, but no actual substitutes. 
Nevertheless, one can still ask: what would constitute a substitute for a BEG? If a 
particular good were to serve as a substitute for a BEG, what condition or set of 
conditions would it have to meet? This section defends the claim that for any good to 
serve as an overall substitute for a BEG it would have to meet a double requirement: it 
would have to leave the agent no worse off, in the same sense required of any substitute 
good in orthodox consumer choice theory, but it would also have to meet an additional 
proviso: it would have to provide the agent with the same objective functional property 
as well. Therefore, unlike the substitutability of ordinary consumer goods, a full account 
of BEGs and their potential substitutes cannot be limited to examining the agent’s 
subjective state alone. 
First of all, what is a substitute good according to consumer choice theory? As 
mentioned above, substitution is normally defined in terms of interchangeability in the 
agent’s utility function and is cashed-out behaviourally in terms of the agent’s 
willingness to trade one good for another. Mas-Colell et al. (1995) define two goods, A 
and B, as substitutes at the price p and utility level u if dhA(p, u)/dpB is greater than or 
equal to zero.56 Goods A and B are substitutes when the price of good A declines (a 
higher demand for good A) and there is a leftward shift in the demand function for good 
                                                          
56 Note that dhA (p, u) is a Hicksian demand function. 
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B. Substitute goods have a positive cross-elasticity of demand. Conversely, goods A and 
B are complements when the price of good A declines (a downward movement along the 
demand curve for good A) and there is a rightward shift in the demand function for good 
B. Complementary goods have a negative cross-elasticity of demand. 
The received view on substitutability, as Mas-Colell et al. characterizes it, can be 
broadly termed as welfare substitutability. Welfare substitutes maintain an agent’s 
overall level of welfare and are wholly explicable in terms of the non-negative welfare 
consequences they have for the agent. In other words, a particular good is a welfare 
substitute because of its utility-making role in relation to the agent and not by virtue of 
any other factor. 
Given the nature of BEGs outlined in the previous section, answering the 
substitutability question is going to require recognizing the objective functional 
properties possessed by such goods. Therefore, it is useful to draw a distinction between 
welfare and functional substitutes that will enable us to see how the view defended in 
this chapter differs from the received view. Each of the following sui generis substitutes 
is agent relative and specific to a particular time and place: 
 
Welfare substitute: Good A is a welfare substitute for Good B  Good A is 
interchangeable for Good B in such a way that it leaves agent α equally or better 
well-off. 
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Functional substitute: Good Y is a functional substitute for Good Z  Good Y 
provides the same functional property as Good Z for agent α.57  
 
Under the assumption that agents prefer continued existence to non-existence, 
for any good to serve as a substitute for a BEG it must be a welfare and functional 
substitute. We can describe such a good as an overall substitute because it comprises 
two kinds of substitutes, welfare substitutes and functional substitutes. The central 
implication of this thesis is that if some Good X does not possess the same functional 
properties, leaves the agent worse off, or both, then it will not be an overall substitute 
for a BEG. These possibilities are depicted in Figure 4 where the following question is 
asked: would Good X serve as an overall substitute for a BEG? As shown in this Figure, 
only the north-west quadrant answers this question affirmatively, where Good X has 
both the same functional property as the BEG it supplants and leaves the agent no worse 
off. The other three quadrants identify instances that fail to satisfy this dual 
requirement. In all of these cases, Good X either leaves the agent worse off, does not 
possess the same functional property as the BEG it supplants, or both. 
  
                                                          
57 John O’Neill et al. (2008) make a similar distinction between technical substitutes and economic 
substitutes. It is to be remarked that functional substitutes are defined independent of price. No matter 
the price of BEGs, they are required for the continued existence of a given agent. Similarly, one can 
determine whether any good is a potential substitute for a BEG by examining its functional properties 
alone (independent of price). 
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Same YES NO 
Different NO NO 
 
Figure 4. Would Good X Serve as an Overall Substitute for a BEG? 
 
 
This account of substitution for any BEG diverges from the treatment of 
substitution found in orthodox consumer choice theory and it also differs from, for 
example, Lancaster’s (1971) account of substitution in his characteristics analysis of 
consumer demand. For Lancaster, substitution between two goods depends on their 
objective characteristics whereby the closeness of substitution can be predicted from 
technical data concerning the characteristics that each good possesses. In other words, 
Lancaster’s framework presumes that welfare and functional substitutes coincide: if 
Goods X and Y share the same characteristics, including what I have termed functional 
properties, then they are (predicted to be) substitutes. It is by granting that the 
characteristics of goods yield utility to agents, and not the consumption of goods 
themselves, that Lancaster is able to collapse the divide between functional and welfare 
substitutes. 
But surely a good might have the same or similar characteristics as another good 
without being a welfare substitute. A motorcycle might be capable of providing the same 
transportation function as an automobile to the agent, but the agent might well prefer to 
Agent Welfare  
Functional 
Property 
 
Equally well-off 
or  
better-off 
 
 
Worse-off 
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consume no goods capable of transportation. The agent’s subjective preferences might 
be such that neither motorcycles nor automobiles sustain his welfare. And, obviously, a 
good can be a welfare substitute without possessing any of the same characteristics or 
properties as the good it supplants. A four-bedroom house on the hillside might be a 
welfare substitute for a first edition copy of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations when the 
agent freely trades one for the other, but the agent cannot take shelter in his rare book. 
Similarly, many loaves of bread might be a welfare substitute for a desktop computer, 
but the latter cannot nourish the agent; nor does the bread compute for the agent. 
This is also true for welfare and functional substitutes. A good can be a welfare 
substitute and not a functional substitute and a good can be a functional substitute and 
not a welfare substitute. Welfare substitutes and functional substitutes are logically 
independent: they can coincide, but they need not.  
To see why this is true consider John O’Neill’s (2013) argument concerning the 
valuation of natural capital. O’Neill objects to the contention that a particular instance 
of natural capital is only valued by agents for the ecosystem services it provides. He 
distinguishes between de dicto and de re valuation and argues that for natural capital, 
such an approach arbitrarily privileges de dicto valuation over de re valuation and this is 
problematic because agents might well value certain articles of natural capital de re. 
Valuing a specific form of natural capital only for the services it provides – an instance 
of de dicto valuation – can be expressed by employing the existential quantifier: 
 
 Agent α values ∃x (X is an article of natural capital that produces service Y). 
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In this case, the agent values a particular article of natural capital X merely for its 
service or output, Y. De re valuation, on the other hand, involves valuing a specific form 
of natural capital for its individuality or distinctiveness and not only because of the 
service it provides. O’Neill argues that agents will sometimes value natural capital de re, 
whereby: 
 
∃x (X is an article of natural capital and Agent α values X). 
 
If the agent values a particular form of natural capital in this way – de re – then even 
though two articles of natural capital might share many or all of the same 
characteristics, the agent will be made worse off if the instance of natural capital he 
values de re is destroyed or depleted, etc. Take, for example, a specific watershed that 
happens to purify water for some agent or group of agents. One agent might value this 
watershed only because it serves as an instrument to purify some quantity of water and 
for no other reason. In this case, the agent can be described as valuing the watershed de 
dicto since he attaches no value to the uniqueness of the watershed, but only to the 
services that it happens to afford him. In other words, the watershed is merely a vehicle 
that, by happenstance, produces some object of value. For this agent it would make no 
difference if the water purification process was executed by some other process since the 
watershed itself is not the object of value. If, on the other hand, the agent values the 
watershed not merely because it produces potable water but because of its uniqueness 
or distinctiveness then the agent can be described as valuing the watershed de re. 
This distinction between de dicto and de re valuation is applicable for the case of 
BEGs. If the agent values a particular BEG de re, then even if the potential substitute 
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good possesses the same functional property – and thus qualifies as a functional 
substitute simpliciter – it will not serve as an overall substitute for that BEG. The reason 
is because even though two goods might possess identical functional properties, if the 
agent values BEGs de re, then that agent will be made worse off without consuming the 
specific BEG or bundle of BEGs that she values in this way.  
Take the example of O2. Earlier, it was claimed rather uncontroversially that O2 is 
a BEG for certain creatures – aerobic organisms – on Earth. One batch of O2 molecules 
is a functional substitute simpliciter for another batch of the same molecules, but no 
other kind of molecule is available to perform the specific causal role required for the 
continued existence of aerobic organisms. While O2 has no actual functional substitutes 
in this world, one might easily imagine that in some possible world there is a class of 
molecules, call them “functional oxygen” or “FOX-O2”, whose members do possess the 
same functional property as O2. If the agent values some batch of O2 de re in this world, 
then although FOX-O2 is a functional substitute simpliciter for O2, it will not serve as an 
overall substitute for O2 since agent welfare will not be sustained with FOX- O2. On the 
other hand, if the agent’s subjective preferences are structured in such a way that she 
values BEGs de dicto so that only the objective functional properties of such goods 
matter for the agent (and not the particular goods that happen to possess them), then 
two goods with the same functional properties will not only be functional substitutes, 
but overall substitutes as well. This is only a special case, however. The mere fact that 
two goods share the same functional properties and therefore qualify as functional 
substitutes simpliciter does not necessarily entail that the agent will be equally well-off 
by consuming one or the other. Although two goods might qualify as functional 
substitutes and these goods might also be welfare substitutes, this need not be the case. 
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One might object to this claim by arguing that agents do not value O2 de re but 
only de dicto and therefore, my attempt to propose otherwise fails. Consider, for 
example, the wisdom imparted to us by the Stoic philosopher Epictetus in his The 
Enchiridion: 
 
With regard to whatever objects give you delight, are useful, or are deeply 
loved, remember to tell yourself of what general nature they are, beginning 
from the most insignificant things. If, for example, you are fond of a 
specific ceramic cup, remind yourself that it is only ceramic cups in general 
of which you are fond. Then, if it breaks, you will not be disturbed. If you 
kiss your child, or your wife, say that you only kiss things which are 
human, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies. 
 
 
In the foregoing quotation, Epictetus can be interpreted as claiming that we do 
(or ought) not value specific items such as ceramic cups, children, and wives de re. Since 
he does not even believe that we value (or ought) to value our significant others de re 
then surely Epictetus would find my claim – that an agent might value O2 de re – to be 
dubious. However, my claim is not an empirical one. Rather, it follows from the 
subjective theory of value whereby agents can prefer any goods to any others for any 
reason. What I am claiming is not that it is empirically true that agents value O2 de re, 
but that agents valuing O2 de re is not ruled out a priori by the subjective theory of 
value. 
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We have now seen why two goods that possess the same functional properties are 
not, necessarily, overall substitutes. For example, under the working assumption of the 
subjective theory of value, agents might prefer any goods over others for any reason, 
including the characteristics of goods other than their functional properties. That being 
said, in the case just considered – where the agent strictly values goods de dicto for their 
functional properties and two goods possess functionally identical properties – then 
such goods will qualify as overall substitutes. In this case, the functional equivalence 
between two goods implies that the agent is made no worse off. Even in this case, 
however, it is crucial to recognize that the double requirement imposed on any potential 
substitute of a BEG is not violated because for any good to serve as an overall substitute 
for the given BEG it will leave the agent no worse off while simultaneously providing the 
agent with the same functional property as well. 
Now, the task at hand is to show that a good capable of serving as a welfare 
substitute simpliciter would be insufficient to serve as a substitute for a BEG. If it were 
the case that welfare substitution was sufficient to account for the overall substitution of 
BEGs, then BEGs would be wholly analyzable in terms of subjective utility and there 
would be no need to account for the objective functional properties of BEGs. The claim 
here, however, is that under the assumption that agents prefer continued existence to 
non-existence, agent welfare could only be sustained by a good that possessed the same 
functional property as the BEG it supplants. Ergo, the dual requirement: any good that 
is a welfare substitute for a particular BEG will also have to possess the same functional 
property as the BEG it supplants. The implication is that explaining the overall 
substitutability of BEGs requires accounting for the functional properties possessed by 
such goods. 
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BEGs and Lexicographic Preferences 
This chapter has argued that accounting for the substitutability of BEGs cannot 
be reduced to a story about subjective utility alone since any good that potentially serves 
as a substitute for BEGs will also have to possess the same objective functional property 
as well. Nevertheless, it is still worth considering the specific case of lexicographic 
preferences. The claim being made here is not that it is impossible to model BEGs with 
lexicographic preferences, a question that is beyond the scope of this chapter, but that 
since the standard account of lexicographic preferences presumes ex hypothesi that 
certain goods or a certain quantity of goods have no substitutes, this presumption is at 
odds with the objective to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for any good to 
potentially supplant a BEG. 
A lexicographic preference that is held for one good or a specific quantity of that 
good implies that it has the highest priority over other goods in the same way that a 
dictionary is organized, by the first letter of words. Such preferences give absolute 
priority to the consumption of one good or specific quantity of a good over all the others 
and therefore, imply a strict ordering. Unlike standard preference relations which allow 
for one bundle of goods to be traded-off against another while keeping the agent’s level 
of utility constant, lexicographic preferences do not permit such simple trade-offs.58 
These preferences have attracted the attention of environmental economists in 
particular because it has been claimed that people hold such preferences for non-
marketed environmental goods, such as wildlife, wetlands, plants and ecosystems, and 
                                                          
58 Lexicographic orderings are hardly unique to consumer choice theory, but can be found in a wide 
variety of familiar theoretical contexts. John Rawls (1971), for example, proposes a lexicographical 
ordering to the principle of equal liberty prior to the principle of regulating economic and social 
inequalities. 
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endangered species (Spash and Hanley 1995; Spash 2000; Lockwood 1996; Ayres et al. 
2001).59 
Other economic theorists have employed lexicographic preferences as a 
technique to account for “basic goods” or “needs” that must be met prior to choices 
being made over other goods (Georgescu-Roegen 1954). In such cases, lexicographic 
preferences are applied to part of a consumption set whereby a minimum quantity of a 
good represents the subsistence level of consumption required for agent survival (Spash 
and Hanley 1995). Under these circumstances, when a certain quantity of basic goods is 
not consumed, then the lexicographic ordering indicates that the agent will suffer a large 
and instantaneous loss in subjective utility, a loss that cannot be compensated by 
consuming bundles of goods that exclude this subsistence level of consumption. 
Lexicographic preferences appear to provide a promising way for consumer 
choice theory to handle BEGs, especially since they have been used to account for the 
subsistence level of consumption required for agent survival and BEGs are themselves 
defined as goods required for continued existence. Consider an example.60 Tom and 
Jerry have the following set of alternatives: 
 
X = ℝ X {0, 1, 2}  
 
                                                          
59 Thomas H. Stevens et al. (1991) found that 25% of respondents in their study revealed lexicographic 
preferences for wildlife preservation in the United States. 
 
60 A referee brought a similar example of kidneys to my attention. 
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where ℝ is the real number line that denotes amounts of money,61 k = 0 means “not 
being alive”, k = 1 means “having one kidney and being alive”, and k = 2 means “having 
two kidneys and being alive”. Tom and Jerry each have a complete and transitive 
preference relation defined over the set of alternatives, X.62 Let each preference relation 
be denoted by ‘≽i’  (with i = t, j) (to be read ‘at least as good as’). The symbol ‘≻i’ is to be 
read ‘preferred to’. Suppose that Tom has the following preferences over money (x) and 
kidneys (k): 
 
For each x, x’ ∈ ℝ and each k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, (x, k) ≽t (x’, k)  x ≥ x’, 
For each x ∈ ℝ and each k, k’ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, (x, k) ≽t (x, k’)  k ≥ k’ 
 ∀ x, x’ ∈ ℝ and ∀ k, k’ {0, 1, 2} it is true that k > k’ ⇒ (x, k) ≻t (x’, k’) 
 
Tom’s preferences suggest that he values both life and money. In fact, he would never 
part with a single kidney, no matter how much money he was offered in exchange for it. 
Jerry, on the other hand, has the following preferences: 
 
For all x, x’ ∈ ℝ and each k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, (x, k) ≽j (x’, k)  x ≥ x’, 
(x + x’, 1) ≽j  (x, 2)  (x + x’) ≥ 107, 
For each x ∈ ℝ, k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, (x, k) ≻j 0 
 
                                                          
61 The negative values represent money forgone and positive values represent money received. 
 
62 A standard preference relation (≽) over two bundles of goods x and y (x, y ∈ X) is rational if it is 
complete (for all x, y ∈ X, we have that x ≽ y or y ≽ x) and transitive (for all x, y, z ∈ X, if x ≽ y and y ≽ z, 
then x ≽ z) (Mas-Colell et al. (1995, 6)). 
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Unlike Tom, Jerry has lexicographic preferences over a part of his consumption set since 
he is willing to part with an infinite amount of money to keep his kidney, when he has 
one. However, Jerry’s preferences also indicate that he is willing to give up on one of his 
kidneys, provided he is compensated with at least $10,000,000.  
This example gives us an account of kidneys, but is it the account we want? As 
depicted above, lexicographic preferences model substitution in terms of welfare alone. 
For Tom, neither of his kidneys have a substitute; for Jerry, when the price is right, one 
of his kidneys has a substitute (though no amount of money will serve as a substitute 
when he has only one kidney). In both of these cases, whether a kidney is substitutable 
depends entirely on the subjective preferences of Tom and Jerry and not on any other 
factor, such as the objective functional properties of kidneys. If the purpose is not to 
establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a good to serve as an overall substitute 
of a kidney then one could safely ignore the objective functional properties possessed by 
these organs. For such purposes, welfare substitution as it is depicted by the standard 
lexicographic preferences above would be entirely adequate. 
However, since our objective is to establish necessary and sufficient conditions 
for any good to serve as an overall substitute for a kidney, modeling substitution in 
terms of welfare alone is restrictive. Consider, for example, the agent who prefers 
continued existence to death and who also happens to possess a single kidney. Suppose 
further that one wants to obtain the conditions that must be satisfied for any good to 
supplant this agent’s last kidney. Answering this query cannot simply rely on a story 
about the structure of the agent’s subjective preferences. It will also require an account 
of the causal role executed by a functional substitute, such as a properly functioning 
hemodialysis machine. But the standard account of kidneys and lexicographic 
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preferences, such as the one given above, does not establish the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for any good to serve as an overall substitute for a kidney because it normally 
abstracts from the causal properties of kidneys and their potential functional 
substitutes. On this account, if a kidney has no substitute, it is simply because it is 
subjectively preferred in a distinctive kind of way. The problem with this approach is 
that it presumes ex hypothesi that kidneys or, a certain quantity of them, have no 
substitutes when our objective is to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for any 
good to serve as an overall substitute for this agent’s last kidney. 
One might argue that establishing necessary and sufficient conditions for any 
good to serve as an overall substitute for a BEG is misguided since functional 
substitution does not concern economics, but some other science, such as ecology. This 
objection fails for a few different reasons. First, although the substitutability of goods in 
terms of their characteristics, including their functional properties, may not be 
pervasive in economics, Lancaster (1971) and Sen (1985) both endorse such an approach 
and, if Jacob Viner’s famous retort that “economics is what economists do” is correct, 
then the substitutability of goods in terms of their characteristics or properties is part 
and parcel of economic science. Second, one needs to understand that the objective of 
establishing necessary and sufficient conditions for any good to serve as an overall 
substitute for a BEG is driven by what BEGs are and how they are distinctive from 
ordinary goods in consumer choice theory. While ordinary goods merely yield utility to 
economic agents, BEGs possess objective properties that afford agents with a causal role 
required for continued existence. Under the assumption that agents prefer continued 
existence to non-existence, agent welfare can only be sustained by a good that possesses 
the same functional property as the BEG it supplants. This statement not only reinforces 
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the claim that for any good to serve as a substitute for a BEG it must meet the dual 
requirement, but it also goes a long way to justify the objective of establishing necessary 
and sufficient conditions for any good to supplant a BEG. It is by virtue of what BEGs 
are and the objective properties they possess which make them distinct from ordinary 
goods that the question of overall substitutability is appropriate for these goods in 
particular. To demand that one must abstract from the functional properties of BEGs 
would be to ignore the very feature that makes these goods distinctive in the first place. 
 
Conclusion 
The largest part of this chapter was devoted to introducing a theory of BEGs and 
proposing necessary and sufficient conditions for any good to serve as a substitute for 
such goods. This theory entails that there are objective ecological conditions that must 
be met to be an agent with subjective preferences. The reason why BEGs, and not 
ordinary consumer goods, are required for the continued existence of a given agent is 
because such goods possess causal properties that are essential to the agent. Given that 
BEGs possess such properties, it would be a kind of category mistake to suggest they are 
members of a class of things that only yield utility to agents. BEGs are never goods that 
merely yield utility to agents since they also afford agents with functional properties 
necessary for continued existence. 
The motivation to develop this theory in the first place was to unmask critical 
natural capital, a concept that is central to the debate between weak and strong 
sustainability. Among the proponents of strong sustainability, critical natural capital is 
meant to denote specific ecological conditions that must be met for agent existence and 
therefore, sustained economic production. However, the problem, until now, was that 
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no one had explained what, precisely, these conditions might be and why they are 
essential for this purpose. Without such an account, there was no way to judge whether 
the argument from critical natural capital was sound. The theory of BEGs, on the other 
hand, answers these questions and thus, helps to move the debate forward between 
weak and strong sustainability. Since this theory entails that economic agents require a 
viable environment constituted by BEGs, we can conclude that human economic activity 
depends on sustaining specific goods in kind, a proposition that is incompatible with the 
following: 
 
Resources are … fungible in a certain sense. They can take the place of each 
other. That is extremely important because it suggests that we do not owe 
the future any particular thing. There is no specific object that the goal of 
sustainability, the obligation of sustainability, requires us to leave 
untouched (Solow 1993b, 181). 
 
While Solow argues that sustainability does not require that any particular kind of 
resource be retained, the theory of BEGs is a challenge to his view since it implies that 
there are some kinds of basic resources or ecological conditions that must be met for the 
objective of sustainable development. Of course, it would be misleading to claim that, on 
the basis of the foregoing quotation, Solow denies human economic activity depends on 
any ecological conditions whatsoever since he is mainly concerned with traditional 
resources as inputs into the production process, not BEGs. Be that as it may, his 
statement that “we do not owe the future any particular thing” contrasts sharply with 
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the proposition that there are specific ecological conditions that must be met for 
sustainable development. 
One might resist the claim that BEGs have any implications whatsoever for 
sustainable development since this theory is at the level of consumption, where the 
relation of interest is between economic agents and goods, and sustainable development 
is at the level of production, where the relation of interest is between sustained output 
and the means of production. However, while it is true that economists normally 
distinguish between substitution at these two levels of analysis, limited substitution 
possibilities in consumption, such as those imposed by BEGs, will almost certainly have 
consequences for sustained productive capacity as well. As David Stern states, “limited 
substitution possibilities in consumption may also make it impossible to derive 
meaningful capital aggregates that are monotonically related to welfare” (1997, 155). 
It is worth noting that the theory of BEGs implies that the consequences for 
economic agents extend beyond mere gains and losses in subjective utility. Without a 
viable environment partly constituted by BEGs at time t1, the agent will lose her 
existence or agenthood and, therefore, the possibility of gaining or losing utility at some 
future time t2. If the agent prefers continued existence to non-existence, then such a loss 
will be different in kind from mere gains or losses in subjective utility since it will 
include the agent’s ability to gain or lose subjective utility. 
It was argued that unlike substitutes for ordinary goods that sustain agent 
welfare, any overall substitute of a BEG must also be a functional substitute. Substitute 
goods must possess the objective causal properties required for the agent’s continued 
existence. This implies that neither welfare substitutes nor functional substitutes are, on 
their own, sufficient to account for the substitutability of BEGs. One might object to this 
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double requirement by insisting that it should be held to account by Occam’s razor: 
functional substitution can and should be reduced to welfare substitution. But while it is 
true that the functional properties of BEGs only command attention because of their 
connection to agent welfare, this chapter has argued that in cases where agents prefer 
continued existence to non-existence, agent welfare will necessarily depend on the 
causal properties possessed by BEGs. For any good to potentially serve as a substitute 
for a BEG, it will have to possess the same functional property as the BEG it supplants 
and this fact cannot be reduced to welfare substitution alone. 
Finally, although agents depend on BEGs for continued existence, the question of 
whether such goods are scarce should not be neglected. To claim that some set of goods 
is required for the continued existence of an agent because such goods possess certain 
causal properties is not to claim that they are scarce or expensive. They might be 
ubiquitous and cheap. In the prototypical case of O2, for example, the quantity of such 
molecules available to certain agents might well be abundant. Indeed, this will often – 
though not always – be the case for BEGs. But while the scarcity of BEGs would be 
crucial to any comprehensive analysis of such goods, the focus of this chapter was to 
make the items denoted by the concept of critical natural capital more explicit by 
introducing a theory of BEGs. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
No One Can Preserve Nature 
 
What many conservation interests want to preserve is a 
nature that is not controlled, shaped, or willed by us, a 
nature which, as against culture, can be thought of as just 
there. But a nature which is preserved by us is no longer a 
nature that is simply not controlled. A natural park is not 
nature, but a park; a wilderness that is preserved is a 
definite, delimited, wilderness. The paradox is that we have 
to use our power to preserve a sense of what is not in our 
power. Anything we leave untouched we have already 
touched.  
 
- Bernard Williams (1995) 
 
 
 
Chapter One claimed that economists have moved away from the image of Nature as a 
Storehouse to the image of Nature as a Garden. Whereas Nature as a storehouse 
generally envisions the whole of nature as a collection of inert materials to be used as 
inputs in human-directed production processes, Nature as a garden consists, in part, of 
what might be termed “ecosystem artifacts” – ecosystems that have been 
instrumentalized for human purposes. Since the ideal view of nature as a garden would 
seem to involve domesticating every last economically valuable ecosystem, the status of 
“wild ecosystems”, “wilderness”, or “untrammelled Nature”, is put into question. 
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Certainly, John Stuart Mill would have questioned the desirability of the whole world 
being domesticated to serve human purposes. In his Principles of Political Economy 
(Book VI, Chapter VI) Mill states: 
 
It is not good for man to be kept perforce at all times in the presence of his 
species. A world from which solitude is extirpated is a very poor ideal. 
Solitude, in the sense of being often alone, is essential to any depth of 
meditation or of character; and solitude in the presence of natural beauty 
and grandeur, is the cradle of thoughts and aspirations which are not only 
good for the individual, but which society could ill do without. Nor is there 
much satisfaction in contemplating the world with nothing left to the 
spontaneous activity of nature; with every rood of land brought into 
cultivation, which is capable of growing food for human beings; every 
flowery waste or natural pasture ploughed up, all quadrupeds or birds 
which are not domesticated for man’s use exterminated as his rivals for 
food, every hedgerow or superfluous tree rooted out, and scarcely a place 
left where a wild shrub or flower could grow without being eradicated as a 
weed in the name of improved agriculture ([1848] 2006, 756). 
 
For Mill, a state of affairs without any spontaneous productions of the Earth, whereby 
all of nature is brought into cultivation, is undesirable, mainly because it would preclude 
humans from developing their depth of character. While this chapter will not directly 
consider the desirability of the world as a garden, it does consider a connected question 
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embodied by the “preservation paradox”.63 John O’Neill et al. (2008, 139) describe this 
paradox as follows: “Nature … is what exists outside of any intentional human 
intervention. Protection or restoration, on the other hand, requires intentional human 
intervention in order to put it into effect. So, how can it be possible to protect or restore, 
by intentional human agency, something that is supposed to be independent of 
intentional human agency?” As a preliminary formulation, the paradox can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. Nature is that realm of phenomena that is independent of intentional 
human agency. 
2. “Preserving” and “restoring” Nature requires intentional human agency. 
3. Therefore, no one can preserve (or restore) Nature. 
 
Some scholars, namely, John O’Neill et al. (2008) and Richard Sylvan (1998) 
have argued that the paradox is false. As we will see below, O’Neill et al. have argued 
that there is at least one way to restore nature without turning it into an artifact. Sylvan 
(1998), on the other hand, simply dismisses the possibility that preserving nature makes 
it more artificial. This chapter argues for the contrary thesis: no one can preserve or 
restore nature. In other words, I will argue that the preservation paradox is warranted. 
Robert Elliott (1982) and Eric Katz (1992, 2012) have made similar claims by arguing 
that restored nature is artificial and that, because of this, it has less value than its wild 
nature counterpart. While this chapter argues that the paradox is sound, it makes no 
                                                          
63 In her Rambunctious Garden: Saving Nature in a Post-Wild World, Emma Marris (2011) argues that 
we should create the “rambunctious garden”, which she takes to be a hybrid between wild nature, on the 
one hand, and human management on the other. 
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claim about the degraded value of restored nature. Moreover, as we will see below, the 
thesis of this chapter also differs from Elliott’s (1982) insofar as he maintains that 
preserving nature is possible. To the contrary, I will argue that when nature is merely 
preserved it is ipso facto made into an artifact. If I am right, then the artifactual can be 
made, not only by intentional human activity directed at restoring ecosystems, but by 
intentionally omitting human activity from preserved “wild” ecosystems as well. This 
new argument will depend, in part, on James Woodward’s (2003) account of absence 
causation. 
The next section begins by reformulating the preservation paradox in order to 
guard it from a few criticisms. Then, to determine whether the preservation paradox 
holds, I will show why it is that restored and preserved nature becomes more artificial 
than it would be otherwise. To do this, I will outline three features that distinguish 
artifacts from natural objects. Unlike natural objects, artifacts are designed or lanned; 
they possess a function attributed to them by an intentional agent or group of agents; 
and, they have been modified by an intentional agent. I will then argue that since 
restored and preserved ecosystems share all of these features, we can conclude that 
restoring and preserving nature turns nature into an artifact. 
Perhaps the first thing to recognize about the preservation paradox as expressed 
above is that it privileges a particular concept of Nature. The presumption being made 
here is that Nature is a realm of phenomena that is independent of intentional human 
agency. Under this account, intentional human agency is the unique cause that 
somehow makes “Nature” or “wilderness” or “wild ecosystems” become artificial. 
Without this particular concept of nature there would be no paradox at all. Indeed, if 
one were to effectively show that Nature is not some realm of phenomena that is 
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detached from intentional human agency, then it would become much less clear whether 
there is any paradox at all. For example, if Nature were taken to be everything actual 
and everything possible (Mill’s first concept of nature) then there would be no paradox 
since Nature could never be destroyed. So, it is crucial to realize that the paradox 
depends on a particular concept of nature and that this concept might contend with 
others.  
Nature as a realm of phenomena that is independent of intentional human 
agency is also problematic because, as suggested in Chapter Two, there is no longer any 
part of the Earth that has not been affected by human agency. If pristine and 
untrammelled Nature or “wilderness” or “wild ecosystem” means some bit of nature that 
is hermetically sealed-off from human activity, then there is no Nature left on or near 
the surface of the Earth.64 Mark Woods refers to this as the “no-wilderness argument” 
and states, “wilderness preservation efforts seem doomed because they ignore the 
historical fact that we today preserve as wilderness has been impacted by people in the 
past. There is no such thing as de facto wilderness in North America, and all of our 
current wilderness areas as untrammeled wilderness are fake” (2000, 355). Following 
this line of thought, it would seem that there is no Nature left to be preserved, and 
therefore, we have another reason for thinking there is no preservation paradox.  
One might suggest weakening the requirement that Nature is completely 
independent of intentional human agency by acknowledging that while it is true there is 
no longer any part of the Earth that remains completely unaffected by human agency 
and human technologies, there are still places and objects that remain relatively 
                                                          
64 Marris (2011, 2) states, “Nature is almost everywhere. But wherever it is, there is one thing that nature 
is not: pristine. In 2011 there is no pristine wilderness on planet Earth.”  
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detached from human agency. Moreover, as David Wiggins (2000, 10) has claimed, 
while it may be true that no pure Nature left that is completely independent of human 
agency, the implication is not that all of nature has yet been instrumentalized to serve 
human purposes.  
The preservation paradox can be reformulated to reflect these two challenges. 
Consider the slightly modified, new preservation paradox as follows: 
 
1. Nature is that realm of phenomena that is relatively detached from 
intentional human agency. 
2. “Preserving” and “restoring” Nature requires intentional human agency. 
3. Therefore, no one can preserve (or restore) Nature. 
 
The only difference between the original preservation paradox and the new one directly 
above is that the former states that nature is that realm of phenomena that is 
“independent” of intentional human agency while the latter states that Nature is a realm 
of phenomena that is “relatively detached” from intentional human agency. Recall from 
Chapter Two that, rather than imposing a strict division between natural and artificial 
objects, it was proposed that the artificial/natural distinction be described as a 
continuum whereby phenomena are branded as more (less) natural or more (less) 
artificial, depending on their degree of detachment from intentional human agency. I 
then distinguished between those objects or items that are completely detached from 
human agency from those which have a first or second degree of detachment. For the 
remainder of this chapter, when I refer to the preservation paradox, I do not take Nature 
to be pristine or untrammelled, a view that Michael P. Nelson and J. Baird Callicott label 
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“naïve wilderness realism” (2008, 12). Rather, from now on, when I state “preservation 
paradox”, I am referring to the new, reformulated, paradox which takes nature to be a 
realm of phenomena that is only relatively detached from human agency (see Figure 2, 
page 55). 
To be clear, from this point forward, rather than using a multitude of related 
concepts, such as “nature” or “wilderness”, I will only use the terms “ecosystems” and 
“wild ecosystems”, since these items are often denoted by economists who deploy the 
concept of natural capital. The adjective “wild” in this context simply designates 
ecosystems that remain relatively detached from intentional human activity whereas 
“ecosystems” simpliciter designate ecosystems that may have been actively and 
intentionally constructed, restored, or managed by human agents. These latter 
ecosystems may have been transformed and completely instrumentalized to serve 
human ends. 
For the purpose of this chapter we also require working definitions of “restoring 
ecosystems” and “preserving ecosystems”. As for the activity of restoring ecosystems, 
this chapter simply follows the Society of Ecological Restoration’s 2002 definition: “the 
process of assisting the recovery of an ecosystem that has been degraded, damaged, or 
destroyed” (see Sarkar 2012, 132). Similarly, José M. Rey Benayas et al. (2009, 1121) 
describe ecological restoration as involving “the recovery of an ecosystem that has been 
degraded damaged, or destroyed, typically as a result of human activities.” Invariably, 
restored ecosystems are ones that have been intentionally returned to some previous 
state or a “reference state” that is valued or desired by some human agent or agents (in 
this chapter I will not speak to the difficulties of choosing and justifying a particular 
reference state). Preserving ecosystems, on the other hand, generally involves no such 
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active human interventions but, on the contrary, are taken to be areas or reserves that 
are merely protected from certain activities that are prohibited or discouraged.65 
It should be clear that by arguing that the preservation paradox is true – that no 
one can preserve or restore nature – I am not claiming nature or wilderness ought not to 
be preserved or restored in any sense. My argument is that nature cannot be preserved 
or restored in the specific sense that is contained by the concept “Nature” as given by the 
paradox. Thus, the argument of this chapter is not for or against the action of preserving 
wilderness spaces or ecological reserves. Rather, the main claim defended in this 
chapter is against the possibility of preserving nature in the specific sense that nature is 
presupposed by the preservation paradox. My claim here is that it is conceptually 
incoherent to preserve or restore Nature when it is conceived as a realm or domain of 
phenomena that is relatively detached from intentional human agency. 
If the preservation paradox is true, then, by restoring or preserving nature one 
turns nature into an artifact, or – in the very least – these activities make nature more 
artificial than it would be otherwise. In order to argue for the truth of this paradox, I 
first need to give an account that explains how natural objects can be turned into 
artifacts. Once established, this account can serve as the basis for evaluating the further 
claim that restoring or preserving nature ipso facto turns nature into an artifact. 
What makes some objects natural and others artificial? Unsurprisingly, there is 
no easy answer to this question. Recall from Chapter Two, that, for Aristotle, (Physics 
Book II, 9-10), artifacts are taken to be different in kind from natural objects. He states, 
“Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes. ‘By nature’ the 
                                                          
65 For more on preserving nature in general, see Sagoff (1974). 
 
138 
  
animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, 
water) – for we say that these and the like exist ‘by nature’.” Artifacts, on the other hand, 
have their forms imposed on them by external causes and do not possess their own 
inner source of reproduction, as was established with Aristotle’s wooden bed example 
described in Chapter Two.  
In his The Sciences of the Artificial, Herbert A. Simon (1996, 5) identifies the 
following four indicia that distinguish the artificial from the natural: 
 
1. Artificial things are synthesized (though not always or usually with full 
forethought) by human beings. 
2. Artificial things may imitate appearances in natural things while lacking, in 
one or many respects, the reality of the latter. 
3. Artificial things can be characterized in terms of functions, goals, adaptation. 
4. Artificial things are often discussed, particularly when they are being 
designed, in terms of imperatives as well as descriptive. 
 
These four criteria, however illuminating, fail to explicitly recognize the linkage 
between artificial things and intentional human activity. In the specific context of 
debating the preservation paradox, John O’Neill et al. (2008, 128-9) have proposed that 
“something is artificial only if it is the result of a deliberate intentional act” and, 
similarly, “something is artificial if and only if it is what it is at least partly as the result 
of a deliberate or intentional act, usually involving the application of some art or skill.” 
If one accepts the putative claim that human agents are the only ones capable of such 
deliberate intentional acts, then, on this account, only such agents are capable of turning 
139 
  
natural objects into artifacts. Moreover, for any natural object to become an artifact 
requires that that object stand in the right kind of causal relation to some intentional 
agent whereby the artifact is the intended product or consequence of some act. This is a 
good initial attempt to distinguish artifacts from natural objects, not only because it 
recognizes artifacts as intention dependent objects, but also because it dovetails nicely 
with the specific concept of nature – a realm of phenomena that remains relatively 
detached from intentional human agency – presupposed by the preservation paradox. 
Beyond O’Neill et al.’s account, which emphasizes artifacts as intention 
dependent objects, we can add three more features or characteristics of artifacts that 
distinguish them from natural objects. Artifacts (1) are designed or planned; (2) possess 
a function attributed to them by an intentional agent or group of agents (this feature 
matches Simon’s third criterion above); and (3) have been, in some way, modified by an 
intentional agent. None of these features should astonish or bewilder the artifact 
theorist or philosopher of artifacts. In fact, all three of them are widely accepted as 
necessary conditions for any object to qualify as an artifact. The reason why I refrain 
from making the stronger claim that these three features together are necessary and 
sufficient conditions that any object must meet to be considered an artifact is because 
my purpose here is not to defend a novel or grand theory of artifacts but to simply 
distinguish artifacts from natural objects by employing the theoretical resources that are 
already available to me. Another qualification is this. For the purpose of this chapter, I 
am only concerned with a subclass of artifacts, technical artifacts, which include an 
enormous variety of everyday physical objects such as tables, chairs, bookshelves, roller-
coasters, and houses, all of which have a practical use for intentional agents. Thus, while 
there are certainly exceptions to the rule, the category of technical artifacts is generally 
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taken to exclude intentionally made objects such as works of art, such as paintings and 
sculptures, for example. 
First, in his Artifacts, Art Works, and Agency, Randall Dipert (1993) suggests 
that, unlike natural objects, artifacts are necessarily objects that are designed and made 
by an intentional agent. 66  Planning or designing artifacts normally precedes the 
construction of the artifact itself. Pieter E. Vermaas and Wybo Houkes (2003) concur 
with Dipert on this feature, suggesting that design is “a planned activity to contribute to 
a user plan for achieving certain goals” (2003, 288). 67  According to Vermaas and 
Houkes, any satisfactory theory of artifacts will need to focus on the design of the object 
at hand. 
Second, it is widely accepted that all technical artifacts possess a function or 
purpose that has been attributed to them by an intentional agent or group of agents. 
Lynn Rudder Baker (2008, 2-3), for example, states that unlike natural objects which 
come into existence without human intervention, artifacts are intention dependent 
phenomena that are “made for a given purpose.” The Finnish philosopher Risto 
Hilpinen (2011) also defines artifacts as essentially “objects that are intentionally made 
or produced for a certain purpose.” Dipert (1993), too, agrees that artifacts are made for 
a certain purpose while making the further claim that an artifact’s function is to be 
                                                          
66 Dipert’s (1993) Artifacts, Art Works, and Agency is among the first analytic explorations into artifacts 
(see Perlman 2004). In addition to being an object that is designed and made for a certain purpose, Dipert 
also adds that artifacts are made to “communicate their function”. Hilpinen (2011), for one, has 
questioned the notion that every artifact must have been made to communicate their function. He states, 
“This is a plausible condition, since an F-object can presumably be a good F-object only if its potential 
users recognize it as such. However, this recognisability should not be taken to mean general 
recognisability: a mechanical shark used in making an adventure film is an artifact, but its authors do not 
wish the audience to recognize it as such, on the contrary. The condition of recognisability applies only to 
the persons who are using it in the making of the film.” 
 
67  Vermaas and Houkes (2003) also require that any satisfactory theory of artifacts will require a 
structural component as well. 
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grounded on the use and design of artifacts (Perlman 2004). In the case of ordinary 
technical artifacts such as tables or chairs, all such items possess specific functions that 
have been attributed to them, not by Nature, but by an intentional human agent or a 
group of such agents. It is by virtue of being intention dependent objects that tables are 
for eating meals, chairs are for sitting, etc. 
How, more specifically, might an object come to acquire a function attributed to 
it by an intentional agent? One way to understand how this process works is to consider 
John Searle’s (1995, 2010) theory of institutional facts. His theory can be summarized 
by the following formula “X counts as Y in C”, whereby X refers to the object being given 
an institutional status, Y refers to the status itself, and C refers to the conditions under 
which the status applies. Thus, for example, a small, malleable, and thin piece of plastic 
with certain origins (the Royal Canadian Mint) and that possesses certain physical 
features or properties (X) counts as a Canadian $10 dollar bill (Y) among Canadian 
citizens in the year 2014. As Searle explains, “humans have the capacity to impose 
functions on objects and people where the objects and the people cannot perform the 
functions solely in virtue of their physical structure” (Searle 2010, 7). J.P. Smit et al. 
(2011) provide another example, of a traffic light, as it would be explained by Searle’s 
theory. They state, “The X-term would refer to the physical object, namely, the actual 
physical traffic light. But the traffic light does not fulfill its function due to the purely 
physical facts associated with it. Rather this object counts as a traffic light only because 
we collectively regard it as having a certain status. What makes it a ‘traffic light’, as 
opposed to so many lights on a pole, is that the green counts as a signal that we should 
go, the red counts as a signal that we should stop, etc. This status of the lights obviously 
does not follow from their physical constitution, but from being objects of collective 
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intentionality, which confers this status” (2011, 5-6). This formula, which is an essential 
feature to explaining all institutional facts, seems to work particularly well for technical 
artifacts since it helps to explain how a mere physical object can be assigned a function 
and have it recognized as such by intentional human agents.  
The third and final feature that distinguishes natural objects from artifacts is that 
the object at hand must have been modified – in some way, shape, or form – by an 
intentional agent. Hilpinen has argued that artifacts necessarily have a maker or author, 
and he outlines the following Dependence Condition that must be met for any object to 
be considered an artifact: 
 
The existence and some of the properties of an artifact depend on an 
author's intention to make an object of a certain kind (Hilpinen 1992, 
65).68 
 
This widely accepted condition is normally interpreted as requiring that the 
author of an artifact must, in some minimal sense, actively modify, transform, or 
improve some object before it is considered to be a bona fide artifact.69 This condition 
also helps to explain why not everything that merely happens to be produced by human 
agents is an artifact. The agent who intends to build a hammer with a wooden handle 
and a steel head, a technical artifact that is first designed and then made for striking 
                                                          
68 Randall Dipert has argued that artifacts are intentionally modified tools that should also be intended by 
its author to be recognized as having been intentionally modified for a certain purpose (Dipert 1993, 29–
31). 
 
69 Sipii (2003, 417) implicitly accepts Hilpinen’s dependency condition when she states “an entity x is an 
artifact if and only if x has been intentionally brought into existence by causing the artifact x to have 
certain properties.” 
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hard surfaces, does not also intend to cast a shadow against the wall of the building 
where he works, nor does the agent intend to produce a plume of sawdust when cutting 
the wood to fashion the handle. The latter two events are not the result of intentional 
actions, but mere happenings. In other words, there is a conceptual distinction to be 
made between objects that are made by intentional human agents and those things that 
are merely caused by human activity. Hilpinen’s dependence condition helps to explain 
why the hammer is a technical artifact while the shadow and the sawdust are not. 
 It should be recognized that intentional agency may not be limited to human 
beings and so Hilpinen’s dependence condition does not necessarily exclude all of the 
animal artifacts made by non-human creatures (Hilpinen 2011). On his account of 
animal artifacts, James L. Gould (2007) supplants intentionality as a necessary 
condition for making artifacts with its mere “usefulness” for a particular creature. 
Specifically, Gould defines an artifact as “any creation on the part of an animal, using 
and/or modifying available materials, which is useful to it or its offspring” (2007, 249). 
Animal artifacts include a wide range of objects that have been modified for their 
usefulness, including the silk spun by insects to make cocoons and the modified twigs 
used by chimpanzees to extract termites from their mounds. But while Gould extends 
artifacts from the human realm to the entire animal kingdom, he also maintains that 
there is a difference between human and animal artifacts. He states that, “in animals the 
vast majority of these artifacts are built according to innate specifications using a set of 
inborn instructions” while other animals (including Homo sapiens) “we see a more 
flexible, goal-oriented system, in which urges rather than detailed instruction seem to 
motivate the creation of the tools, homes, and decorative devices – sometimes with 
apparently traditional group specific designs” (2007, 266). In any case, while technical 
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artifacts are normally considered to be objects that are intentionally designed and made 
by human agents for specific purposes, and such artifacts are the ones emphasized in 
this chapter, Gould’s account of animal artifacts suggests that intentional agency may 
not limited to human agents alone. 
If restoring and preserving ecosystems involves designing and planning them, 
attributing them with a function, and intentionally modifying them in some way, then 
we can conclude that such objects are artificial and that the preservation paradox is true. 
How do restored and preserved ecosystems measure up to these three features of 
artifacts that I have delineated above? Are restored ecosystems designed or planned? Do 
they possess a function that has been attributed to them by intentional human agents? 
Are restored and preserved ecosystems modified by an intentional agent? Even if the 
answer to all of these questions happens to be positive, what about the tricky case of 
merely preserving wild ecosystems? Since these ecosystems are, by definition, relatively 
detached from human activity, it is puzzling to envisage how these items could be 
modified by intentional human agents (and therefore, satisfy Hilpinen’s dependence 
condition as described above). 
First of all, it should be evident that the activity of restoring ecosystems, the 
process of assisting the recovery of an ecosystem that has been degraded, damaged, or 
destroyed in order to bring about some desired effect, requires making a plan or design. 
In his Nature by Design: People, Natural Process and Ecological Restoration, Eric 
Higgs (2003) argues that “restoration is fundamentally about design”. Planning a 
restored ecosystem not only requires determining the targeted historical reference state 
that happens to be preferred or desired by human agents, but it also requires 
establishing the most effective means for attaining the final product: a restored 
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ecosystem. Without a plan or design, even if it is imperfect or incomplete, that precedes 
the actual restored ecosystem it is difficult to see how any ecosystem could, in fact, be 
restored. Planning in this sense, even if the plan ultimately fails, is not merely required 
for restored ecosystems but for preserving ecosystems as well. While it is true that 
preserving wild ecosystems does not involve active human intervention, it does involve 
minimal planning insofar as the ecosystem that remains relatively detached from 
human agency – where specific intentional activities are prohibited or discouraged – 
must be cordoned off from other the other adjacent areas that are not being preserved 
by human agents. 
Certainly, ecosystems that have been denoted by the concept of natural capital 
possess a function attributed to them by human agents: to produce economically 
valuable goods and services to human agents. This point was established in Chapter 
Two. It is worth emphasizing, however, that restored and preserved ecosystems are 
sufficiently different from ordinary technical artifacts to be considered a special class of 
technical artifacts. Unlike ordinary artifacts, such as tables and chairs, that do not 
possess a function independent of those attributed to them by intentional agents, 
ecosystems may possess functions independent of those attributed to them by 
intentional human agents. 
Restored and preserved ecosystems may possess functions independent of 
human agents while technical artifacts are not normally considered to possess any 
function independent of those attributed to them by human agents. In other words, the 
functions of technical artifacts, such as shoes and hammers, are never considered to be a 
natural property possessed by such objects but is only ever attributed to them by some 
intentional agent. 
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Jay Odenbaugh (unpublished manuscript) has argued that one can make sense of 
an ecosystem’s non-intentional natural function by grounding them in terms of Robert 
Cummins’ (1975) theory of function.70 Cummins’ causal-role functional analysis entails 
that the function of an item is determined by the causal role it plays in relation to a 
larger system: some item possesses a function if and only if it plays a causal role in 
relation to some larger system under consideration (Perlman 2004). More specifically, 
Odenbaugh explains Cummins’ account of function as follows: “suppose that x is some 
part of a system S, has a disposition F, and S itself has some disposition C. Roughly 
then, the systemic capacity function of x in a system S is F if, and only if, x is capable of 
F-ing and x’s capacity to F in part accounts for S’s capacity to C” (unpublished 
manuscript, 18). Odenbaugh gives the example of fungi. Fungi (x) have the function of 
decomposing woody products (F) in an ecosystem (S) if, and only if, fungi are capable of 
decomposing woody products (F-ing) and fungi’s capacity to decompose woody 
products in part accounts for an ecosystem’s capacity to contribute to the carbon cycle 
(C). If it is true that, as Odenbaugh argues, ecosystems possess such Cummins-style 
functions then it would seem that unlike ordinary technical artifacts, ecosystem artifacts 
can be described as possessing two distinct functions that have two distinct origins: one 
that is bestowed by nature, the natural function of ecosystem artifacts, and the second 
being put there by intentional human agents, the artifactual function of ecosystem 
artifacts.  
The notion that there is a subclass of technical artifacts that possess two 
functions, one natural and the other artifactual, is not entirely novel. Dan Sperber 
                                                          
70 Among ecologists, “ecosystem function” has multiple meanings. For a list of such meanings, see Jax 
(2010).  
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(2007) recently gave a similar account for what he terms biological artifacts. According 
to Sperber, biological artifacts perform their intended artifactual function for human 
agents by performing a natural or biological function. Unlike the natural function of 
ecosystems, however, which Odenbaugh construes in terms of Cummins-style causal 
role functions, Sperber adopts Ruth Milliken’s (1984) etiological theory of function to 
explain the natural function of biological artifacts. This particular non-intentional 
theory of function bases the function of a trait, not on the present-day causal role it 
performs in relation to a larger system, as is the case for Cummins’ theory of function, 
but on its evolutionary history. Under Milliken’s (1984) account, the biological function 
of some trait is to be determined by how it has evolved over time under evolutionary 
pressures, namely, natural selection. For example, the heart can be described as having 
a biological function not only because it plays a causal role in relation to the organism of 
which it is a part, as would be the case under Cummins’ (1975) account, but also because 
this organ contributed to the successful reproduction and continued existence of some 
biological species over time. 
Take the case of leeches, a prime example of a biological artifact according to 
Sperber. Properties of these organisms have been controlled, used, and generally 
exploited by human agents for bloodletting for millennia. Sperber explains that, “leeches 
… have the artifactual function of letting blood. This is the intended effect for which they 
are used. This is also the effect the use of leeches has produced in the past and which 
causes people to go on using them expecting the same effect” (Sperber 2007, 130). The 
biological function of this trait, on the other hand, is to draw blood from a host, a trait 
that was selected for by natural selection. Somewhere along the evolutionary pathway, 
this particular trait was selected for because it was adaptive, or fitness enhancing, for 
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the organisms who possessed it. This biological function, unlike its artifactual function, 
came about independently of human agency. 
If Odenbaugh and Sperber are correct in their respective accounts of ecosystem 
function and biological function, then, in addition to their artifactual functions, 
ecosystem artifacts and biological artifacts can be described as possessing non-
intentional functions as well. In other words, ecosystem artifacts can be described as 
possessing multiple functions. This feature would appear to challenge orthodox theories 
of technical artifacts, such as Dipert’s (1993), since such theories suggest that technical 
artifacts only possess the intentional functions attributed to them by intentional agents. 
Vermaas and Houkes (2003), for instance, argue that a theory of artifact function 
should focus on the design of an object and claim that their function is merely based on 
the intentions of designers, which precede the artifact. While this claim appears to cover 
many instances of technical artifacts, it appears to be at odds with ecosystem artifacts 
and biological artifacts since these entities possess functions that are independent of any 
function attributed to it by an intentional agent.  
Some scholars deny that nature is capable of attributing functions to any 
phenomena, including ecological or biological phenomena. John Searle (2004), for 
instance, is a non-reductive naturalist who takes a conventionalist position on all 
functional claims. For Searle, the only source of functions, an essentially value-laden 
term, is the intentional activity of creatures like us who attribute functions to specific 
objects, including the specific traits of organisms, such as hearts, and technical artifacts, 
such as tables. Under his view, all functional claims are ontologically dependent on 
human intentionality (see Perlman 2004, 11). To claim that the function of the heart is 
to circulate blood in an organism is to also suppose that the heart malfunctions when it 
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fails to perform this task. To make such functional claims involves making inescapable 
value judgments and since naturalism excludes such judgments from the natural world, 
it must exclude functional claims as well. Thus, for Searle, to suppose that the function 
of the heart is to circulate blood involves an implicit commitment to a norm that values 
the continued existence of organisms. If human agents supposed that life and the 
continued existence organisms was a bad thing, we would not attribute the heart with 
the function of circulating blood nor would we claim that the heart malfunctions if it 
failed to circulate blood. Under Searle’s conventionalist account, one can equally 
conceive of an intentional agent or group of agents who attribute hearts with the 
function of merely making thumping sounds rather than circulating blood. For Searle, 
there are no functions without intentional agency. 
Peter Godfrey-Smith (2014), on the other hand, takes issue with the claim that all 
talk of function must be normative or teleological. He defends the use of “function” 
purely on methodological grounds, for the purpose of explaining biological phenomena, 
without any necessary implication for “goodness” or “propriety”. He states: 
 
Within a minimal concept of function as causal role, or contribution to the 
activities of a system, this evaluative way of thinking about functions is 
clearly out of place, except as a kind of pretence. If something does not 
play its usual role in explaining activities of a more complex system, that 
need not be a bad or improper thing; it might be a step in the right 
direction for all concerned. In the case of the etiological concept of 
function, something’s function is the effect it has that explains why it is 
there. This, again, brings with it no implication of goodness or propriety. 
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The function has a role in the explanations of a certain kind, and that is all. 
Descriptions using the word “function” can sometimes seem richer, 
stronger; there can seem to be a warm glow of purpose about a thing when 
it fulfills its function. But this is a leftover from earlier views. It does not 
correspond to anything in our present understanding of living systems 
(2014, 64-5). 
 
But while Searle and Godfrey-Smith differ on the question of whether the use of 
function must have some association with “goodness”, neither scholar is likely to deny 
that the term “function” is essential to some biological explanations. The point being 
made here is that the function of ecosystems (denoted by the concept of natural capital), 
whether restored or preserved, is to produce economically valuable goods and services 
and that this function has been attributed to such ecosystems by intentional human 
agents. However, while this function is imposed on ecosystems by human agents, we 
have also seen that it is conceivable that ecosystems have Cummins-style functions 
independent of human agency. This would seem to be a difference between ecosystem 
artifacts and ordinary technical artifacts since it is generally supposed that the latter 
artifacts only ever possess a function that has been attributed to it by an intentional 
agent. 
Finally, restored and preserved ecosystems have been modified by an intentional 
agent. Recall that Hilpinen’s dependence condition requires that the existence and 
selected properties of an artifact depend on an author's intention to make an object of a 
certain kind. The first thing to recognize is that this condition is causal and that it is 
normally interpreted as requiring that the author of an artifact actively modifies some 
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natural object in order to turn it into an artifact. Interpreted in this way, the author of an 
artifact must modify some object vis-à-vis intentional activity for that object to be 
considered an artifact. If this were the only way to interpret Hilpinen’s dependence 
condition, then my claim that preserving wild ecosystems turns them into artifacts 
would be problematic since wild ecosystems are, by definition, relatively detached from 
intentional human activity. In fact, under the standard interpretation of the dependence 
condition, wild ecosystems are not artifacts at all, but merely “instruments” or what 
some scholars have referred to as “naturefacts”. 
Dipert (1993), for one, would disagree with my claim that preserved wild 
ecosystems are artifacts. He would argue that if such an ecosystem were simply 
discovered and intentionally used for some purpose, it would not be an artifact but an 
“instrument”. For Dipert (1993, 23-7), instruments are simply items that have been 
intentionally used but that do not possess sufficient characteristics or qualities to render 
them genuine artifacts. Dipert explains that, 
 
for an object to be intentionally used by an agent, the agent has to have 
conceived of one or more of these properties, deliberated about whether 
this or another object could better fulfill the purpose because of these 
properties, and concluded that the object will make a net positive 
contribution to the agent’s purpose and that it will do better than, or as 
well as, other objects that are considered and equally available (1993, 25). 
 
According to Dipert’s view, instruments are generally middle-sized and moveable 
objects that, unlike artifacts, are not modified but are merely found or discovered and 
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used “as is” – natural objects that are used for some goal or purpose. For example, a 
fallen log that is found and then intentionally used by some human agent to serve as a 
seat or a foot stool qualifies as an instrument, not a genuine artifact, on Dipert’s 
account. The same is true of a stone that is found and then intentionally used by some 
agent to strike one’s foe. Dipert gives the example of the stone that David used to slew 
Goliath. He states, “we might guess that an object’s merely being deliberately used in 
intentional activity, such as the handy stone with which David slew Goliath, is not 
sufficient to make it an artifact. What, after all, did David do to the stone to make it an 
artifact? How does it differ from a stone that was not used intentionally?” (1993, 21; 
emphasis added). According to Dipert, David must do something to the stone in some 
way before it can be considered a genuine artifact. Namely, he must actively and 
intentionally modify it. Thus, under Dipert’s account, instruments are like artifacts in 
the sense that they are used by intentional agents but they are different in the sense that 
instruments are merely found and used, whereas artifacts are always modified or 
improved by intentional activity. In other words, Hilpinen’s dependence condition, or 
something like it, is required for any object to qualify as an artifact. 
Hilpinen (2011) also recognizes a similar category of items that are “between” 
natural objects on the one hand and artifacts on the other. Following anthropologists 
and others, he refers to such items as “naturefacts”. Like Dipert’s instruments, 
naturefacts are items that are found and then used by creatures to serve some purpose. 
Hilpinen (2011) describes naturefacts as “objects taken from their natural environment 
and used as tools or for some other purpose form a bridge between natural objects and 
artifacts.” There are numerous examples of naturefacts in the animal kingdom. Wendell 
H. Oswalt (1973, 14-6) introduces a few, including the pebbles used by species of wasps 
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(Ammophila urnaria and A. Yarowi) to pound dirt into nests, and the stones used by 
Egyptian vultures (Neophron percnopterus) to break open the shells of ostrich eggs. 
Once again, the distinguishing feature between naturefacts and artifacts, like the 
distinguishing feature between Dipert’s instruments and artifacts, is that the items that 
populate the former category do not possess properties that have been put there by the 
active modification, transformation, or improvements by some intentional agent. On 
this account, naturefacts, like instruments, are not taken to be genuine artifacts since 
artifacts require that modifications and improvements are caused by intentional human 
action. 
Since restoring ecosystems requires active and intentional human intervention to 
bring about some desired state of affairs or intended effect (a restored ecosystem), I will 
take it as a matter of course that such ecosystems are objects that satisfy Hilpinen’s 
dependence condition. The more challenging case is to sustain the claim that merely 
preserving nature or wild ecosystems that remains relatively detached from human 
activity turns nature into an artifact or an ecosystem artifact because preserving wild 
ecosystems does not require intervening directly in the ecosystem in the way that 
restoring ecosystems do. In fact, wild ecosystems are, by definition, ecosystems that 
remain relatively detached from human agency. So, if Hilpinen’s dependence condition 
is interpreted as requiring that the author of artifacts to intentionally and actively 
modify properties of the object at hand, then it would follow that preserved wild 
ecosystems are not artifacts. If there were no other ways to interpret the dependence 
condition, then wild ecosystems that have been merely discovered and attributed an 
artifactual function would not qualify as artifacts because they have not been 
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intentionally modified by the activity of an intentional agent or author. They would 
appear to be naturefacts or instruments. 
To claim that for any object to be an artifact it must be modified is to require that 
the artifact stand in a causal relation with its maker or author. If I am to sustain the 
claim that preserved wild ecosystems are artifacts while remaining true to the other two 
features of artifacts delineated above, then I will need to show that the dependence 
condition can be interpreted differently than is normally the case. I will argue that the 
dependence condition can be interpreted as the properties of an artifact that are 
dependent upon an author’s intention to make an object of a certain kind by 
intentionally omitting their activity and that this omission counts as genuine causation. 
When Hilpinen’s condition is interpreted in this way, by omission rather than action, we 
can see that there are circumstances in which merely preserving wild ecosystems turn 
such ecosystems into artifacts. If I am right, then unlike the existence of ordinary 
technical artifacts, such as tables and chairs, which, under most accounts, require that 
such object have been actively modified or improved for some function or purpose, the 
existence of ecosystem artifacts can depend on intentionally omitting human activity as 
well. 
The central claim being made here is that there are cases when a wild ecosystem’s 
continued natural expression (the intended effect) is counterfactually dependent on 
some agent or group of agent’s intentionally omitting their actions (the cause). In other 
words, there are cases when intentionally omitting human activity from a wild 
ecosystem causes that ecosystem to express itself naturally. To understand how 
causation by omission is plausible I will draw upon James Woodward’s (2003) 
manipulability theory of causation. Woodward states that “X is a  … cause of Y if and 
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only if there is a possible intervention on X that will change Y or the probability 
distribution of Y” (2003, 51). He defines an intervention variable I and putative cause 
and effect X and Y only if I meets the following four conditions (2003, 98): 
1. I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X. That is, certain values of 
I are such that when I attains those values, X ceases to depend on the values of 
other variables that cause X and instead depends only on the value taken by I. 
2. Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. That is, I does not directly cause Y 
and is not a cause of any of Y that are distinct from X except, of course, for those 
causes of Y, if any, that are built into the I-X-Y connection itself; that is, except 
for (a) any causes of Y that are effects of X (i.e., variables that are causally 
between X and Y) and (b) by any causes of Y that re between I and X and have no 
effect on Y independently of X. 
3. I is statistically independent of any variable Z that causes Y and that is on a 
directed path that does not go through X. 
4. I is statistically independent of any variable Z that causes Y and that is on a 
directed path that does not go through X. 
Although Woodward’s theory of causation highlights a manipulability account, it 
is critical to bear in mind that it does not depend on what human beings can actually 
manipulate or do. This means that interventions, for Woodward, can involve non-
human causes as well. Thus, for example, the gravitational pull that the Earth exerts on 
the moon is a genuine cause under Woodward’s’ theory, even though humans cannot 
(currently) exert the same force on this celestial body. Describing Woodward’s account, 
Julian Reiss (unpublished manuscript) explains that, “causality does not only obtain 
whenever a factor is manipulated and a certain result ensues but also whenever were the 
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factor to be manipulated, the desired result would ensue” (58; italics in the original). In 
this sense, Woodward’s theory of causation shares many features with counterfactual 
theories of causation, such as that defended by David Lewis (1973).  
Because, for Woodward, a sufficient condition for some X to cause or have a 
causal effect on Y is that some change in the value of X produced by an intervention is 
associated with a change in the value of Y, Woodward argues that omissions or absences 
can be causes as well (Woodward 2009). Unlike process theories of causation that do 
not generally view causation by omission as being genuinely causal, Woodward’s theory 
can account for intuitively plausible causal claims such as “I killed the plant by not 
watering it” (Beebee 2004).71 Why does this qualify as a genuine causal relation under 
Woodward’s account? Quite simply, since a change under an intervention in whether 
the person in charge of watering the plant is associated with a change in the value of the 
variables measuring whether the plant dies, the statement “I killed the plant by not 
watering it” is a genuine causal claim. 72  In this case, causation by omission is no 
different in kind from the claim that “I killed the plant by uprooting it and tossing it into 
the dustbin”. 
Perhaps the central challenge for theories of causation that imply causation by 
omission can be genuinely causal is to restrict the number of genuine causal claims so 
that they do not diverge too far from our intuitions about causation. For example, it 
would be absurd to claim that my not being blown-up by a stick of dynamite two 
minutes ago is the cause of me now writing my dissertation. Certainly, it is physically 
possible that I could have been blown-up by a stick of dynamite two minutes ago but 
                                                          
71 Process theorists, such as Salmon (1984) and Dowe (2000), for example do not consider causation by 
omission to be genuinely causal. 
 
72 For more on causation by omission or absence causation, see Hall (2000) and Schaffer (2000). 
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then again the question is not about physical possibility. The question concerns whether 
an event that did not transpire, namely, my being blown-up by a dynamite stick, causes 
my writing this dissertation at this very moment. Do we want to judge that this non-
event is the cause of me now writing this dissertation? Woodward would respond with 
an emphatic “no” and I agree. For every putative case of causation by omission, it would 
seem that some are correctly judged to be causal, as is the case with Beebee’s (2004) “I 
killed the plant by not watering it” example, and others that might be incorrectly judged 
as causal, as is the case for “my not being blown-up by a stick of dynamite two minutes 
ago is the cause of me now writing my dissertation.” 
To save his theory from making causal claims that ought not to be made, 
particularly when it comes to causation by omission, Woodward proposes that we need 
to recognize “serious possibilities”: possibilities that we are willing to take seriously, 
thereby excluding non-serious possibilities (Woodward 2003). Woodward gives the 
example of a Doctor D. Suppose it was standard practice for doctors to administer 
antibiotics when they notice patients displaying symptoms of fever. Suppose further that 
D noticed that his patient P had a fever and he administers no antibiotic. Woodward’s 
(2003) manipulability theory of causation supports the judgement that the failure of D 
to administer the antibiotic to P causes P to die. Why? Since manipulating the values of 
the variable A (which reflects whether or not the antibiotic is administered) will change 
the value of the variable S (which reflects whether or not the patient dies), D causes P to 
die. Thus, much like the case whereby a person is judged to have killed the plant by 
failing to watering it, D causes P to die. 
Now, Woodward asks us to consider a slightly modified case whereby some 
random person X could have administered the antibiotic but does not and it seems 
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correct to claim that X did not cause P to die. X is not a doctor, and he lives in a far off 
land without any responsibility for the care of the patient who is displaying signs of 
fever. Suppose further that X goes into the exact hospital where the P is located and he 
can actually see that P is developing a fever. Not only does X witness P in such a grim 
state but, as it turns out, X has also recently learned that administering antibiotic to 
patients who were in such a circumstance is the correct response required to keep P 
alive. In this case, we can say that P’s survival is counterfactually dependent on whether 
X administers the drug to the patient. However, relative to the first case, it is not so clear 
that P actually causes X to die. In fact, Woodward argues that we are not normally 
inclined to claim that X causes the patient’s death. He states, “there seems no reason at 
all to take the possibility seriously that X’s failure to do these things causes the patient’s 
death” (2003, 88). 
What is the difference between these two cases? Why are we more likely to accept 
the first as an instance of causation by omission but not the second one? In both cases, 
the patient dying is counterfactually dependent on someone – D or X – failing to 
administer the antibiotic. In the first case, when D fails to administer the antibiotic, we 
more readily accept the causal claim that D killed P. In the second case, we are more 
likely to reject the claim that X killed P. To explain this difference, Woodward appeals to 
the notion of serious possibility. When it comes to causal judgments, particularly when 
there is a putative case of causation by omission, Woodward argues that there is no 
escaping the fact that our judgements will be influenced by what we think are true and 
that concern serious possibility (and this is not problematic). Thus, while Woodward’s 
theory of causation judges that causation by omission can be genuinely causal, such 
relations depend on a notion of serious possibility, without which his manipulability 
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theory would lead to judgements that are at odds with the causal claims we normally 
accept as true. 
Now that we have shown that, under Woodward’s theory of causation, there are 
circumstances in which omissions or absences can count as being genuinely causal, we 
can return to asking whether Hilpinen’s dependence condition is met when Nature (or 
parts of Nature) is preserved. Remember, this condition is normally interpreted as 
requiring that at least some of the properties of an object are dependent upon the 
intentional activities of some maker. By contrast, I am suggesting that the condition can 
be interpreted as requiring that at least some properties of an object are dependent 
upon an author’s intention to make an object of a certain kind by intentionally omitting 
their activity from the object. In our case, the object at hand is a wild ecosystem that is 
being preserved by some intentional agent or group of intentional agents. If Hilpinen’s 
dependence condition has been met in this way then preserving wild ecosystems turns 
them into artifacts (on the presumption that such wild ecosystems also meet the other 
two features every artifact must meet, as delineated above).73 
My claim here is that, for those cases of preservation where the natural 
expressions of wild ecosystems are counterfactually dependent on omitting human 
activity, we can correctly claim that such an omission causes the continued natural 
expression of a wild ecosystem. In cases where the intentional omission of human 
activity did not occur, and the continued natural expression of the ecosystem would not 
have obtained, then we can correctly claim that the intentional omission of human 
activity is the cause (or a causal factor) of the natural expression of the wild ecosystem. 
                                                          
73 Similarly, in his essay entitled “The Incarceration of Wildness: Wilderness Areas as Prisons”, Thomas 
Birch (1990) argues that wilderness areas are artificial since they are products of human power (see Katz 
2012). 
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In short, the natural expression of a preserved wild ecosystem depends on the author’s 
(group’s) intention to make an object of a certain kind by intentionally omitting their 
activity from that wild ecosystem. 
Consider a simplified example, one that, I submit, qualifies as a serious 
possibility. Suppose there are only two possible outcomes for some wild ecosystem that 
remains relatively detached from human agency. This ecosystem will either continue to 
naturally express itself or not. The wilderness area will either be preserved or converted 
into a parking lot. If human activity is omitted from the ecosystem, it will continue to 
express itself. If human activity is not omitted from the ecosystem, then the ecosystem 
will not continue to express itself. In this case, where there are only two possible 
outcomes, omitting human activity can be said to cause the natural expression of the 
wild ecosystem. The wild ecosystem’s natural expression is counterfactually dependent 
on whether some agent or group of agents omit their activity from an ecosystem in order 
to produce some intended effect: the wild ecosystem’s continued natural expression. 
The continued natural expression of the wild ecosystem depends on some agent or 
group of agent’s intentionally omitting their activities from the wild ecosystem because 
if the agent did not intentionally omit his or her action, then the wilderness area would 
be converted into a parking lot. 
Of course, I do not deny that there are circumstances when the continued natural 
expression of a wild ecosystem is not counterfactually dependent on the activity that was 
intentionally omitted by human agents. Consider this case. Whether or not some 
intentional agent or group of agents omitted their activity from some wild ecosystem, 
the ecosystem would have continued to naturally express itself, uninhibited by human 
intervention. In such a case, the agent merely intends to omit his activity from some 
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wild ecosystem but, even if he had not done this, the wild ecosystem would have 
continued to express itself in any case. Under this scenario, the outcome would have 
been equivalent to what unimpeded nature produced had the agent not intentionally 
omitted his activity from the wild ecosystem. In this case, on Woodward’s account of 
causation, it would be incorrect to judge that the agent’s intentionally omitted activity 
caused wild ecosystem’s continued natural expression because whether or not such 
activity was intentionally omitted, the ecosystem would have naturally expressed itself. 
Consider another example. Suppose there is a planet, Vulcan, and that it was 
discovered in another solar system in the Milky Way.74 It is a jungle planet that has 
never been touched by any intentional creatures, including human beings. For years it 
was analyzed passively and remotely. After it was discovered, the United Federation of 
Planets forbids anyone from landing on Vulcan or interfering with it in any way; it 
enforces its edict strictly and successfully. Has Vulcan become more artificial than it 
would be otherwise? If the natural processes on Vulcan would have continued no matter 
what happened, then Vulcan would not be rendered more artificial. However, if human 
agents had previously planned that Vulcan was to continue to exist as one big giant 
nature preserve, the function of which was to produce some desired (aesthetic) effect, 
and, most importantly, if Vulcan had not been turned into a nature preserve it would 
have been transformed into a parking lot for space crafts owned by members of the 
United Federation of Planets, then we can claim that Vulcan (even though it has not 
been directly affected by human activity) is more artificial than it would have been 
otherwise. 
                                                          
74 A similar example was brought to my attention by an examiner of this dissertation. 
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Richard Sylvan (1998) and Robert Elliott (1982) are both critical of the claim that 
intentionally omitting human activity can be causal in the specific sense that I have 
described above. In his essay entitled “Mucking with Nature”, Sylvan dismisses the 
whole preservation paradox as the “bottom of a barrel of rotten arguments”. He is 
critical of the claim that “doing nothing counts as doing something, inaction as action, 
so non-interference itself amounts to interference” (1998, 57). While Elliott concedes 
that restored ecosystems are artificial, he maintains that merely preserving nature does 
not make nature artificial. He states: 
 
The idea is that by placing boundaries around natural parks, by actively 
discouraging grazing, trail-biking and the like, by prohibiting sand-mining, 
we are turning the wilderness into an artefact, that in some negative or 
indirect way we are creating an environment … But … what is significant 
about wilderness is its causal continuity with the past. This is something 
that is not destroyed by demarcating an area and declaring it a national 
park. There is a distinction between the ‘naturalness’ of the wilderness and 
the means used to maintain and protect it. What remains within the park 
boundaries is, as it were, the real thing (Elliott 1995, 87 in O’Neill et al. 
(2008, 139-40). 
 
Elliott suggests that preserving wilderness is preserving the “real thing” since there is 
causal continuity with the past. Once certain boundaries are established, the place is not 
made into an artifact but remains part of nature. One problem with this line of 
reasoning, however, is that anything that happens to a wilderness area or wild 
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ecosystem would qualify as having causal continuity with the past. Another problem is 
that, as argued above, there are cases of mere preservation when the natural expression 
of nature or wild ecosystems is counterfactually dependent on omitting human activity. 
In such cases, the omission causes the continued natural expression of a wild ecosystem 
in a manner that both Sylvan and Elliott deny. It should also be clear that, contra 
Elliott’s (1995) worry, I am not suggesting that the mere imposition of a boundary 
around some wild ecosystem turns that ecosystem into an artifact. Instead, my claim is 
that Hilpinen’s dependence condition is met when preserving a wild ecosystem involves 
the intentional omission of human activity. 
John O’Neill et al. (2008) have also argued that the preservation paradox is false 
since there is “one distinctive sense in which restoration is possible”. To make their case, 
these authors draw an analogy between biological regeneration on the one hand and the 
restoration of nature on the other. They begin by observing that certain species can 
naturally regenerate parts of their bodies, quite independent of human agency. For 
example, these authors tell us that many lizards have the capacity to re-grow their tails. 
Similarly, they argue, nature can be restored when non-human agency alone does the 
restoration. Specifically, they claim that “a system that has regenerated entirely 
‘naturally’, that is, without intentional or even unintentional assistance of human 
beings, might be said to have originated naturally, even though it no longer has the 
particular historical origin it once had. It has restored itself rather than being restored” 
(2008, 143). Thus, according to these authors, nature’s unassisted agency can restore 
nature and, therefore, the preservation paradox is false since there is at least one 
instance whereby nature can be restored without the active intervention of intentional 
human agents. 
164 
  
But, while I agree that there is a distinction to be drawn between items or objects 
that grow up spontaneously, independent of human agents, and those which require the 
active intervention of intentional human agency, it remains unclear what consequence 
this distinction has for the preservation paradox. Restoration is essentially an 
intentional activity performed by an intentional agent who has the aim or goal of 
returning some object to a previous condition or reference state. To claim that 
restoration is possible when it is consummated by natural or non-human causes alone is 
to either speak metaphorically or to attribute intentionality to nature. However, it would 
appear that these authors endorse neither of these options. Of course, I am in full 
agreement with O’Neill et al. (2008) when they claim “Nature’s agency” is causally 
efficacious in the sense that there are non-human causes or variables that operate 
independent of human intervention (i.e., lizards that are capable of regenerating their 
tails), but the point being made here is that, unless nature, or some bit of nature, is itself 
an intentional agent, it cannot be straightforwardly described as restoring itself. If 
nature was an intentional agent, then it would be conceivable that nature could restore 
itself independent of intentional human agency. Since the preservation paradox hinges 
on the concept of nature as that realm of phenomena that is relatively detached from 
human agency, any actual restoration of nature by non-human causes would render the 
paradox false.75 As it stands, however, there do not appear to be any such examples. To 
my knowledge, no one has persuasively argued that nature is an intentional agent 
capable of restoring itself. Therefore, since the only intentional agents capable of 
restoring nature appear to be human agents and these agents and their activities are 
                                                          
75 Hence, O’Neill et al.’s (2008, 139) claim that the paradox is “more apparent than real”. 
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barred from Nature ex hypothesi, there is further reason to maintain that the paradox is 
true. 
This chapter argued that the preservation paradox holds up under scrutiny. Since 
nature is taken to be what exists outside of any intentional human intervention and the 
preservation or restoration of nature requires intentional human intervention in order 
to put it into effect, these intentional activities turn nature into an artifact or, in the very 
least, they make nature more artificial then it would be otherwise. To be clear, my claim 
is not that nature ought not to be preserved or restored but that it is conceptually 
incoherent to preserve or restore nature when it is conceived as a realm or domain of 
phenomena that is relatively detached from intentional human agency. In this specific 
sense, I have argued that no one can preserve nature. 
To make my case, I presented three features that distinguish artifacts from 
natural objects and then argued that restored and preserved ecosystems, including wild 
ecosystems (that remain relatively detached from human agency), share all of these 
features, thus making them artifacts as well. Unlike natural objects, artifacts are (1) 
designed or planned; (2) they possess a function attributed to them by an intentional 
agent or group of agents; and, (3) they have been modified by an intentional agent 
(Hilpinen’s dependence condition). 
The biggest challenge of this chapter was to show that at least some of the 
properties possessed by preserved wild ecosystems depend on intentional agency. The 
reason why this was a challenge is because wild ecosystems are, by definition, 
ecosystems that remain relatively detached from human agency, and yet Hilpinen’s 
dependence condition, a causal condition that every artifact must meet, requires that 
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the existence and some of the properties of an artifact depend on an author's intention 
to make an object of a certain kind. 
Hilpinen’s dependence condition is normally interpreted as requiring that the 
existence and some of the properties of an artifact depend on an author’s intentional 
activity to make an object of a certain kind. If there was no other way to interpret this 
causal condition, then preserved wild ecosystems could never be artifacts since the 
intentional activities of agents are excluded from these ecosystems by definition. 
However, following Woodward’s manipulability theory of causation, I argued that it is 
plausible to claim that some causes by omission can count as genuine causes and that 
Hilpinen’s dependence condition can be interpreted as requiring that the existence and 
some of the properties of an artifact is dependent on some author intentionally omitting 
their activity from preserved ecosystems to produce some intended effect: the continued 
natural expression of the ecosystem. I then argued that when a wild ecosystem’s 
continued natural expression is counterfactually dependent on some agent or group of 
agent’s intentionally omitting their actions then we can claim that the agent’s 
intentional omission counts as causing the wild ecosystem’s continued natural 
expression. This means that simply preserving wild ecosystems can also satisfy 
Hilpinen’s dependence condition. 
  
167 
  
CHAPTER SIX 
 
Some Water Should Not be for Sale 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
One research question on the topic of natural capital and ecosystem services to be 
considered at a future date is whether there are moral limits to buying and selling such 
items. In this chapter, before concluding this dissertation, I will first sketch an argument 
for why some water, a basic ecological good, should not be for sale. 
The question of whether natural capital and ecosystem services should be for sale 
presupposes that the items denoted by such concepts could be for sale. Without the 
possibility that such items could be for sale there is no reason to worry about such items 
being bought and sold. Anything that is for sale must, in some sense, possess economic 
value or a price. 76  Mark Sagoff (2004; 2008) has consistently argued against the 
proposition that natural capital and ecosystem services have economic value. Following 
Locke’s canonical labour theory of value and the further Lockean claim that unimproved 
land is waste, Sagoff does not deny the platitudinous claim that people “benefit” from 
the various goods and services produced by natural capital, a claim that is ubiquitous 
                                                          
76 Since economists use the concepts of natural capital and ecosystem goods and services to denote 
various phenomena, including traditional resources, such as oil and gas, in some cases the question of 
whether natural capital has economic value will be a simple empirical question. In cases where instances 
of natural capital are non-market phenomena, however, it is much less clear whether such items actually 
possess economic value. This chapter is only concerned with the latter cases. 
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throughout the literature on natural capital and ecosystem services.77 Instead, he objects 
to the proposition that such items have economic value, period. Sagoff insists that the 
economic value of any item is not determined by its benefit alone. His objection springs 
from the canonical distinction between “use value”, on the one hand, and “exchange 
value” on the other, a distinction that can be traced all the way back to Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics, and that was explicitly recognized by the most important 
classical political economists, including Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, 
and Karl Marx. Smith provides a fine description of the distinction in Book I (Chapter 
Four) of the Wealth of Nations when he states:  
 
The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and 
sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes 
the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object 
conveys. The one may be called ‘value in use’; the other, ‘value in 
exchange’. The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently 
little or no value in exchange; and on the contrary, those which have the 
greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. 
Nothing is more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce any thing; 
scarce any thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, 
has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may 
frequently be had in exchange for it ([1776] 1976, 44-5). 
 
                                                          
77 “Nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless materials as in themselves” (Sagoff 2008a, 
94).  
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This quotation shows that Smith recognizes water has tremendous value in use 
but no exchange value; diamonds, on the other hand, have exchange value – a price –
but almost no use value. While neo-classical revolutionaries, eventually resolved the so-
called “water-diamond paradox” circa 1870, what matters for our purpose is the 
observation that the utility or benefit of any object does not, by itself, determine the 
price that is paid for it.78 This is true no matter how useful an item might be. Thus, when 
Sagoff objects to the claim that every instance of natural capital has no economic value, 
he follows the same line of reasoning expounded by the leading classical political 
economists. The price of the air we breathe, Sagoff claims, is correctly priced at zero 
because it is abundant and free. In other words, one might surmise that the current 
supply of air far exceeds the demand for it. In such a case, Sagoff points out that the 
market mechanism has not failed to assign a price to air because it ignores its usefulness 
in keeping human beings alive. No matter how useful air is to the life of human beings, 
this property alone does not imply that air will have a price. For why would anyone pay 
for air if it could be obtained gratis?79 In this sense, Sagoff’s claim that natural capital 
and ecosystem services afford tangible benefits to human beings, but do not possess 
economic value, hinges on the further claim that such items are, in some sense, 
plentiful. 
                                                          
78 While Smith notes that diamonds have little use value and a high exchange value, and water has 
significant use value and low exchange value, he did not treat this fact as a paradox. Smith uses this 
example to show that there is no need for exchange value and use value to move in parallel. 
 
79 Similarly, in his Principles of Political Economy, Ricardo recognized that the price of land – rent – 
would only be paid when land became scarce (after the first settling of a country in which land is 
abundant and fertile). Ricardo states, “For the reason stated why nothing is given for the use of air and 
water, or for any other of the gifts of nature which exist in boundless quantity … no charge is made for the 
use of these natural aids in production, because they are inexhaustible, and at every man’s disposal” 
([1817] 1951, 69).  
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Before confronting the issue of whether natural capital and ecosystems services 
are plentiful or scarce, it is worth recognizing that it remains unclear why Sagoff invokes 
Locke’s labour theory of value to support his claim that Nature’s productions have no 
economic value.80  Most economists today, certainly those who self-identify as neo-
classical economists, subscribe to a subjective theory of value (something that Sagoff 
himself concedes). Strictly speaking, if the labour theory of value were true, then it 
would rule out the possibility that any unassisted or spontaneous productions of the 
Earth, ones that did not require human labour to be brought into existence, possess 
economic value. This is because any commodity that possesses economic value would 
have to require a certain amount of toil and trouble – a real price – to acquire. On this 
account, commodities that simply appeared as manna from heaven would have no 
exchange value. If the labour theory of value were true, then Nature’s independently 
produced productions could not have economic value. Be that as it may, all else being 
equal, the truth of this consequent depends on the truth of the antecedent, but Sagoff 
has not shown this to be the case. 
Sagoff’s objection to the claim that natural capital and ecosystem services have 
economic value also appears to rest on a conceptual misunderstanding. This is because 
his argument supposes that the concept of natural capital merely denotes Nature’s 
unassisted or independent productions. Consequently, when he objects to the claim that 
ecosystem goods and services have economic value he is only denying that unimproved 
aspects of Nature have economic value. But if my analysis in Chapter Two is correct, 
then the concepts natural capital and ecosystem services do not merely denote Nature’s 
                                                          
80 Sagoff makes the strong and puzzling claim that nothing has economic value. He states: “the phrase 
‘economic value’ has no coherent reference” (2008b, 242). But surely items with economic value are 
exchange value (and items with exchange value can be exchanged for other commodities in the 
marketplace. 
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unassisted productions or unimproved aspects. Instead, economists regularly count 
beneficial ecosystems that have been actively modified, restored, or managed by human 
agents as instances of natural capital as well.  
The Catskills Watershed of New York, an example mentioned in Chapter Two, is 
such an instance of natural capital par excellence. In this case, the Catskills is being 
intentionally managed for certain desired effects, in particular, water filtration, for the 
citizens of New York City. This particular instance of natural capital is claimed to be 
productive of ecosystem goods and services, even though it has been obviously modified 
and improved for certain ends or purposes and not others. On the economist’s account, 
the Catskills Watershed still counts as an instance of natural capital. Therefore, even if 
Sagoff’s objection was compelling, it would only apply to a subset of phenomena 
denoted by natural capital and ecosystem services: Nature’s unassisted productions, and 
not those which have been modified by human agents. 
If it were true that, as Sagoff claims, natural capital and ecosystem service were 
always and everywhere plentiful or abundant, then such items would not possess 
economic value. While I agree with Sagoff that not every useful item produced by non-
human causes has economic value, there are cases when natural capital and ecosystem 
services can and do have a price. 
To my knowledge, no environmental economist has ever claimed that the force of 
gravity has economic value. This is for good reason. Gravity would appear to be 
beneficial for just about every human activity on Earth, including economic activity, but 
this does not automatically imply that gravity has economic value (even if we were to 
disagree on which theory of economic value is true). If gravity were to ever possess 
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economic value then, in the very least, it would have to be the kind of thing that is scarce 
or could become scarce in some sense. 
With that being said, the scarcity of any item is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for that item to possess economic value. The unique grain of sand that I take 
pains to locate and acquire on Wreck Beach in Vancouver is scarce in the sense that no 
other object possesses all of the same properties possessed by my particular grain of 
sand, but the thing is not likely to have any economic value because there is no other 
person in the marketplace willing to exchange any other economically valuable items, 
including money, for it. If I have understood Sagoff’s objection correctly, then his claim 
that no ecosystem services have economic value is very much like the claim that gravity 
has no economic value. The gravity on Earth is certainly useful and ubiquitous, and 
there appears to be no possibility on the horizon that this force of Nature will become 
depleted or destroyed. For these reasons, and others, (including the difficulty of 
appropriating it), gravity has no economic value. 
Is the case of natural capital and ecosystem services the same or analogous to the 
case of gravity? Is it true that, like gravity, every ecosystem good and service and every 
instance of natural capital is so abundant and plentiful that they do not possess any 
economic value? 
Even if one were to answer the forgoing questions affirmatively, it would seem 
that one would still have to concede that items which are abundant and free at one place 
and time can be limited and expensive at another. J.S. Mill ([1848] 2006) recognized as 
much when, in his Principles of Political Economy, he repudiated the claim that air and 
water are forms of wealth. Wealth, for Mill, consisted of useful material objects that 
possessed exchange value. Although he recognized the usefulness of air and maintained 
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that we were much richer with it than without it, he also recognized that in ordinary 
circumstances no one in the marketplace would be willing to exchange commodities or 
anything else for it. Mill also recognized, however, that air can become limited and 
acquire an exchange value. He gives the example of providing air to diving bells and 
further predicts that if “any revolution in nature the atmosphere became too scanty for 
the consumption, or could be monopolized, air might acquire a very high marketable 
value” ([1848] 2006, 8).81 This Millian line of thinking establishes that, even if specific 
forms of natural capital and ecosystem services are shown to possess no economic value 
at one place and time, a reduction in the quantity of such items might well cause those 
same items to possess a positive price at another place and time.82  
It should also be evident that, from my grain of sand example above, the scarcity 
of any good is not merely determined by the quantity of that good alone. If natural 
capital and ecosystem goods and services possess exchange value, then, at least from the 
vantage point of orthodox consumer choice theory, this value will be conjointly 
determined by the utility functions of economic agents. As Dan Hausman explains:  
 
If two people have almost no water and no expectations of having more 
soon, the first will have to offer a high price to induce the second to part 
with any water. Knowing only the utility functions or only the amount of 
water available, one could not explain why water could be exchanged for so 
                                                          
81 For Mill, if nature supplies a commodity in such abundance that any demand for it can be satisfied 
without incurring any costs of production, then its exchange value will be zero. 
 
82 I would surmise that, while Sagoff insists ecosystem services have no economic value because they are 
abundant, he would still agree with Mill’s assertion that this state of affairs is a contingent one. 
 
 
174 
  
large a bundle of commodities. One needs both bits of information. The 
scarcity of water is derived from these two pieces of information: it is not 
an independent fact (1981, 25). 
 
The agent’s utility function, derivable from the agent’s subjective preferences 
alone, like the quantities of ecosystem goods and services alone, do not imply that 
ecosystem goods and services are scarce and that agents will have to pay for them. As 
Hausman affirms, whether any good or service possess economic value depends on the 
utility functions of agents and the relative quantities of such goods and services. That 
being said, in the passage by Hausman just quoted the first person who is willing to pay 
for water may not necessarily have to offer a high price to induce the second person to 
part with her water. This proposition is true even if, as Hausman describes, the two 
people at hand have almost no water and no expectation for acquiring any more in the 
near future. Why? In the standard case of consumer choice there is a utility-maximizing 
economic agent who possesses subjective preferences that, when satisfied, yields 
marginal utility to that agent. Given the choice between two different bundles of goods 
and services, the agent will prefer to consume one over the other; since this theory does 
not privilege the consumption of any particular kind of good over any other and 
subjective preferences are taken as given, agents can prefer to consume any bundle of 
goods over any other for any reason. Even if one has empirical evidence to expect that 
people are willing to pay a high price for water when they have none – a hypothesis that 
would seem to be confirmed by the empirical evidence – the subjective theory of value is 
consistent with the possibility that economic agents give their water away gratis, no 
matter what the circumstance. 
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Now that I have established the possibility that natural capital and ecosystem 
services can possess economic value, my objective is to show that some do. Two 
conditions must be met for this to be true: first, natural capital and ecosystem services 
must, in some sense, be limited in quantity. This is because, if every instance of natural 
capital and ecosystem services were everywhere super-abundant or plentiful, then, as 
Sagoff argues, they would also be free. No rational economic agent will pay for 
ecosystem goods and services if they could simply acquire such items gratis. Second, 
such items must also contribute or be expected to contribute to human welfare, and, in 
this case, the currency of human welfare is reducible to the satisfaction of an agent’s 
subjective preferences.83 
For Sagoff, it appears that the market price of natural capital and ecosystem 
goods and services – zero – is identical to the economic value of these items. However, 
environmental and resource economists, including Dasgupta (2009), Heal (2000b), and 
Barbier (2000) disagree. Each scholar independently argues that the economic value of 
certain goods and services, “non-marketed goods and services”, is not the same as their 
market price. Non-marketed goods and services include ecosystem goods and services, 
and these items have a positive economic value. Ecosystem goods and services have no 
market price because while these items are economically significant, there is no market 
for them. As Heal states, “natural ecosystems usually provide services for which there 
are no markets and so no market prices …” (2000a, 117). How can one determine the 
economic value of goods and services that have no market price? Economists have 
devised a variety of indirect methods to serve this purpose, including willingness-to-pay 
                                                          
83 Rather than questioning this theory of human welfare, I will take it as given for the purpose of this 
analysis. 
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surveys, the travel-cost method, replacement cost, and hedonic indices. All such 
techniques can be used to show that, although ecosystem goods and services have no 
market price, they do possess economic value.84 
One reason why natural capital and ecosystem services are becoming more 
economically valuable is because, as some economists have argued, these items are 
becoming increasingly scarce and that, in many cases, the cause of this scarcity is 
human economic activity. Citing recent findings of the Millenium Ecosystem 
Assessment (2005), Barbier (2011) declares that we are now living in the “Age of 
Ecological Scarcity” whereby natural systems and landscapes are being exploited by 
human economic activity and that this results in a loss of ecosystem goods and services 
that otherwise contribute to human well-being. As ecosystem goods and services 
become increasingly scarce, such items become objects for economic study. In other 
words, as natural capital and ecosystem services become increasingly scarce, they 
become economic phenomena. 
Barbier (2011) claims that there is a fundamental trade-off between increased 
human economic activity, on the one hand, and the number of ecosystem goods and 
services available, on the other. This trade-off, however, appears to be far too crude. 
While it may be true that human economic activity reduces the production of ecosystem 
goods and services at a particular time and place, this need not be the case. Human 
economic activity is not merely destructive since it can also be directed towards 
enhancing and improving existing ecosystems so that they serve human ends by 
producing economically valuable ecosystem goods and services. There is also a worry, as 
                                                          
84 Each of these techniques has important shortcomings. For details, see Heal (2000a; 2000b) and 
Barbier (2011). 
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stated in Chapter Two, of over-emphasizing human causes that contribute to ecological 
scarcity in the sense that Barbier (2011) uses this term. Increased ecological scarcity that 
is characterized by a reduction in the quantity or quality of the goods and services 
afforded by ecosystems can have non-human causes as well. Thus, while the empirical 
evidence would appear to support the claim that we are increasingly living in an “Age of 
Ecological Scarcity”, where the number and quality of ecosystem goods and services are 
on the wane, it is not so clear that the trade-off between landscape-converting human 
economic activities and less ecosystem goods and services is as simple as it has been 
characterized by Barbier (2011). 
Now that I have established that natural capital and ecosystem services can have 
economic value, it is important to recognize why economists and other scholars are 
motivated to attribute such items with economic value. Given that natural capital and 
ecosystem services are non-marketed goods, why bother wrestling with indirect 
methods to attach a price to natural capital and ecosystem services? One clear 
motivation is to avoid market failure. Economists, including Dasgupta, worry that if the 
economic value of natural capital and ecosystem services is not explicitly recognized, 
then these natural assets will be mismanaged. If the foregoing indirect methods are not 
employed, then the economic value of natural capital and ecosystem services will be 
underestimated or, at worst, ignored altogether. For example, if the economic value of 
the pollination services afforded by pollinator species remains unaccounted for, then 
this natural asset could be not only depleted but depleted inefficiently. Without 
attaching economic value to pollination services, economically valuable ecosystems 
could be over-used, depleted or exploited in a manner that does not accurately represent 
their economic value. Once the economic value of pollination services afforded by 
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pollinator species is properly estimated, then this information can be used to manage it 
like any other capital asset: to optimize its flow services (rate of return) to some agent or 
group of agents over time. 
Another related motivation stems from the putative connection between 
attributing economic value to natural capital and ecosystem services, on the one hand, 
and conserving those same items, on the other. Daily has claimed that there are two 
main routes for conserving natural capital and ecosystem services: either by (A) moral 
suasion, a traditional strategy among conservationists that involves persuading others of 
the intrinsic and aesthetic values of those items denoted by the concept of natural 
capital, or by (B) attributing economic value to natural capital and ecosystem services so 
that these items can be managed efficiently with the market mechanism. Daily argues 
that (A) failed in the past and therefore, efforts should be aimed at conserving natural 
capital should proceed on an economic basis. Mark Sagoff’s (2004) argument has the 
same logical structure as Daily’s – a disjunctive syllogism – but he reaches quite a 
different conclusion. He agrees with Daily on the two routes to conserving natural 
capital and ecosystem services, (A) and (B), but, as we have seen above, since Sagoff 
denies that such items possess economic value he concludes that conservation efforts 
should spring from moral duty alone. For Sagoff, it is morally right for us to ascribe 
intrinsic value to various aspects of nature. 
Both of the foregoing arguments are problematic. Sagoff claims that natural 
capital and ecosystem services do not have economic value but, following Dasgupta and 
Heal, I have already argued that the contrary claim is true. Attributing economic value 
to natural capital and ecosystem services might prove to be a viable strategy for 
conserving those items but there is no necessary connection between attaching a price to 
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some item, including natural capital and ecosystem services, and that item’s 
conservation. As Heal remarks, “valuation is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
conservation. We conserve much of which we do not place economic value, and we do 
not conserve much that we value economically” (2000a, 125). Indeed, many items that 
once bore a price in the marketplace no longer exist. If the quantity and quality of 
natural capital and ecosystem services were merely governed by their economic value, 
then they could share this same fate. This observation raises deep worries for wedded to 
Daily’s argument. The economic value of any class of goods and services (ecosystem 
goods and services) or their means of production (natural capital) does do not 
necessarily privilege the maintenance or conservation of those items. In fact, from an 
economic point of view, if it were cheaper (and technologically possible) to deplete or 
destroy all of the natural capital and ecosystem services on Earth, then, this action ought 
to be taken. For obvious reasons, this observation should concern both economists and 
conservation biologists who attach prices to those items denoted by the concept of 
natural capital with the hope of conserving them. (Of course, by the same token, 
economic arguments for the maintenance of natural capital do not necessarily preclude 
the possibility that natural capital and ecosystem goods and services should be 
conserved; the point being made here is that attaching economic value to natural capital 
is not an impervious strategy for conserving them). 
Now that I have established the possibility that natural capital and ecosystem 
services could be for sale, the question that I want to consider next is whether such 
items should be for sale. Are there moral limits to buying and selling natural capital? 
Why not buy and sell everything? What, if any, are the limits to the kinds of things that 
should be for sale in the marketplace? Are there any such limits? Might there be 
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compelling moral reasons why some things should not be bought and sold? Most people, 
for example, would find it morally objectionable to buy and sell human babies, treating 
them as if they were ordinary commodities, like chocolate bars and paper clips. The 
question is, why? What about other goods, such as the right to vote in a democracy, 
kidneys, and toxic waste? Should these items be for sale alongside toilet paper and 
chicken nuggets? 
Before proceeding any further a distinction needs to be drawn between 
estimating the economic value or “monetizing” natural capital and ecosystem services 
and putting these items up for sale. Obviously, the first does not imply the second. To 
see why, consider an analogy: estimating the economic value of statistical human lives 
(see Grüne-Yanoff 2009). The decision to either maintain an old highway or construct a 
new one will often involve calculating the fatality risks associated with each potential 
action. Economists estimate such values so that pertinent information can be used in 
the decision-making process, not so that people can be subsequently bought and sold in 
the marketplace. The same reasoning applies to natural capital and ecosystem goods 
and services. While the indirect methods mentioned above can be used by economists to 
estimate the economic value of natural capital and ecosystem services, there is no 
necessary connection between this activity and putting such items up for sale in the 
marketplace. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that if there are objections to merely 
monetizing natural capital and ecosystem services, they will likely be different from the 
objections to buying and selling such items. 
Among the scholars who argue that there are moral limits to the market, they 
often disagree about when such limits apply and why there should be any limits in the 
first place. One might divide these scholars into two camps. The first gives explicit focus 
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to the harmful consequences caused by certain market transactions. For example, Debra 
Satz (2010) argues that the limits to free markets should be determined by the harmful 
consequences that are caused by buying and selling items when agents have either weak 
agency or vulnerability. The second camp consists of several scholars, including 
Elizabeth Anderson (1990), Margaret Radin (1996), Michael Sandel (2012), and Michael 
Walzer (1983). These scholars argue that there are moral limits to markets, not because 
specific market participants possess a ruinous property but because the distribution of 
goods should be consistent with their social meaning. These scholars, particularly 
Anderson (1990) emphasize that the market is not a neutral mechanism for distributing 
goods and services but, invariably, involves treating goods in a specific way: as 
commodities. Since not all goods in human life should be treated as commodities, these 
scholars argue that there is a class of goods that should not be for sale. 
From this point forward, I will describe Satz’s (2010) view as a consequentialist 
view and group Anderson (1993), Radin (1996), Sandel (2012), and Walzer (1983) 
together, portraying their view as a conventionalist view. 
Debra Satz (2010) argues that when buying and selling goods in the marketplace 
cause extremely harmful consequences, then such transactions should be blocked. She 
describes such markets as “noxious” since they are characterized by participants who, as 
mentioned already, have either weak agency or vulnerability. Both of these undesirable 
properties can be the source of extreme harms to individuals and society. Weak agency 
is problematic for individuals who do not possess sufficient information about the 
nature or consequences of a particular market and, as a result, these individuals end up 
engaging in actions that are harmful towards their own welfare. Vulnerability, on the 
other hand, refers to the status of participants in a market who have very unequal needs 
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for the goods that are being exchanged. Consider, for example, the poor and destitute 
man who has no other choice but to sell his kidney to a rich foreigner in order to support 
his family. This kind of transaction is not voluntary and mutually beneficial exchange 
between two market participants. Rather, Satz argues that such a transaction is 
characterized by vulnerable agents who act out of desperation which can cause extreme 
harms for society. What kind of harms? Satz argues that such transactions promote 
servility and dependence while undermining democratic governance and other 
regarding motivations (Satz 2010, 98-9). It is critical to recognize that, for Satz, the 
mere existence of noxious markets does not imply that there is an objective list of items 
that should never be for sale, however. On the contrary, her framework, which consists 
of both the sources (weak agency and vulnerability) and consequences (extreme harms 
for both individuals and society) of noxious markets, is meant to serve as a guide for 
evaluating the acceptability of specific markets on a case-by-case basis. 
The second camp is occupied by Anderson (1990), Radin (1996), Sandel (2012) 
and Walzer (1983) and underscores the social meaning of goods as the basis for limiting 
the reach of markets. This conventionalist view gives a reason why, for example, human 
babies should not be for sale. Quite simply, babies are not the kind of good that should 
be for sale since treating them like commodities is corruptive. Sandel explains that, “to 
corrupt a good or a social practice is to degrade it, to treat it according to a lower mode 
of valuation than is appropriate to it” (2012, 34). Under this account, slapping a price 
tag on a baby and selling it in the marketplace would involve valuing the baby in the 
wrong kind of way. 
Take the example of friendship. Sandel (2012) argues that friendship is not the 
kind of human good that that can be put up for sale without degrading or corrupting it. 
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Recall that, for Aristotle, friendships are characterized by mutual liking. In other words, 
a friend is someone who likes and is liked by another person.85 Character friendships in 
particular are essential to human flourishing and Aristotle affirms that they seem to be 
the greatest of external goods. 86 The primary purpose of such friendships is to develop 
the moral goodness of each person involved in the relationship (Cooper 1980). These 
relations involve well-wishing that is fully reciprocated between the parties involved and 
are grounded in knowledge of and love of one another’s good qualities of character. 
Sandel argues that friendships are the kind of good that cannot be bought and sold 
since, as he puts it, “the money that buys the friendship dissolves it, or turns it into 
something else” (2012, 94). While it is true that one might be able to pay others for the 
services that would be expected from a friend, the friendship itself, if it is a bona fide 
relation between individuals, is not the kind of thing that can be bought and sold in the 
marketplace without degrading or corrupting it. 
Satz agrees with the conventionalists that some goods, including friends and 
honorific goods (such as the Nobel Prize), should not or cannot be for sale because doing 
so corrupts them, but she insists that the problem is not sufficiently widespread to cause 
real concern. In fact, she depicts the conventionalist view as standing in opposition to 
her own consequentialist view and claims that the former should be jettisoned 
altogether. She states, “I think we should reject the main contemporary alternative 
arguments for limiting markets based on the social meaning of goods. As I see it, a 
                                                          
85 See the Rhetoric (1380b36-1381a2) in Barnes ([1984] 1995). 
 
86 Aristotle distinguishes between three types of friendship: for virtue (kat’ aretên) or character, for utility 
(kata to chrêsimon), and for pleasure (kata to hêdu). The last two are less enduring than the first. They 
include, for example, business relations, which cease to exist when the advantages of the relationship end; 
pleasure friendships merely involve loving another person for their incidental features, not for their 
character or virtue. It is also worth noting that, for Aristotle, friendships are “very necessary for living” 
and that “no one would choose to live without friends” (NE 1169b10). 
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major problem with noxious markets is not that they represent inferior ways of valuing 
goods (as those who link the limits of markets to social meanings claim) but that they 
undermine the conditions that people need if they are to relate as equals” (Satz 2010, 
94).  
Against Satz, I will argue that the conventionalist view is not in opposition to her 
consequentialist view but that the former can be subsumed by the latter. Satz provides 
two arguments against the conventionalist view. First, she points out that the social 
meanings of goods are frequently contested. Different individuals and different moral 
communities are bound to attribute a wide variety of social meanings and values to 
specific goods. For some individuals and moral communities, the Bible, Talmud, and 
Koran are all sacred texts, but for others these same texts possess no such meaning. 
Without a widespread consensus on the social meaning of goods, Satz argues that 
meaning alone should not be expected to serve as a benchmark for deciding when some 
item should not be for sale. 
Satz’s second argument against the conventionalist view is that there is only a 
tenuous connection between the social meaning agents attribute to a good and its 
distribution by the market. Conventionalists often worry that buying and selling certain 
socially significant goods can crowd-out or uproot other important ways of valuing such 
items. Satz argues, on the contrary, that “the market price is rarely the direct expression 
of our evaluative attitudes towards goods” (2010, 82). Once again, take the example of 
buying and selling sacred texts. Does the bookstore owner who sells religious texts 
undermine the social meaning and value of the Bible for Christians? When sacred texts 
are treated as mere commodities, for their instrumental value alone, are they being 
treated in the wrong kind of way? Does this treatment undermine other important ways 
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of valuing such items? Satz convincingly argues that buying and selling sacred texts in 
the marketplace does not seem to displace their social meaning or importance among 
those for whom it matters. Instead, the same item can be treated quite differently by the 
market participants who are involved in the same market transaction. The atheist 
bookstore owner can treat religious texts as mere commodities, recognizing that such 
items have no other value apart their contribution to his profit margin, without affecting 
their sacredness for the religious buyer. Satz’s main point is that, in this case, the 
intrinsic value of sacred texts can be preserved through ordinary market transactions. 
The social meaning of precious goods need not be undermined when they are treated as 
commodities. 
Satz’s two arguments against the conventionalist view certainly warrant a 
response, but her arguments are not sufficient for rejecting the view wholesale. Why? 
First of all, by arguing that we should reject the conventionalist view, Satz supposes that 
her theory of noxious markets is more detached from this view than it actually is. We 
have seen that Satz argues for restricting the market in cases where buying and selling 
goods and services results in extremely harmful consequences for both individuals and 
society. But if her view is genuinely consequentialist then it should also account for the 
harmful consequences that arise from destroying the social meaning of certain goods for 
a particular individual or moral community, even if such pernicious consequences turn 
out to be anomalous or infrequent. Rather than viewing the conventionalist view as 
opposed to Satz’s consequentialist view, what I propose is that it would be better to 
recognize the former as being subsumed by the latter. The main upshot for doing so is 
that we would possess a more general consequentialist theory that can account for the 
important social meaning of goods while explaining why some things should not be for 
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sale. This more general consequentialist theory would extend beyond Satz’s emphasis on 
weak agency and vulnerability to include all sources of significant harms that arise from 
market transactions, including those that might arise from corrupting goods that 
possess social meaning for a particular moral community. If I am right, then the two 
camps – the consequentialist view and the conventionalist view – are not really opposed 
to one another but can both be captured under the canopy of Satz’s consequentialist 
view. 
But what about Satz’s two arguments against the conventionalist view? She 
maintains that because the social meaning of goods is often contested this meaning is 
not an adequate standard for establishing the moral limits to markets. While Satz is 
right to highlight that the social meaning of goods can be contested in the manner she 
describes and that this disagreement can be a barrier to establishing the moral limits to 
markets, it should also be clear that not all socially meaning goods are equally contested. 
For some moral communities, there will be sufficient consensus on the meaning of a 
good so that members of the community can decide on the further question of whether 
it should or should not be treated as a commodity. What I am claiming here is not that, 
for example, almost no one disagrees with the claim that human babies should not be 
for sale. Rather, some moral communities will have achieved a relatively stable 
consensus on the value and social meaning of human babies and because of this, babies 
will not be treated as a commodity to be bought and sold in the marketplace. This 
indicates that, among some goods, their social meaning can reach a wide consensus and 
that such meaning can still be grounds to block specific market transactions. 
Satz’s second objection to the conventionalist view is that there is only a tenuous 
connection between the social meaning that agents attribute to a good and its 
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distribution by the market. This proposition seems to contradict the conventionalist 
view since these theorists are wont to emphasize the crowding-out effect of treating 
goods as commodities. What could be more meaningful than a sacred text that is used 
by members of a moral community to organize their entire lives? Yet, as Satz points out, 
even when these items are treated as mere commodities by some participants in the 
marketplace, they do not lose their sacredness for those who deeply care about such 
items. Her main claim is that there is no necessary connection between preserving the 
social meaning of a particular good and the good being treated as a commodity. I agree. 
However, what I disagree with is the implication of this statement. Satz argues that by 
showing that there is no necessary connection between the social meaning of goods and 
their distribution by the market, this is enough to conclude that the conventionalist view 
should be jettisoned. However, in order to address the conventionalist’s worry in its 
entirety Satz is required to show that all socially meaningful goods retain their meaning 
when they are bought and sold in the marketplace. Given the analysis so far it remains 
an open question whether this is the case. The question before us now is whether all 
socially meaningful goods are like the Bible and other sacred texts insofar as they 
maintain their meaningfulness when they are treated as commodities in the 
marketplace. If it turns out that there are such goods and when they are treated as 
commodities they lose their social significance (thereby negatively affecting human 
welfare) then a consequentialist view should recognize such harms and grant them equal 
consideration. 
To summarize, Satz is right to emphasize the extremely harmful consequences 
that can arise from specific market transactions where market participants have weak 
agency or are vulnerable. She is also right to point out that the social meanings of some 
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goods are contested and that merely treating a good as a commodity need not crowd-out 
other important values or social meanings that moral communities might attribute to 
such goods. However, Satz’s objections to the conventionalist view are not enough to 
warrant the claim that we should reject it if doing so amounts to overlooking the harms 
that might arise from crowding-out the social meaning of goods. I have also argued 
against the claim that the conventionalist and consequentialist views are strictly 
detached. Where they exist, the potential harms caused by treating “socially meaningful 
goods” as commodities can be and should be captured by a wider version of the 
consequentialist view. Satz’s critique of conventionalists is illuminating because we 
learn that the social meaning of goods will not serve as a benchmark for establishing the 
moral limits to markets. Be that as it may, Satz’s proposal that we reject the 
conventionalist view goes too far because there may be cases when the moral limits to 
markets should be established on the basis of social meaning. 
Now, with a generalized consequentialist position on the moral limits to markets 
in order, recall the theory of basic ecological goods (BEGs) introduced in Chapter Four. 
BEGs represent the objective ecological conditions that must be met for some agent to 
have existence and, therefore, subjective preferences that could be satisfied. To be an 
agent with subjective preferences requires being an agent that is situated in the right 
kind of relation to one’s environment, an environment that is partly constituted by 
BEGs. These characteristics, remember, make BEGs distinct from ordinary consumer 
goods since the latter only ever yield subjective utility to agents while BEGs afford the 
agent with causal properties required for survival, a role that is not multiply realizable in 
any other kind of good. In this section, my main claim is that in desperate circumstances 
– when BEGs are radically scarce – buying and selling them in the marketplace will 
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almost certainly violate what Robert Nozick (1974) has referred to as “Locke’s proviso”. 
If I am correct, then, we can conclude that there are moral limits to buying and selling 
water. To make my case I will use the example of water, but the conclusion I reach 
applies to all BEGs. 
In Chapter Five “Of Property” of Two Treatises of Government, John Locke 
([1689] 1980) claims that God gave the Earth in common to mankind and that, 
originally, in the State of Nature, each person had an equal claim to make use of the 
Earth and its products.87 Locke then grapples with the topics of original acquisition and 
private property. How can one person come to own previously unowned objects when 
such objects are entrusted to no one in particular but to all of mankind in common? 
Locke’s answer does not rely on the social utility of private property but, instead, he 
argues that since each person has ownership in themselves and their ability to labour – 
self-ownership – people can come to own previously unowned goods by mixing their 
labour with them and improving such objects for the benefit of life. 
Since everyone in the State of Nature initially had equal claim to the Earth, 
however, Locke must somehow ensure that these claims are not breached by any such 
individual appropriations of private property. To resolve this issue he argues that 
appropriations are sanctioned only insofar “enough and as good left for others”. 
Otherwise, Locke states, “for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as 
good as take nothing at all. Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of 
another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water 
left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of 
                                                          
87  For a modern day secular argument supporting the claim that the earth originally belongs to 
humankind collectively, see Risse (2014). 
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both, is perfectly the same” ([1689] 1980, 21). It is mainly from these passages that 
Robert Nozick (1974) famously attributes Locke with a specific proviso. Nozick explains 
that, “a process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a 
previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to 
use the thing is thereby worsened” (1974, 178; emphasis added). Locke’s proviso 
requires that all acquisitions must not worsen or harm the situation of others and, 
therefore, the proviso represents a bona fide constraint on property rights. To determine 
if the proviso has been violated one must show that other agents are below their baseline 
or starting position because of the appropriation. Thus, when contemplating whether 
Locke’s proviso has been violated, the crucial question to ask is whether the 
appropriation of an unowned object has worsened the situation of others. 
Presumably, I do not need to say much to motivate the claim that, for any given 
human agent, water is a BEG. Of course, this does not imply that all water is a BEG for 
an agent. At a specific time and place, some water with a certain degree of purity is 
required for that agent’s continued existence. Therefore, to be more precise, a subset of 
water qualifies as a BEG for a given agent or group of agents.88 For the purpose of my 
argument, I am only concerned with that amount and quality of water that qualifies as a 
BEG for some agent or group of agents. Referring to water as a BEG suggests that some 
water for some agent is meeting a need without which that agent would not survive. 
Now, the claim defended in this section – that buying and selling some water should be 
blocked – is restricted to cases where people urgently need it for their continued 
existence. I will argue that when there are no alternative sources of water available and 
                                                          
88 Recall that this specific quantity and quality of water that is required for the continued existence of 
agents but it says very little about the quantity and quality of water required for living a good life. Aside 
from the observation that water is a necessary condition for living any life at all, good or bad, the concept 
of BEG remains silent. 
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an owner of water prevents desperate people from acquiring it, because of a 
prohibitively high price, or otherwise, then this transaction violates Locke’s proviso and 
thus, should not be permitted. This argument hinges on the assumption that agents 
prefer continued existence over non-continued existence (if agents did not have this 
preference, but, instead, preferred to die of dehydration, then it is less clear whether 
such an agent would be harmed when prevented from acquiring the quantity and quality 
of water that could save her life). 
Nozick (1974) maintains that, in most circumstances, appropriating unowned 
objects will not violate Locke’s proviso. Presumably, there are many appropriations that 
would not worsen the situation of others. It seems clear enough that the proviso would 
not be violated if an agent were to appropriate all of the discarded toenail clippings in 
the world. With that being said, Nozick thus affirms that the proviso is particularly well-
suited to cases where agents appropriate the necessary conditions of life. Nozick gives 
the example of one person coming to own all of the drinkable water in the world and 
argues that if such an appropriation were to take place, then it would violate the 
Lockean proviso (Nozick is skeptical that such an appropriation could actually happen 
since water eventually become prohibitively expensive to the agent attempting to 
appropriate it all).89 Why? Such an appropriation would almost certainly worsen the 
situation of others because, unlike discarded toenail clippings, every agent requires 
some quantity and quality of water to live any life at all. It is important to recognize that 
                                                          
89 If Locke’s proviso would be violated by appropriating all of the water in the world then it would also 
violate the proviso if one were to purchase all of the water in the world, knowingly or not. Nozick states, “if 
my appropriating all of a certain substance violates the Lockean proviso, then so does my appropriating 
some and purchasing all the rest from others who obtained it without otherwise violating the Lockean 
Proviso. If the proviso excludes someone’s appropriating all the drinkable water in the world, it also 
excludes his purchasing it all” (1974, 179). 
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in a case such as this, the proviso is not violated merely because some water is 
appropriated (recall Locke’s example above when one agent drinks from a river without 
worsening the situation of the next agent who endeavours to drink from the same river) 
but because all of the water is appropriated and this substance has a special relation to 
agents, one that cannot be easily substituted for another and, therefore, is bound to 
worsen the situation of others. 
It is crucial to recognize that the proviso can also be violated if an original 
acquisition combines with spontaneous natural events that, jointly, worsen the situation 
of others. To adapt one of Nozick’s (1974) examples, suppose I were to appropriate one 
of ten thousand watering holes in a desert and that, in the beginning, this appropriation 
does not worsen the situation of others one iota. While everyone is certainly affected by 
my appropriation, since they can no longer appropriate my specific watering hole, no 
one’s situation is immediately worsened by my owning the watering hole and therefore, 
the condition underlying Locke’s proviso is met. But suppose further that quite 
independent of my own activities, a natural disaster strikes post facto – well after I had 
appropriated my watering hole – and, mysteriously, all of the other watering holes in 
the desert except for mine dry up. In this case, my appropriation of the watering hole 
and the natural events combined to make water radically scarce and thus violate Locke’s 
proviso. As Nozick avows, the original process that would have normally given rise to a 
permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing – my watering 
hole in the desert – no longer applies since the situation of others has been worsened. 
Of course, not every event that worsens the situation of agents violates the 
proviso. The proviso is only violated when agents are harmed by specific causes. These 
causes are either the acquisition of unowned things or, as demonstrated in the foregoing 
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case, the acquisition of unowned things plus certain other natural events that combine 
to worsen the situation of others. This means that, for example, unassisted Nature 
cannot violate the Lockean Proviso. An agent’s situation will surely be worsened if he 
chooses to live as a hermit in the Negev desert and a natural disaster causes all of his 
water supply to evaporate. However, in this case, the condition underlying Locke’s 
proviso would still be met because no other agent’s appropriation caused the scarcity of 
water. No other agent’s appropriation caused the desert hermit’s situation to be 
worsened. For Locke’s proviso to be violated, the hermit’s situation must have been 
worsened by the activities of another, even if those activities are combined with natural 
events. 
Now that we have a better idea of what Locke’s proviso is and how it can be 
violated, what if any limits does it impose on buying and selling water? To my 
knowledge, free market environmental economists do not generally recognize any such 
limits. Some have argued that as water becomes increasingly scarce it should be 
privatized and subsequently bought and sold in the marketplace. For example, 
Anderson and Snyder (1997, 11) state, “private rights must be established to enable 
individuals acting in a market to determine water allocation.” Without explicitly 
recognizing limitations to buying and selling water, Anderson and Leal (2001, 105) 
argue that, “because [water] is a necessity of life … it must be entrusted to the discipline 
of markets that encourage conservation and innovation”. These authors maintain that 
the free market will distribute water like any other commodity: according to its most 
valued use. The market does this by efficiently allocating water to those who are willing 
and able to pay the most for it. Even in the aftermath of a terrible natural disaster, such 
as Hurricane Katrina, for example, some economists have defended the practise of price 
194 
  
gouging because charging a relatively high price for water in such urgent circumstances 
represents its scarcity and, moreover, such prices have beneficial consequences 
(Culpepper and Block 2008). As standard economic theory predicts, high prices will 
incentivize the owners of water to transport their water to the disaster zone and sell it, 
rather than choosing to sell it in a jurisdiction where the price is relatively low. This free 
market approach to distributing water treats water as an ordinary commodity and does 
not explicitly recognize any limits to buying and selling it. 
The problem with this line of reasoning is that water, or, at the very least, a 
specific quantity and quality of water, is not merely an ordinary commodity and there 
are moral limits to buying and selling it. Some instances of buying and selling water – 
for example, during a natural catastrophe – will violate the Lockean proviso in the same 
way that the proviso was violated in the example above, when I came to be the sole 
owner of the last watering hole in the desert through a combination of my original 
appropriation of water and the subsequent natural events that, together, caused water to 
become perilously scarce. In both of these cases, as the owner of water, if I were to 
prevent others from obtaining it by charging a high price or otherwise, then their 
situation would be worsened, not merely by the natural events that took place following 
my original appropriation, but by my appropriation plus the natural events that were 
beyond my control. 
While my claim is that some buying and selling water should not be permitted, it 
should also be recognized that the price of water on its own need not prevent others 
from acquiring it and, as a consequence, my claim that some water should not be bought 
and sold, even when water is extremely limited, is a qualified one. Suppose, for example, 
that in the case of a natural disaster the only water available is owned by a person who, 
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no matter what the circumstance, endeavours to sell it for a very low price – almost 
gratis. Suppose further that the price was so low that it prevented no one from actually 
using or obtaining it. In this case it would be difficult to sustain the claim that the 
situation of others was worsened by this benevolent owner’s appropriation of water 
combined with the subsequent natural events that caused the disaster and eventual 
scarcity of water. In other words, it would be difficult to sustain the claim that Locke’s 
proviso has been violated. In this special case, the grounds we had for blocking the sale 
of water – when its high price excludes other agents from accessing it – have been 
removed.90 But, of course, this is a fictional case. No theory predicts that owners will 
benevolently sell their water at a relatively low price when water is scarce and others 
need it for survival. On the contrary, economic theory predicts that, ceteris paribus, the 
opposite to be true: owners of water will sell their water at a relatively high price when it 
becomes increasingly scarce, even when others need it for their continued existence. 
This theoretical prediction alone is sufficient reason to underscore the moral limits of 
buying and selling water in those cases when others urgently need it. 
The proviso requires that buying and selling water in the marketplace is limited 
in some minimal sense.91 If water is radically scarce and such transactions exclude 
agents from obtaining it, they should be blocked. We have seen that the proviso can be 
violated when others are harmed by the original appropriation or by the appropriation 
combined with certain natural events. However, Nozick explains that there is an 
                                                          
90 By the term “sale” I mean the transfer of the possession of ownership or title of a good or property in 
exchange for money or some other commodity. 
91 There may be independent reasons against privatizing (and subsequently buying and selling) water tout 
court but my ambition here is more modest. The proviso does not require that no water is bought and 
sold. Since I am only concerned with the limits to buying and selling water required by the proviso I will 
suspend judgement on other possible limits that might be imposed on such transactions. 
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exceptional class of cases when the situation of others is worsened and the proviso is 
still not violated: when the agent who appropriates some object also compensates those 
who were harmed so that their situation is no longer worsened. To continue along with 
our example, in the case of water, any such compensation will have to be in-kind and 
involve a specific distribution: according to those whose situation has been worsened.92 
Is the free market expected to distribute water in this manner? If the market did 
distribute water to those whose situation has been worsened by the appropriations of 
others, then, for all intents and purposes, such a distribution would qualify as 
compensation and it would appear that Locke’s proviso would also remain intact. But 
the problem here is an obvious one. The market does not automatically distribute water 
to those whose situations have been worsened in order to safeguard Locke’s proviso. 
Rather, the market, as just mentioned, allocates scarce resources according to their most 
valued use, distributing them to those who are willing and able to pay for it. Therefore, 
the free market outcome is not likely to coincide with the outcome required to keep 
Locke’s proviso intact because it is unlikely that the specific agents who are willing and 
able to pay the most for water are not going to be the same agents who have been 
harmed and who need water to survive.93 
But what is one to make of the free market environmental economist’s argument 
that price gouging in a disaster zone signals and incentivizes the owners of water to 
                                                          
92 Why in-kind? I cannot be compensated post facto for a loss in some condition required for survival. It is 
worth noting that the owner of water might also have to be compensated in some sense. Consider the 
watering hole example above. Suppose it was only through great cost and effort that I maintained my 
watering hole while others did not and this was, in part, the reason why my watering hole was the last one 
that remained after the natural disaster. The process that originally gave me property rights in my 
watering hole might no longer obtain since it violates the proviso but given that I have incurred great cost 
to maintain my watering hole I would have claim to some reasonable compensation. 
93 Even if the free market were to distribute water according to its most valued use, such a distribution 
would not override those who have a claim not to be harmed by the appropriations of others. 
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transport and sell it to those in the disaster zone? Surely, this is a beneficial 
consequence of the free market, one that, given the dire circumstances, should be 
enthusiastically embraced. After all, who would object to transporting water to a 
disaster zone where there are agents in desperate need of it? While I do not deny that, 
on the whole, such activities would seem to have positive consequences, the point that I 
am making is that such consequences are not likely to prove sufficient for keeping the 
proviso intact and it is keeping the proviso intact that is our sole concern here. Why will 
the proviso be violated in this case? Water might be transported into a disaster zone 
because it bears a relatively high price, but once again, it is not likely to distribute water 
in the specific way that required by the proviso. What matters when it comes to Locke’s 
proviso is not merely the promise of transporting a large quantity of water to a disaster 
zone for the purpose of selling it, but ensuring that those agents who have had their 
situation worsened by the appropriation and subsequent natural events are 
compensated to such an extent that they are not worse-off from their baseline case. In 
short, the problem with the free market environmental economist’s line of reasoning 
when applied to water is that price gouging in a disaster zone, for example, does not, on 
its own, ensure the conditions underlying the proviso will be met. In other words, 
economically efficient outcomes do not require a specific distribution but when it comes 
to compensating individual agents who have been harmed by the original 
appropriations of others (in combination with certain natural events) Locke’s proviso 
does require a specific distribution. 
An alternative policy might be used to preserve the efficiency of the price system 
and incentivize the supply of water where it is needed the most: to make monetary 
transfers to “needy” individuals (those individuals whose situations have been 
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worsened). Under this arrangement, the monetary transfers could be used by such 
individuals for any purpose, including purchasing water in the marketplace. However, 
whether such a policy would help to leave the proviso intact remains an open question 
since monetary transfers to individuals in need of water are not identical to transfers of 
water in kind. If it were guaranteed that the individuals who received monetary 
transfers could thereby attain sufficient water so that the proviso is left intact, then our 
worry about violating the proviso would be alleviated. 
To summarize, this chapter began by arguing against Sagoff’s claim that natural 
capital and ecosystem services have no economic value. While Sagoff is right to argue 
that the price of any item does not merely depend upon its benefits to human agents, his 
argument also hinges on what I argued to be the contestable claim that all such items 
are, in some sense, plentiful. Moreover, Sagoff’s argument merely focuses on 
unimproved aspects of Nature, but the concept of natural capital denotes parts of nature 
that have been modified, restored, or managed by human agents as well. Therefore, even 
if Sagoff’s argument was sound, it would only show that some and not all of the items 
denoted by natural capital possess economic value. With the possibility that natural 
capital and ecosystem services could be for sale, this chapter then went on to consider 
the question of whether such items should be for sale. A generalized consequentialist 
position on the moral limits to markets was developed and, by using the example of 
some minimum quantity and quality of water, it was argued that, in desperate 
circumstances, when basic ecological goods are radically scarce, buying and selling them 
in the marketplace will almost certainly worsen the situation of others when compared 
to their baseline case and, therefore, such activities should be blocked. 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation began with the claim that, rather than depicting Nature as a 
collection of inert materials to be drawn upon by human agents and then subsequently 
used in technological forms of production, environmental economists have begun to 
depict the world as comprised of various unproduced means of production, such as 
ecosystems, that are generally found, rather than made, and then, in some cases, 
improved upon to serve human ends. In Chapter One, it was claimed that the clearest 
vision of this Garden Image of Nature was put forward by the evolutionary theorist 
Thomas Henry Huxley who, in his Evolution and Ethics, insisted that the world is 
divided by a wall. On one side this wall was the “State of Nature”, which contains all of 
those great works of Nature produced by non-human causes or what Huxley referred to 
as “the cosmic process”; on the other side of this wall was the “State of Art”, which 
contains all of those items that have been created and can only be sustained by 
mankind’s perpetual activities. This portrayal of the world as one that is divided into two 
separate realms is, today, difficult to sustain. The ideal state of affairs among a growing 
number of economists is to have every last ecosystem on Earth adapted to human wants 
and needs. Since this ideal entails that the whole world is to be managed for human 
ends, there is no longer any firm division between Huxley’s “State of Nature” and the 
“State of Art”. In other words, there is no wall in the Anthropocene.94 Just as Huxley’s 
                                                          
94 The term “Anthropocene” was first coined by the Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen in year 2000 to describe 
the current geological epoch that is characterized by the enormous role that human activity has for 
geological and ecological phenomena (Jones 2011). 
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student, H.G. Wells, had predicted in The Time Machine, the Earth has become, or is 
fast becoming, a kind of garden that consists of natural objects purposefully arranged 
and modified by intentional human agents in order to serve their own objectives. 
Chapter Two established criteria to distinguish natural capital from 
manufactured capital. It was claimed that natural capital has a dual nature and that the 
spatio-temporal particulars denoted by the concept of natural capital include objects 
that are capable of producing goods and services. Such objects are depletable, beneficial, 
original, and self-generative. Among these characteristics, the last two, original and self-
generative, drive a wedge between natural and manufactured capital. Since 
manufactured capital is always a produced means of production that depends on the 
savings decisions of economic agents, the members of this class are never original or 
wholly self-generative. In the latter half of this chapter it was claimed that, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, the “natural” and “artificial” are to be located along a 
spectrum or continuum, with the most natural objects being those that remain relatively 
detached from intentional human agency and the most artificial objects being those that 
have been built or constructed by intentional human agents. 
Chapter Three began by tracing the historical roots of the idea that Nature is a 
producer to the Swedish botanist Carl Linnaeus’ Oeconomia Naturae and the 
Physiocrats of France during the mid-eighteenth century. While this chapter probed the 
extent to which the Physiocrats, such as Quesnay, actually considered nature to be an 
independent producer, it was argued that the concept of natural capital is not entirely 
novel since there is a nascent category of the concept to be unearthed in the writings of 
classical political economists, such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx. 
When such economic theorists referred to the spontaneous productions of the Earth and 
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Nature’s natural products, they had a distinctive category of production in mind, one 
that denotes Nature’s independently generated products. Although this category was, on 
the whole, considered to be rather unimportant for economic science, it was 
acknowledged nonetheless and, therefore, can be recognized as a harbinger to the 
concept of natural capital. 
As detailed in Figure 1 (p. 8), one central difference between the Warehouse 
Image of Nature and the Garden Image of Nature is that the former takes the 
ecological conditions required for human economic activity as given while the latter 
does not. Chapter Four considered this difference when it answered what is perhaps the 
most vexing question concerning natural capital with respect to the social scientific 
approach to sustainable development: to what extent can manufactured capital serve as 
a substitute for natural capital? Can the entire stock of natural capital be depleted while 
meeting the goal of sustainable development, provided that it is supplanted with 
manufactured capital? It was shown that economists influenced by the life sciences, 
often referred to as ecological economists, have long argued that there is a subset of 
natural capital, critical natural capital, for which there are no substitutes. These 
economists argue that critical natural capital must be maintained for the goal of 
sustainability. The problem with this argument, however, is that, until now, no one had 
systematically explained what these special ecological conditions might be and why they, 
and not others, are essential for this purpose. To resolve this issue, this chapter 
introduced a new theory of what were termed “basic ecological goods” (BEGs). BEGs are 
distinct from ordinary goods in orthodox consumer choice theory because the former 
are objective ecological conditions that must be met for the continued existence of 
economic agents while the latter only ever yield subjective utility to economic agents. 
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This theory gave an account of the minimal ecological conditions required for the 
continued existence of economic agents and, therefore, sustainable development. The 
real upshot to this theory is that the conditions required for human economic activity 
are no longer shrouded in mystery as they were under the canopy of “critical natural 
capital”. 
Finally, Chapter Five, entitled, “No One Can Preserve Nature”, began by 
recognizing that the Garden Image of Nature would seem to involve domesticating 
every last ecosystem on Earth. 95  In response to this state of affairs, this chapter 
considered the preservation paradox, a paradox that is more familiar to environmental 
ethicists than to philosophers of economics. This paradox states that preserving or 
restoring Nature, when Nature is understood as that realm of phenomena beyond 
intentional human agency, is impossible since these activities necessarily involve human 
agency. Following established theories of artifacts, this chapter introduced criteria for 
turning natural objects into artifacts, and then argued that no one can preserve or 
restore nature or a part of nature without turning it into an artifact or, in the very least, 
making it more artificial than it would be otherwise. In other words, it was argued that 
the preservation paradox is warranted. 
What, if any, implications do the arguments of this dissertation have for the 
social science of economics? For one, with the concept of natural capital, the whole of 
                                                          
95 This image is very much in agreement with that held by the current Chief Scientist of the Nature 
Conservancy, Peter Kareiva. He states: “ours is a world of nature domesticated, albeit to varying degrees, 
from national parks to high-rise megalopolises. Facing this reality should change the scientific focus of 
environmental science. Instead of recounting doom-and-gloom statistics, it would be more fruitful to 
consider the domestication of nature as the selection of certain desirable ecosystem attributes, such as 
increased food production, with consequent alteration to other ecosystem attributes that may not be 
desirable. Under this paradigm, our challenge is to understand and thoughtfully manage the trade-offs 
among ecosystem services that result from the inescapable domestication of nature” (Kareiva et al. 2007, 
1). 
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nature is construed as a producer, or, more precisely, a collection of producers, that 
supply valuable goods and services to economic agents. In many cases, unlike instances 
of manufactured capital, instances of natural capital are available to human agents 
without cost. While some such productions are produced in a manner that is relatively 
detached from human agency, in many other cases, such production processes are 
improved with direct or indirect human intervention so as to ensure the continued 
production of goods and services. With the items denoted by the concept of natural 
capital, it should be apparent that there are substantial non-human causes operating as 
a source of economic phenomena and this observation is significant for economics from 
a historical point of view. 
As noted in Chapter One, Schabas (2005) has argued that the ascription of non-
human agency in economics has been on the wane since Mill. While Mill explicitly 
recognizes “nature’s agency” towards the very beginning of his monumental Principles 
of Political Economy ([1848] 2006), he repositions the core of phenomena studied by 
economists such that human agency is the proximate cause. Then, with the advent of 
neoclassical economics circa 1870, particularly the revolutionary works of William 
Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, and Léon Walras, virtually all economic phenomena are 
shown to derive from human deliberation alone. If Schabas is correct, then, for 
neoclassical economists, human agency has become the proximate cause of economic 
phenomena and, by this process, economic science has become increasingly 
“denaturalized” (a process that, Schabas claims, has never been completed). With 
natural capital denoting specific ecosystems that possess economic value, however, the 
science of economics might well be described as fast becoming “re-naturalized” in the 
specific sense that non-human agency is the proximate cause of an entire class of 
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economic phenomena, namely, ecosystem goods and services, that are to be studied and 
analyzed by economists. In other words, there is a class of readily consumable goods and 
services produced, not directly nor indirectly, by the hands of human beings, but by 
nature itself. With nature being ascribed the status of an economic producer, we might 
well side with Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations when he described the special case 
of agricultural production, affirming that “nature labours along with man.” Indeed, with 
the growing emphasis on the concept of natural capital among environmental 
economics, it would seem that both humans and nature produce goods and services.  
In some cases, nature endows human agents with production processes capable 
of producing goods and services autonomously, quite independent of human agency. In 
these cases, nature’s “natural machines” need no improvement or active modification 
since they satisfy humanity’s needs just as they are, without the need for direct human 
intervention. Because nature is not a perfect producer, however, not every instance of 
natural capital will be capable of producing autonomously in this way. In many other 
cases, instances of natural capital will require transmutation and improvement by 
human agents, with the expectation being that these improved production processes, 
which include items such as restored ecosystems, will continue to produce certain 
desired goods and services in the future.  
If unassisted nature were a faultless producer, then we would all be living in the 
Garden of Eden and there would be no need to toil about in the first place. This state of 
affairs would eliminate the need for human economic activity altogether and, therefore, 
economic science in toto. Indeed, it should be apparent that there are significant 
limitations to how economic theorists can possibly conceive of nature for the purpose of 
economic analysis. If nature is to be construed as a collection of processes that produce 
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goods and services for human agents, then it must also be construed as a collection of 
imperfect processes of production. 
Under the Garden Image of Nature, since every ecosystem with economic value 
is to be managed to serve human ends, one might well claim that, for the same reason 
that there is no (capital-N) Nature left on Earth, there is no natural capital either. 
Indeed, this statement appears to be bolstered by the conclusion reached in Chapter 
Five: even in the case of merely preserving parts of nature, they are made into artifacts 
or certainly more artificial than they would be otherwise. Such reasoning makes it 
appear that even if there are instances of natural capital that remain today there will be 
no such instances of natural capital in the near future since every item denoted by this 
concept will, ultimately, be arranged by either intentional human activity or the 
intentional omission of such activity. This conclusion, however, would be mistaken. 
Why? To reiterate, the concept of natural capital does not merely denote nature’s 
unassisted productions, but includes nature’s assisted productions as well. For instance, 
it includes all of those ecosystems that have been intentionally modified and improved 
by human agents as well. For this reason, one might maintain that while there may be 
no Nature left on Earth, in the sense that there is virtually no part of the surface of the 
Earth that remains completely unaffected by human agency, the number of items 
denoted by the concept of natural capital can still be expected to proliferate, not shrink. 
This is because the items denoted by the concept of natural capital do not have to be 
part of Nature.   
This dissertation has covered a lot of ground, but it has also left many 
unanswered questions on the topic of natural capital. One enormous topic, briefly 
alluded to in the present chapter is the question of how nature is and ought to be valued. 
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With the encroaching Garden Image of Nature, the ideal state of affairs not only 
involves systematically managing all of the Earth’s ecosystems, but it would also seem to 
involve managing them in a particular way: to maximize utility. 
There are two distinct issues here, neither of which has been analyzed in this 
dissertation. The first is the questionable activity itself of governing or dominating all of 
the Earth’s economically valuable ecosystems, including those processes that came into 
existence in a manner that is relatively detached from human agency. One might 
certainly question whether this reputed ideal, captured by the Garden Image of Nature, 
is actually an ideal, or, whether it is even desirable. Chapter Five made clear that J.S. 
Mill would certainly have questioned the desirability of this state of affairs. Once again, 
Mill states: 
 
Nor is there much satisfaction in contemplating the world with nothing left 
to the spontaneous activity of nature; with every rood of land brought into 
cultivation, which is capable of growing food for human beings; every 
flowery waste or natural pasture ploughed up, all quadrupeds or birds 
which are not domesticated for man’s use exterminated as his rivals for 
food, every hedgerow or superfluous tree rooted out, and scarcely a place 
left where a wild shrub or flower could grow without being eradicated as a 
weed in the name of improved agriculture ([1848] 2006, 756). 
 
In addition to Mill’s worry about eliminating all of the spontaneous productions of the 
Earth, one might also ask whether it is right for one species – Homo sapiens – to 
dominate all of the others in this way. The second issue here is the putative moral 
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principle used to guide such activities. It is one thing to decide on whether to manage 
the Earth’s ecosystems for the benefit of human agents and their interests, but it is quite 
another to decide on the principle to direct such activities. On the whole, neoclassical 
environmental economists take it for granted that the best state of affairs is to maximize 
utility. The problem here is that, when it comes to managing nature or parts of nature, 
and not merely (traditional) economic phenomena, this principle may turn out to be 
inappropriate or unsuitable. Because both of these issues, the questionable activity of 
managing the items denoted by the concept of natural capital and the principle used to 
guide such activities, are not merely the subject matter of environmental economics but 
environmental ethics and environmental philosophy as well, I suspect that any 
satisfactory resolution to them will require contributions from all three of these 
disciplines. 
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